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ABSTRACT
CRITERIA IN CRISIS: MODERNIST, POSTMODERNIST,
AND FEMINIST CRITICAL PRACTICES
FEBRUARY 1999
MARY ANN SUSHINSKY, B.A. KENT STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
I examine a problem or dilemma of legitimation faced by the critical
theorist who takes as the object of his or her critique a totality of which
she or he is a part. The dilemma is that the theorist must either
illegitimately exempt her critical theory from the determining influences of
the totality or lose normative authority. The critics I examine in detail are:
Adorno and Horkheimer; Kant; Hegel; feminist standpoint epistemologists,
in particular, Sandra Harding; Irigaray; Foucault; and Arendt.
I conclude that a purely theoretical or epistemic ground for the
legitimacy of totalizing critique is impossible; philosophical critique must
involve an extra-rational faith or a political commitment. However, I also
argue that the project of theoretical grounding should not be abandoned. I
continue this project by drawing out of the critical theorists I examined
some preliminary concepts and strategies (such as mimesis, hysteria, free
action, and psychoanalytic practice) that may, after further development,
serve to provide a theory of the legitimacy of critical philosophy.
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CHAPTER I
THE CRISIS OF REASON AND THE DILEMMA OF CRITIQUE
According to Gilles Deleuze, "Philosophy is at its most positive as
critique. I agree. Certainly a critical attitude toward received views has
been a moving force behind much of the philosophical thought of the
entire western tradition in philosophy
.
2
In this dissertation, I will focus
more specifically on critique as it has been manifest in the modern
period. This is not because I fail to recognize the critical attitude and
method inherent in the philosophies of the Ancients (especially Socrates
and Plato, whose reliance on the distinction between reality and
appearance informed all of their philosophical thought), but because the
modern period in philosophy, in its unique preoccupation with questions
of methodology and epistemology, can be seen as offering self-conscious
and sophisticated reflection upon the capacities and problems of critique
itself. Furthermore, the modern period in philosophy can be seen to differ
from a premodern philosophical Weltanschauung in its extension of the
powers of critical reason to all spheres of human functioning, including
those areas of life which the premodern tradition had left to the authority
lilies Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy . (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983), page106.
2 For a study which focuses on critique as fundamental to philosophical
thought throughout the tradition, where it has been instantiated in various
analyses of alienation, see Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination, (New
York: George Braziller, 1973).
1
of religious and political institutions. 3 Modern philosophers threw off the
yoke of authority and insisted upon autonomously exercising their own
critical faculties in order to gain scientific (i.e., systematic, certain,
reliable) knowledge and to determine practical questions about society,
politics and law, and ethics. 4 Motivating the critical philosophies of
Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, to name a few, has been the assumption
that knowledge could be achieved only by means of a process of critical
inquiry. The most prominent voices of philosophical modernity have taken
up the task of revealing received views, traditional practices, and
institutions to be illegitimate.
There is another reason that I am concerned with modernity's
employment of critique. Many prominent philosophers have argued that
the modern period is coming to an end. 5 This state of affairs gives rise to
3The 18th century Enlightenment was known for this confident extension of
reason in the rise of modern science and in bourgeois political revolutions.
4Kant's famous three questions— 'What can I know?,' 'What ought I to do?,'
'What can I hope?' can be seen to incorporate this attitude of critical autonomy
in all spheres.
5Many philosophers have recently either made this claim or attempted to
explore its legitimacy. See, for example, Jean Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern
Condition for the paradigm statement. According to Lyotard, the basic
characteristic of postmodernity is a lack of faith in "metanarratives," or large-
scale theories which purport to explain all of physical or social reality (e.g.,
Marxism, Christianity, Psychoanalysis). I am, for the moment, leaving the
question as to whether there is a qualitative difference between modernity and
postmodernity open. I do believe that a large number of current thinkers seem
to have a more cynical view of the value and capabilities of reason to improve
the general quality of human life than did most thinkers of even a century ago.
Whether it would be reasonable to draw a sharp distinction, however, between
modernism and postmodernism on this point, I tend to doubt. (Would we have
2
an apparent paradox. For it is by making use of various forms of the
concept of critique that the so called "post-modern" thinkers are claiming
to have transcended, surpassed, outgrown, or deconstructed
philosophical modernity. Critique therefore appears to be one modern
concept which has transgressed the boundaries of its place of origin and
to have survived the "paradigm shift" out of philosophical modernity and
into post-modernity. Thus, the concept of critique itself entails paradox,
for it is both immanently embedded in the tradition to which it applies
itself, and at the same time, as critical of that tradition, it transcends its
place of origin to become something else . 6 What is this "something else"
that critique has become? Are there vestiges of its modernist (and
perhaps even earlier) origin involved in its current uses, and if so, why
are these vestiges not repudiated along with the critique and repudiation
of other aspects of modernist reasoning? This paradox suggests the need
to subject the concept of philosophical critique itself to critical scrutiny.
Toward this end, I would like to examine a basic dilemma or problem
to classify Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as postmodernists, for they were hardly
optimistic about the status quo?) I rather believe (somewhat like Habermas) that
there is a more gradual trend of deepening skepticism going on which is an
(dialectical) evolution out of the past deployment of critique and the
strengthening of reason's autonomy. I intend to clarify this issue more in the
dissertation.
6
I borrow the terms "immanent" and "transcendent" from the existential
phenomenologists, especially Merleau-Ponty, who use these terms to describe
the structure of human consciousness which is both embedded in the world and
able to gain the perspective of distance upon it.
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which is engendered by the attempt at critique, with a view toward
determining whether the currently employed strategies or forms of
critique are successful in escaping the problems which it, itself, has
identified in the traditional modern uses of the concept.
In this first chapter, I will describe the larger problem of the crisis
of reason, specifically as it pertains to the paradoxical structure of
critique, and elaborate the consequent dilemma facing the critical
theorist. I then intend to examine this dilemma as it is exemplified in
Adorno and Horkheimer's critical analysis of Enlightenment rationality.
The Crisis of Reason
The basic problematic of critique can be seen as (in my view) an
important— in fact, the most significant— aspect of what has commonly
been referred to as the "crisis of reason ." 7 Ironically, it has been the work
of modernist critique itself which has been responsible for the current
crisis in which, I am arguing, it too is implicated. For it has been the
modern uncovering of the various aspects of reason's lack of "purity"
and autonomy which has also rendered dubious critical thought's
capacity to pass judgement on the legitimacy of others. This modernist
7 See, for example, Sabina Lovibund, "Feminism and the 'Crisis of
Rationality' New Left Review , no. 207, September/October, 1994; Elizabeth
Grosz, "Bodies and Knowledges: Feminism and the Crisis of Reason," in
Feminist Epistemologies , edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, (New
York: Routledge, 1993).
4
trend is easily recognized in the increasingly accepted idea that thought is
always "situated" in and conditioned by extra-mental factors. This
modern development can plausibly be seen as starting from the extreme
isolation of reason, (supposedly) accomplished in the radical abstraction
from the concrete, empirical, and bodily of Descartes' ego cogito, and
ending with all of the ways in which "pure reason" has increasingly come
to be seen as compromised by its dependence upon historical, social,
economic, political, bodily, or unconscious phenomena. This development
was particularly acute in nineteenth century thought, in the Hegelian
stress on reason as historical, and in the culmination of this trend in the
work of the "philosophers of suspicion ," 8 Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud.
Twentieth century philosophers have thus found it less and less
defensible to assume reason to be operating autonomously, and today's
critical theorists, from the Frankfurt School to feminist critics, continue
to alert us to the ways in which our basic structuring concepts and
categories have been shaped by human institutions and embodied
experiences. On the Anglo-Analytic side of the theoretical field, the now
classic work of such thinkers as Quine, in deconstructing the
analytic/synthetic distinction, and Kuhn, in demonstrating the social
influences shaping scientific theories, contributes to this development by
questioning the very idea of beliefs whose truth is a product of necessary
8 This phrase is commonly attributed to Paul Ricoeur.
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reasoning and therefore beyond the reaches of skeptical scrutiny. It is
hardly necessary to run through a detailed litany of the modern and post-
modern work which tends to show the situated nature of thought and
reason.
The point which I have chosen as a clearly visible instance of the
accomplishment of the limiting of the capacity of critical reason, in
response to the application of critique to itself (a self-reflexive
procedure), is the critique of Kant, whose valiant attempt to chisel "pure
reason out its mired predicament within the empiricist epistemology, by
means of the use of the scalpel of critique, serves as a classic
demonstration of the paradoxical position in which critical philosophers
continue to find themselves. I believe that the "transcendental ideality"
of Kant's basic ontology set the stage for further considerations of the
manner and extent of the human contribution to the construction of the
very object of knowledge. With the "thing-in-itself" cast irretrievably out
of cognitive bounds, it was only a short step to a renewed problematizing
of the status of knowledge. If the object of knowledge is in all cases a
product of mental activity enacted upon a sensible manifold, is it not
possible that that mental activity could be otherwise? Thus, at least
some thinkers have proposed that the possibility of "alternative
conceptual frameworks" begins with Kant. Kant's sophisticated and
subtle arguments succeeded in making a form of idealism an inevitable
6
consequence of continuing to believe in the possibility of scientific
objectivity itself. Furthermore, Kant’s analysis of the workings of the
mechanisms of perception, cognition, and reflection begins with our
first-order encounter with sense-data, thus demonstrating that our
mental functioning is conditioned (by both empirical and transcendental
factors) from the ground up, so that cognitive experience can never be
entirely "pure.” Kant therefore "saved" natural scientific objectivity only
by reinterpreting its nature. To ground cognition and knowledge in a
transcendental ego, which itself cen never be on object of knowledge
,
casts aspersions on the instrument of critical knowledge itself and cannot
be completely satisfying to the skeptic. The door is thereby further
opened by Kant for a wide variety of attempted proposals regarding the
actual ground and source of "knowledge," and the degree of "objectivity"
which we are able to attain.
The idea of "pure thinking" has by now been questioned in all
areas of human cognitive endeavor from natural science (e.g., Kuhn,
Feyerabend, Harding, Keller, Haraway), to social science (e.g., sociology
of knowledge and ideology critique), to logic and abstract reasoning (e.g.,
Nye, Lloyd, Godelier, Sohn-Rethel), to moral reasoning (Gilligan), down to
the primary level of perception (e.g., Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology,
phenomenological psychology). It seems that in our functioning as
thinking beings we are variously anchored to and determined by the body
7
(Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Bordo), the unconscious (psychoanalytic
theory), material economic activity (Marx), lived experience (Husserl),
language (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, ordinary language
philosophy), and political power (Foucault), to name just a few of the
proposed grounds of thought. This far-reaching and varied philosophical
development paves the way for viewing all beliefs and intellectual
activity— critique included— as ultimately grounded not in universal laws
of purely autonomous reason, but elsewhere.
The Structure of Critique and the Critic s Dilemma
The crisis of reason, as it more specifically pertains to critique,
takes the following form. Critique requires a perspective which
transcends the object of critique, but which, in a significant class of
cases, cannot account for itself, and must be considered illegitimate.
Ironically, the transcendent-critical perspective is illegitimate only in cases
where the critical theory is held to be universal in scope. Thus, theorists
who argue that all perspectives— including that of critical reason — are
determined by the object of their critique (e.g. socio-ideological
institutions such as patriarchy, material-economic arrangements, libidinal
economies, neural-chemical processes, linguistic practices, or whatever is
seen as the determining totality) face the dilemma of either exempting
their own theoretical pronouncements from critical scrutiny or admitting
8
that the theories they offer are also relative to the structure of
domination that they have found. For this type of theorist, any degree of
transcendence or self-exemption from the determining constraints of that
which s/he is criticizing constitutes an illegitimate move which threatens
to contradict the critical claims that all consciousness (or subjectivity, or
agency), is determined by the totality, a claim which is precisely the
fundamental point of the critical theory. Those critical theorists who do
not respect this prohibition are subject to charges of pragmatic self-
contradiction and self-refutation
.
9 But unless the critical claims are more
universal in scope, unless the critical philosopher can justify a more
comprehensive vision than that which s/he is criticizing, the force and
legitimacy, the epistemic or moral superiority, of the critique is
unfounded. As Richard Bernstein explains, "Critique always presupposes
some ideal in the name of which we engage in critique — however we
9 The basic form of this argument that charges self-refutation is quite clearly
exposited in Hilary Putnam's Reason. Truth and History
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), as a refutation of relativism. Putnam traces the
argument to Plato, so it's clear that it has been around for quite some time.
Some contemporary uses of this same argument can be found in Jurgen
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity , trans., Frederick
Lawrence, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) where he uses the argument against,
most strikingly, Derrida, but others as well, including Adorno; Thomas
McCarthy, (see "The Politics of the Ineffable," Philosophical Forum . v.XXI, Nos.
1-2, Fall-Winter, 1989-90, pp. 146-1 68, for a discussion of self-refutation,
again, with respect to Derrida; and Charles Taylor, ("Foucault on Freedom and
Truth," Foucault: A Critical Reader , editor, David Couzens Hoy, (New York:
Basil Blackwell, 1986), which offers a critique of Foucault along these lines.
9
conceive of this ideal and whatever status we claim for it ." 10 Thus, there
can be no such thing as totally immanent critique
.
11
Self-critique is in
every case the critique of one aspect of a whole by another which is
transcendent to the object of critique because it claims a greater degree
of participation in the value or values in the name of which the critique is
being conducted. Similarly, what Seyla Benhabib calls "defetishizing
critique, critique which simply lays out alternative possibilities to a belief
or practice, without arguing for the moral or epistemic superiority of the
alternative, entails an appeal to transcendent values, since to see a belief
as limited in scope due to the fact that there is an alternative of equal
value or plausibility presupposes an act of transcendence out of the
particular belief structure which had previously appeared to be universal
in scope, as well as a commitment to the superior value of a more
10Richard Bernstein, "Metaphysics, Critique, Utopia," Review of
Metaphysics . December, 1988, page 257.
n The Frankfurt School example of "immanent critique" will be discussed in
depth below in Chapter One of the dissertation. In short, my argument will be
that although Adorno and Horkheimer recognize their necessary immanence to
the Enlightenment rationality that they are attempting to critique, it is this very
immanence which ultimately prevents their success. Although Adorno and
Horkheimer recognize the dialectical reciprocity of the progressive and
regressive aspects of Enlightenment, their critical practice is an attempt to make
use of and extend the progressivity, in order to identify and eliminate the
regressive and barbaric elements. However, insofar as immanence can be
maintained, the repressive elements cannot be left behind. See Theodore
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , translated by John
Cumming, (New York: Continuum, 1986).
10
comprehensive view, i.e., the view which encompasses both alternatives,
as opposed to the view which sees only one possibility. 12
The necessary elements of critique consist both of a recognition of
a problem or crisis in the object of critique, and the application of, or
appeal, to an ideal standard or criterion according to which the critical
object can be judged and found wanting. This analysis of critique is lent
support by the word's etymological connection to both the terms
'criterion' and 'crisis'. 13 One way of understanding the dilemma of
critique is to see these two aspects as in conflict. In order to recognize
the crisis, the critic must have an insight of the deficiency of the object
which entails the employment of a criterion; however, if the criterion has
been engendered out of the totality which is in crisis (as is the case of
the critics of modernity, or of reason), the criterion should not be relied
upon. However, if the critic turns her critical skepticism on the criterion
itself, s/he ends up without any normative standard, and without any
means for making critical distinctions.
12Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia , (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986).
13
AII three terms, 'critique', 'criterion', and 'crisis' come from the Greek,
'krisis' and 'krinein', which mean 'to choose, separate, divide, judge, discern'.
Both Benhabib and Bernstein comment on the connection of 'critique' with
’crisis' but fail to mention the equally significant connection with 'criterion'. See
Benhabib, Ibid., page19, and Bernstein, Ibid., page 257.
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The Epistemological Form of the Dilemma
This problem or dilemma of critique is the same problem as that
which is manifest in modern epistemology as the well-known "problem of
the criterion or dilemma of epistemology." The epistemological form of
the dilemma of critique is that what we possess at the start of any
inquiry into the nature of knowledge cannot be assumed to be true, but
merely apparent, knowledge. We have, as yet, no standards or criteria by
means of which to distinguish knowledge from the false claims to
knowledge. That some criterion is needed if certain knowledge is to be
obtained has been a standard philosophical position since Plato, whose
"paradox of learning" in the Meno is resolved by recourse to a "myth"
( i - e
. ,
the "myth of recollection") which denies the possibility of a state of
absolute ignorance. 14 On this account, we necessarily presuppose criteria
which distinguish true knowledge from a false claim to knowledge. In
other words, we, in some sense, always already know what knowledge
is, and, furthermore, we have no choice but to trust that our
presuppositions are legitimate.
But with the "epistemological turn" of modern philosophy, an
appeal to an irrational and unexplained ground of knowledge was
14As I will argue in Chapter 2, Hegel's solution is similar to Plato's in that he
too denied that total ignorance can ever be the starting place of coming to
know. Rather, for Hegel true knowledge or science exists from the beginning in
the simplest, most naive pose of consciousness. The criteria for knowledge are
therefore necessarily present within the first acquaintance of consciousness
with its object.
12
considered inadequate. The question and status of the criterion was then
taken up with renewed vigor. Descartes' solution to this problem was to
attempt to obtain a truth of which he could be certain, and then to
deduce from that instance of knowledge its distinguishing features,
which he then inferred to be the sufficient conditions for its certainty.
The epistemic marks by means of which Descartes concluded that he
could be certain of the truth of his instance of knowledge were nothing
other than the clarity and distinctness with which his insight impressed
itself upon him. Thus, Descartes believed that he had wrested the criteria
of knowledge from an indubitable instance of knowledge, and thereby
solved the problem. But it can be easily argued that this solution is
illegitimate. Descartes must have presupposed his criteria from the outset
in order to have recognized the cogito as true on the basis of its clarity
and distinctness. For if not (echoing Meno), how could he know that he
knew? And if so, how could he claim to be starting from scratch?
A clear model of the epistemological form of critique can be seen
in the early modern period's rival epistemologies. What is seldom noticed
in discussions of rationalism and empiricism is that each of these
foundationalist epistemologies is also a theory of critique, as a theory of
how to distinguish real from merely apparent knowledge or false belief.
Each theory of knowledge offers a critique of received opinion; each
offers a method to avoid being duped by false claims to knowledge.
13
Rationalism assumes that knowledge is a whole (Descartes' "tree of
knowledge") based ultimately on self-evident intuitions immediately
present before the mind's eye." Critique is, on this view, a process of
checking knowledge claims against the touchstone of intuitive self-
evidence, rejecting those claims that don't measure up. Empiricism, on
the other hand, measured knowledge claims against the incorrigibility of
sensory evidence. What characterizes foundationalist styles of critique,
as such, is the employment of values or criteria which are held to be
absolute or transcendent to the crisis in the object of critique. The criteria
are held secure during the critique and exercise a normative role over that
which they are used to legitimate. But the failures of rationalism and
empiricism illustrate the impossibility of holding the normative criteria
exempt from the operation of critique. Rationalism, in attributing
legitimacy only to the transcendent component of the knowledge
equation, resulted in a circular system which excluded an openness to
new knowledge which could be derived from experience. Thus, Descartes
was compelled to introduce the "deus ex machina" of God in order to
allow for the possibility of warranted knowledge of the external world.
Empiricism, on the other hand, resulted in a skepticism about such
pragmatically necessary and taken-for-granted fundamental concepts as
the existence of the self. Furthermore, when taken to its logical extreme,
as with Berkeley and Hume, belief in the existence of even the material
14
world (empiricism s alleged strong suit) was seen to be unjustified. Thus,
the early epistemologies, in claiming to have found ways to exempt their
criteria for knowledge from critical skepticism resulted in crippled and
one-sided systems, which failed to be able to legitimate instances of
knowledge that they needed. Thus, there was a logical movement from
foundationalist critique, which employs universal and necessary or
indubitable standards, to immanent critique, which recognizes the
impossibility of exempting the standards themselves from the need for
critical scrutiny.
Critique as Practical/Political
It should be evident that there is a purely epistemological aspect to
the problem or dilemma of critique, for as I have stated above, the critic
must have knowledge of, or insight into, a crisis or problem in the object
of critique. In this way, the dilemma of critique parallels the
epistemological problem of the criterion. But there is also a practical-
ethical aspect to the problem of critique, for critique is an activity and
behavior, and not merely an ideational state. This way of viewing critique
is similar to seeing it on the model of what the Ancient Greeks called a
"techne," a purposive human activity, a craft, or a skill. According to the
Greek analysis, every techne is characterized by three aspects: its aim or
goal, the object upon which it operates, and the method or knowledge
15
which accounts for its success. 15 We have thus far been discussing the
nature of the critical method. What, then, is the goal or aim of critique?
The modern period in philosophy can be seen as the quest for certainty.
This desire, motivated historically in large part by the successes of
natural science and the clash between scientific and religious beliefs,
gave rise to an increased attention on the part of philosophers to
questions of method. 16 The profound distrust of received views
engendered by the scientific refutation of much Church teaching in the
early modern period, led to the requirement that method offer a way to
adjudicate between conflicting knowledge claims. Hence, method was
required to be critical. But it was not knowledge, merely for its own sake,
that the critic desires. As we have already seen with Descartes, the
epistemic certainty toward which the critic aims is in the service of her
desire for autonomy and freedom from externally imposed domination by
the authorities of religion, tradition, and power. Furthermore, critique
aims to motivate change (in beliefs, policies, institutions, or actions) on
the part of others. Thus critique always has an agenda to change
consciousness, and frequently behavior, and in this respect critique has
15See, for example, Plato's Gorgias, translated by Donald J. Zeyl,
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987).
16
ln fact, epistemology as a discipline can be seen to have begun as late as
the Nineteenth Century as a reflection on modern scientific success; see George
Canguilhem, Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988), page 1.
16
been an important motor of philosophical and political development, as
well as a fundamental way in which thought relates to "real life," or
theory to praxis. It is therefore these practical-ethical values-freedom,
autonomy, and justice which may be seen to be the deeper motivation
for acts of philosophical critique.
There is also another sense in which critique is inherently action
rather than merely thought. All critique participates in the ethical-political
realm of life, for critique is fundamentally an act of resistance—
a
rejection of illegitimate authority and an exercise of the critic's
autonomy— which at the same time establishes and enlarges the
conditions for that autonomy and freedom
.
17 This feature of critique is
evident in Descartes' epistemological work, in its self-consciously
revolutionary rejection of all previous authority, but it should be
recognized as an essential feature of all forms of critique as well. Insofar
as authentic critique is possible, it must contain a transcendent
moment— a moment which is original and free from determination. This
original critical moment installs the critic at a distance from the object of
critique, and is, therefore, responsible for the normativity and authority of
the critique. Critique is thus essentially free action, as well as an instance
of theory. This aspect of critique— critique as free action — can therefore
17This same aspect of critique would allow us to characterize it as an
"ontological event," in the Heideggerian sense. Critique brings freedom into
being. (Although I am not claiming that critique is the only way in which
freedom comes into being.)
17
also be seen to be an instance of what Hannah Arendt calls "the
political ." 18 For Arendt, the basic existential category of the political is
"natality," which is the spontaneous act of beginning anew. Philosophical
critics, in their rejection of received opinion and authority, inaugurate a
new beginning, thereby establishing their own freedom and a space for
its exercise.
It follows that the object upon which the activity of philosophical
critique is performed will be beliefs, or apparent and untested knowledge
claims
.
19 Furthermore, the most forceful instances of critique will apply
not only to beliefs which we in fact hold, but to those which we are in
principle capable of holding, and thus will be concerned with the
conditions for the possibility of knowledge and belief (e.g., our minds,
reason, language, principles of justice or knowledge, social and political
institutions and practices). Thus, even apparently "purely philosophical"
(and not just obviously "political") critics — those who take the
philosophical tradition, knowledge, metaphysics, or the faculty of reason
18Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: university of Chicago
Press, 1958) and The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1971). I will discuss Arendt's conception of political freedom and its relevance
to philosophical critique in Chapter 5 of the dissertation.
19When we perform philosophical critique upon socio-political institutions or
practices with the aim of gaining knowledge, it is perhaps more accurate to say
that the object of our critique is the belief in the legitimacy of the institution or
practice.
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itself as the objects of their critiques-are engaged in political action, and
function to engender change.
This aspect of critique
— critique as praxis— must not be lost sight
of, for it is frequently the ethical-political dimension of critique to which
we turn when seeking justification and grounds for the critique. Thus at
the end of Descartes' epistemological inquiry, the theoretical certainty
which grounds his post-critical knowledge of the external world rests on
faith rather than reason, for this certainty is underwritten, according to
Descartes, by none other than the hand of God. Similarly, Plato's solution
to the epistemological problem of the Meno turned to the plane of
practice, wherein the possibility of knowledge was practically
demonstrated, rather than rationally argued, by the tutorial with the
slave . 20
20We can also see the practical/political aspect of critique to be at play in
other Platonic dialogues. Socrates, in the Gorgias, claims "I am the true
politician," for he saw his work, indeed he saw philosophy, to be a political,
rather than a theoretical enterprise. Furthermore, this view of the
Socratic/Platonic dialectic allows for an understanding of the functional
significance of the frequent use of myth in the dialogues. Myths are used as an
alternative to purely rational or theoretical means for causing the ideational and
behavioral changes in interlocutors, listeners, and readers which were the
frequent goal of the dialogue. Furthermore, as we have already seen above,
with Meno, myth often functions as an alternative to theory as a ground for the
possibility of the critique.
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The Dilemma as a Dialectic of Theory and Practice
But as we have seen above, this transcendent and normative
aspect of critique is precisely that which is seen to be in crisis according
to the dilemma of critique. To ground the legitimacy of critique in its
ethical-practical nature as free action falls sway to the dilemma, for the
kind of fundamental critique with which we are concerned is necessarily
critical of the very possibility of free action. Yet when we seek
theoretical grounding and legitimation for our critical activities in theory
rather than action, we are again brought to the same quagmire, for
thought which cannot be considered above the taint of illegitimate
influence and determination cannot prove human freedom to be possible.
The question of grounding then seems to falter on this choice between
the practical and theoretical, with both aspects giving way to each other,
and neither being sufficient.
The dilemma of critique is a dilemma of grounding or justification.
It can be seen as one mode of the expression of a deep-lying
philosophical dualism. Dick Howard identifies the dilemma in its most
general form as the choice between two explanatory
concepts— normativity and genesis . 21 According to Howard, all of our
explanatory attempts appeal to one or the other principle. Yet appeal to
21 Dick Howard, From Marx to Kant . (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1985) and The Politics of Critique . (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1 988).
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one without the other is not possible, for they require each other;
normativity grounding genesis, and vice versa. The bipolar and
ambiguous structure of critique, as I have been here developing it, can
also be viewed in light of this opposition, for the critic's criteria and
insight are engendered out of the totality which s/he is critiquing, yet
these criteria must claim to have normative force over that very totality.
This general opposition or dichotomy, according to Howard, has taken
various forms in the history of theory: the split between theory and
practice, critique and criticism, and philosophy and politics, among them.
Howard argues that the dilemma is necessary and that each explanatory
pole is irreducible to the other. Thus political action requires philosophical
grounding, and vice versa. If Howard is correct, then there can be no
solution to the dilemma of critique. Our attempts to critique the totalities
that spawn our very ability to critique must be seen as theoretically
without ground. But before giving up on the possibility of theoretically
justified critique, there are instances of global critique which must be
examined. I will begin with a classic instance of a critique which
struggled self-consciously with the problem of normativity and genesis,
or transcendence and immanence, and which claimed to have found a
way of achieving transcendent normativity by means of maintaining
immanence — the critique of Adorno and Horkheimer.
21
The Critique of Enlightenment
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, Enlightenment is
"totalitarian," in that it encompasses all thought and language which may
be used to refer to and to criticize it . 22 Their attempt to elude this trap of
enlightened reason entails their belief in reason's own ability to purge
itself of those barbarous elements which do not measure up to its own
standards. Thus they engage in "immanent" critique, hoping to extend
the non-dominating, non-oppressive elements of reason, while leaving
behind the tendencies toward oppression. Although I will argue that it is
not possible to eliminate completely the oppressive aspects of
enlightened reason, I intend to follow Adorno and Horkheimer in an
attempt to broaden and transform the concept of reason itself, in a way
which may serve to liberate some of what reason has previously denied
and suppressed. This possibility arises from the uncovering by Adorno
and Horkheimer of reason's necessary involvement with myth, magic,
and mimesis. They show that myth and reason are not completely
separable from one another, nor are they essentially different, but are
rather dialectically identical, the one giving way to the other, and the
one, as they demonstrate through a reading of Homer, "expounding and
elucidating" the other . 23 Both mimesis and rationality embody an attitude
22Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment .
23Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 46.
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of domination over nature, but perhaps it is possible that myth and
mimesis contain something else, as well, that can serve as a glimpse of
liberatory redemption
.
24
Adorno and Horkheimer write in the introduction to the Dialectic of
Entigh tenmen t:
We are wholly convinced — and therein lies our petitio
principii—\ha\ social freedom is inseparable from enlightened
thought. Nevertheless, we believe that we have just as clearly
recognized that the notion of this very way of thinking, no less
than the actual historic forms-the social institutions— with which
it is interwoven, already contains the seed of the reversal
universally apparent today. If enlightenment does not
accommodate reflection on this recidivist element, then it seals its
own fate. If consideration of the destructive aspect of progress is
left to its enemies, blindly pragmatized thought, loses its
transcending quality and, its relation to Truth . 25
But just how is this required reflection upon its own regressive elements
possible? Adorno and Horkheimer are quite aware of the paradoxical
nature of this task, yet they attempt it anyway. How is it that they see
the regressive aspects of enlightened thought to be identifiable and
eliminable by enlightenment thinking itself? "Social freedom," they argue,
requires enlightened thought, yet enlightened thought "contains the seed
24My discussion of this point will foreshadow my attempts in later chapters
to sketch some new critical concepts and theoretical tools and to explore their
use by more recent (especially feminist) thinkers.
25Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page xiii.
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of its reversal." What exactly do Adorno and Horkheimer understand by
the concept of enlightenment?
For Adorno and Horkheimer, 'enlightenment' refers to a type of
reasoning and not just to the Western historical period (Eighteenth
Century European culture) which is considered to be the apotheosis of
this type of thinking . 26 Enlightenment is seen as constituting the basic
cognitive orientation of the entire Western tradition of philosophical
thought, beginning with the emergence of reason out of supposedly pre-
rational myth . 27 The project of enlightenment, according to Adorno and
Horkheimer, is the "disenchantment of the world" and the elimination of
fear by means of the increase in knowledge. The attitude inculcated by
this knowledge is patriarchal, one of domination and sovereignty over
nature, while the essence of this thought is technology, or the ability to
manipulate, control and change nature. According to Adorno and
Horkheimer,
Bacon's view was appropriate to the scientific attitude that
prevailed after him. The concordance between the mind of man
and the nature of things that he had in mind is patriarchal: the
26See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas ,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), page148. Also see Martin Jay,
The Dialectical Imagination . (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).
27
lf this is the case, then postmodernity, if successful in transcending and
rendering illegitimate modernity's concepts of reason and rational values, must
also be seen as a critical overcoming of the entire western tradition. Indeed,
some so called "post-modern" critical philosophers do see themselves as having
gone beyond the metaphysical totality— e.g., Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida.
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human mind, which overcomes superstition, is to hold sway over
a disenchanted nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no
obstacles:
. . . Technology is the essence of this knowledge
.
28
But don't Adorno and Horkheimer themselves bring a
technological, instrumental and patriarchal posture to their inquiry? They
attempt to learn the essence of enlightenment, so that they may develop
a strategy for the fulfillment of its positive goals, and the elimination of
its defects. "The accompanying critique of enlightenment is intended to
prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment which will release
it from entanglement in blind domination ." 29 The critique of
enlightenment is carried out for the intended purpose of furthering
enlightenment. This purposiveness of the critique is thus already
suspiciously entangled with the object of the critique. The outstanding
characteristic of enlightenment thought is its Baconian instrumental
power, its tendency and ability to manipulate, dominate, and put to use
its object. Since critique is necessarily purposive and instrumental, it too
must be considered an instance of, what is in this case, its object. Thus,
instrumentality per se cannot be totally repudiated and transcended by
Adorno and Horkheimer, unless they are likewise to repudiate their own
activity. Is there a solution to this apparent paradox?
28Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 4.
29Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page xvi.
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Habermas has also reflected upon this problem in the work of
Adorno and Horkheimer. As he so clearly describes the problem,
As instrumental, reason assimilated itself to power and thereby
relinquished its critical force-that is the fr/73/ disclosure of
ideology critique applied to itself. To be sure, this description of
the self-destruction of the critical capacity is paradoxical, because
in the moment of description it still has to make use of the
critique that has been declared dead. It denounces the
Enlightenment's becoming totalitarian with its own tools. Adorno
was quite aware of this performative contradiction inherent in
totalized critique. 30
According to Habermas, it is the insistence of Adorno and Horkheimer to
apply critical reason to itself, thereby engaging in a second order
reflection, which causes the problem and which is, in his opinion,
illegitimate. Furthermore, according to Habermas, this historical
progression from legitimate and useful "ideology critique" (i.e., critique
which demonstrates the illegitimate entanglement of a theory with
irrational power) to "totalizing critique" (i.e., critique which takes as its
object the procedure of ideology critique itself) is unnecessary and
requires a "one-sided" and "oversimplified" reading of the culture of
modernity in order to make it appear to work.
Yet the drama of enlightenment first arrives at its climax when
ideology critique itself comes under suspicion of not producing
(any more) truths— and the enlightenment attains second-order
30Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by
Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), page119.
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reflectiveness. Then doubt reaches out to include reason, whose
standards ideology critique had found already given in bourgeois
ideals and had simply taken at their word. Dialectic of
Enlightenment takes this step— it renders critique independent
even in relation to its own foundations." 31
Habermas' suggestion is similar to the proposed solutions to
Russell's various paradoxes of reference, which simply proscribe self-
referentiality in certain instances . 32 But is this possibility really open to
Adorno and Horkheimer? Why did Adorno and Horkheimer believe it
necessary to engage in critique at such a totalistic, "meta" level?
According to Habermas, it was the horror of recent history that led
Adorno and Horkheimer to believe that enlightened reason was itself
flawed. The rise of German fascism and western totalitarianism indicated
that any source of hope for social liberation was to be abandoned; the
Marxist historical dynamic had failed to bring about lasting revolution.
How had the Marxist ideology critique resulted in Stalinism? How had
European culture and rationality produced Auschwitz? For these reasons,
Adorno and Horkheimer thought it necessary to attempt a critique of the
totality and essence of reason. This insight into Adorno's and
Horkheimer's motivation allows us to see perhaps more clearly the
31 Jurgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse , pagel 16.
32There is of course also the well known joke, according to which the patient
tells the doctor that "it hurts when I do this," to which the doctor replies "well,
don't do that."
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insufficiency of genetic explanation to provide theoretical grounding.
Although we can certainly understand the desirability of a critique of the
kind of thinking that could produce atrocity, and in this sense we could
say that the attempt is justified, at the same time we must admit that
the lack of theoretical understanding of the mechanism whereby such a
critique is possible leads to skepticism with respect to the legitimacy of
its results. The question remains whether Adorno and Horkheimer are
able to provide an adequate theoretical explanation of that mechanism
and so to ground the conclusions of their critical project.
Their attempt to uncover the irrational within the very structure of
the rational traces this entanglement to the beginnings of Western
Civilization in the work of Homer, which they consider to be "the basic
text of western culture." The Odyssey is therefore read as a narrative of
the coming into existence of the individual subject, with all his bourgeois
and atomistic attributes of self-identity, self-reliance, and autonomy. This
process of individuation is at the same time a process of tearing oneself
out of the world of animistic superstition governed by invisible and
undifferentiated elemental forces. This struggle, as Adorno and
Horkheimer show, is a dialectic, for pre-rational myth is always already
rational science; it explains, confirms, presents reality, and in so doing it
sets off the process of enlightenment. Myth and magic see more in
nature than meets the eye, and according to Horkheimer and Adorno this
28
more is the precondition for language, since it provides the objectifying
distance necessary between a thing and its name. On the other hand,
enlightened reason is shown to revert increasingly to myth and magic. In
its fundamental principles of the interchangeability of objects and the
repeatability of events (the "principle of immanence," 33 enlightenment
reasoning loses its grasp of the very nature which it sought to
understand and dominate, and becomes once again estranged from a
totality which it finds fearsome and oppressive. Both science and myth
originate in fear, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, which they
attempt to assuage by recourse to explanation.
The dialectic of myth and magic, on the one hand, and reason, on
the other, is shown to be manifest in many forms throughout the
Homeric narrative. Firstly, both antipodal elements exist formally, as the
mythical content of the Odvssey is organized and mastered through the
Apollonian form of the epic. In terms of content as well there is much in
the text that contains a similar dualistic admixture of the magical and the
rational. The notion of the gift, for example, is, according to Horkheimer
and Adorno, "halfway between barter and offering," and thus makes use
of the prerational concept of sacrifice as well as the modern notion of
equivalent exchange. 34 The mythic power of the gods is itself divided
33Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 12.
34Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 49.
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between the older, cthonic deities, and the newer gods, whose relation
to the elemental forces they evoke is more distanced and symbolic rather
than identical. And of course it is the power of the gods over the minds
of humans in the form of superstition and fear against which our hero,
the representative of a demythologized rationalism, is pitted. Yet this use
of reason by Odysseus is itself impure. The battle waged by Odysseus to
free himself from enslavement by the power of myth draws upon that
very power, in the fundamental use he makes of mimetic artifice and
deceptive cunning. Odysseus fools the Cyclops and cheats the Sirens by
exploiting a basic dualism inherent in the first glimmers of enlightened
reasoning
— the distance between meaning or intention, and its
expression. Thus, Odysseus, in claiming to be "Nobody” speaks the
literal truth of his name, yet gains advantage from the ambiguity of
meaning. Similarly, he is able to win from the Sirens the prize of their
song without paying the price of madness by following the letter of the
law, but not its intent. Odysseus outwits his enemies, who represent the
older, darker world, by using their level of enlightenment against them.
Odysseus' use of both mystification and instrumental rationality exploits
the weaknesses of both and pits their strengths against each other.
Adorno and Horkheimer thus reveal him to be an immanent critic. But is
Odysseus' example of turning mythic enlightenment against itself,
thereby propelling itself out of the sheer darkness and terror of myth in
30
the direction of further enlightenment, one that can be followed by
contemporary critics, such as Adorno and Horkheimer? And if so what
could this mean, since we live in a time when enlightened reason appears
to have succeeded beyond all expectation and hope in demystifying
reality? It is science, the very flower of disenchanted reason, rather than
superstition and myth which now dominates human consciousness and
behavior, at least within the cultural milieu that has produced the horrors
to which the critique of Adorno and Horkheimer respond.
In pointing out this dualism of the prerational and rational at the
heart of the "bourgeois" Odysseus' cleverness, Adorno and Horkheimer
demonstrate the already purposive-rational character of mythical thinking;
enlightenment is present within myth from the beginning. This admixture
of reason and superstition which characterizes Odysseus' adventure
indicates another aspect of the paradox of the critical perspective utilized
by Adorno and Horkheimer. In seeking to uncover the origins of the
narrowing of reason to instrumentality, Adorno and Horkheimer analyze
the development of enlightenment out of myth in such a way as to
support their theoretical assumptions that the process of disenchantment
from myth and superstition is one of continual and increasing
employment of reason as instrumental. Odysseus is shown by Adorno
and Horkheimer to be "always already" a bourgeois subject. This problem
31
is seen by Seyla Benhabib as one of viciously circular reasoning on the
part of Adorno and Horkheimer.
. . . The interpretation of Odysseus already presupposes a self in
fear of losing itself in otherness, a self aware of the dangers to
his continuing identity posed by the urges within. Yet this self is
one whose identity formation already reveals a pathological
resistance against the blurring of boundaries. Odysseus fears
merger and seeks autonomy, and attains autonomy only at the
expense of self-repression. Humanity's original fear from nature is
already viewed by Horkheimer and Adorno as a fear of merger
and a pathological resistance to otherness. They project back to
the beginnings of human subjectivity pathologies which they
themselves diagnose as belonging to its historical development,
for the fear of otherness becomes pathological only in the case of
the rigid authoritarian personality whose ego boundaries must be
violently asserted. It is as if Odysseus prefigures the authoritarian
personality. 35
Thus in their attempt to capture the emergence of instrumental
rationality from out of its other, Adorno and Horkheimer return to a
beginning wherein the dialectic of enlightenment is already in full swing.
Adorno and Horkheimer fail to see beyond enlightenment reasoning
which appears to be already present at its own origin. The moment of its
actual birth eludes the dialectical analysis. Yet it is easy to see that this
is an inevitable consequence of their methodology of immanent critique.
Adorno and Horkheimer are motivated by a critical view of disenchanted
35Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia , page168.
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reason and its correlative subjectivity-that of bourgeois autonomy. They
seek its origin in what is commonly accepted to be one of the earliest
manifestations of the same western reason they wish to critique. It is
hardly surprising that in their analysis they would find exactly what they
expect. Not only have Odysseus' adventures been presupposed to be a
starting point for the dialectic of enlightenment, but the methodology of
immanent critique employed by Adorno and Horkheimer could not
possibly reveal anything else. This methodological circularity, although
understandable, is troubling if what is sought is a solution or a way out
of the dialectic of myth and enlightened reason. Immanent critique
appears incapable of escape from this dialectic, for it cannot envision any
alternative type of rationality. No concretely developed other to the
dichotomous possibilities of either superstition or enlightenment is
revealed in the analysis of Odysseus' "adventures with the dialectic."
Both myth and enlightenment are present, and both are intertwined in
many of Odysseus' actions, but Adorno's and Horkheimer's analysis is
unable to demonstrate a radically different rationality that can be held out
as a normative standard which could serve as an alternative to either the
instrumentality or the barbarism (or the barbarism of
instrumentality— e.g., the "efficiency" of the death camps, or the mind-
numbing pleasures of the "culture industry") which it is their concern to
critique. Insofar as it is the aim of Adorno and Horkheimer to
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demonstrate a dialectic of enlightenment and myth, their analysis of
Odysseus succeeds. Insofar as this demonstration itself purports to be a
critique, in its revelation of rationality's dark side as complicitous with
myth and magic, questions remain. The legitimacy, as well as the utopian
alternative driving this critique is unclear. The normative force of the
critique relies on two assumptions, for which no argument is given — that
myth-driven enlightenment is bad; and, conversely, that narrowly
instrumental reason in its opposition to myth and magic is likewise bad.
On what grounds is either condemnation justified or justifiable?
We have seen in the analysis of Odysseus the demonstration of
the first "thesis" of the text, that "myth is already enlightenment." The
other side, so to speak, of the dialectic of enlightenment is the argument
of Adorno and Horkheimer's second thesis that "enlightenment reverts to
mythology ." 36 This second thesis can be seen as a demonstration of the
revenge that subdued nature has taken upon humanity. Enlightened
subjectivity, as we have seen, constitutes itself via a radical separation
from nature, begun in terror as a response to the fear of the vast powers
of "circumambient" nature. Yet, as Adorno and Horkheimer demonstrate,
although this separation was originally a defensive response to terror, its
inevitable consequence is a reversion to terror. This thesis is
demonstrated in the second "excursus" of the text, which examines the
36Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page xvi.
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way in which bourgeois Kantian reason and morality find their paradigm
instantiation in the coldly calculative protagonists of Sade’s writings
.
37
This excursus" traces the rigidification of reason into instrumental
reason, pinpointing the moment of this accomplishment in Kant. Kant's
definition of 'enlightenment' as maturity amounts to the individual's rule
by reason. Since reason's function is to systematize and organize the
activities of the understanding, to provide for the connection and unity of
principles and facts, the mature autonomy prescribed by Kant has the
effect of levelling all differences in the particular objects of knowledge as
well as in the "highest" manifestation of consciousness attainable by the
individual knowing subject. To bring the diversity of perceptual
experience to order culminates in the purely formalistic knowledge of
mathematical law. But this type of knowledge is empty of content and
significance. Knowledge which is stripped of the meaning it has within
the context of its socio-historical development reduces to tautology, and
the knowing subject loses all critical capacity in the face of the
immediacy of the given. Thus, not only the object, but the subject of
knowledge becomes empty, as well.
What appears to be the triumph of subjective rationality, the
subjection of all reality to logical formalism, is paid for by the
obedient subjection of reason to what is directly given. . . . The
37Slavoj Zizek makes a similar point when he argues that the film character
of Hannibal Lecter is the paradigm instantiation of Kantian morality. See Slavoj
Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology . (New York: Verso, 1989).
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task of cognition does not consist in mere apprehension,
classification, and calculation, but in the determinate negation of
each im-mediacy. Mathematical formalism, however, whose
medium is number, the most abstract form of the immediate,
instead holds thinking firmly to mere immediacy. 38
Furthermore, since empirical facts belong to the realm of practice (for
they derive from experience with physical reality and can only be tested
by experimental means), Kant's characterization of legitimate knowledge
as phenomenal or scientific further supports the Baconian equation of
knowledge and power. Kant thus provides transcendental ground for
reason's instrumental nature, according to Adorno and Horkheimer.
Enlightened maturity becomes, on this view, success at survival, and the
promise of autonomous freedom held out by reason is merely an abstract
generalization from the hierarchical domination of social reality. Thus, the
unifying purpose of reason can only endorse and derive from the social
status quo.
Even if the secret utopia in the concept of reason pointed, despite
fortuitous distinctions between individuals, to their common
interest, reason— functioning, in compliance with ends, as a mere
systematic science— serves to level down that same identical
interest. It allows no determination other than the classifications
of the societal process to operate. No one is other than what he
has come to be: a useful, successful, or frustrated member of
vocational and national groups. He is one among many
38Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 27.
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representatives of his geographical, psychological and sociological
type. 39
Kant s transcendental proof provided a linkage between reason and
purpose in such a way that Sade's characters can be shown by Adorno
and Horkheimer to portray the epitome of the Kantian enlightened
individual.
What Kant grounded transcendentally, the affinity of knowledge
and planning, which impressed the stamp of inescapable
expediency on every aspect of a bourgeois existence that was
wholly rationalized, even in every breathing-space, Sade realized
empirically more than a century before sport was conceived. 40
Moreover, this instrumentality is carried over into morals, for
Kantian rationality gives rise to a purely formal morality which has lost
the capacity to ground concretely normative judgements. Sade's Juliette
engages in acts of cruelty, sexual excess, and criminality, all the while
maintaining her enlightened maturity and never flinching before the
possibility of her maxim becoming universal law. This moral poverty of
enlightened reason points up its failure to provide the utopian freedom,
the promise of which had motivated its development and offset the
sacrifices— e.g. the self-denial, the distancing from the natural, the
sensual, the base. Even Juliette, to whom all things are permitted, does
"Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 84.
40Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 88.
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not experience the sensual pleasure of her indulgences, but attains only
the formal intellectual satisfaction of the bourgeois.
. . . Juliette embodies (in psychological terms) neither
unsublimated nor regressive libido, but intellectual pleasure in
regression— amor intellectualis diaboli, the pleasure of attacking
civilization with its own weapons. She favors system and
consequence. She is a proficient manipulator of the organ of
rational thought. In regard to self-control, her directions are at
times related to Kant's as the special application is to its basic
proposition.
. .
41
The increasing instrumentalization of reason becomes incapable of
purging, harnessing, or even of negatively evaluating the barbaric
impulses which remain embedded in a radically other nature from which
reason is profoundly alienated. Furthermore, reason's very alienation from
nature increases the tendencies of the bourgeois subject toward
barbarism. This is due to the huge psychological cost of this self-
distancing from nature. Reason must differentiate itself from the natural,
the bodily, and the irrational. But nature, as the necessary substratum of
reason's very existence cannot be annihilated, but only oppressed and
denied. Its power is thus increased, in a classic instance of the Freudian
phenomenon of the "return of the repressed," as reason fears it as its
unknown source. The fear is that of backsliding into a dark and shameful
past from which reason has managed to escape only barely, and with
41 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 95.
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great struggle. Thus, any reminders of reason's proximity to nature evoke
terror, anger, and hatred, which quite often can and will explode into
atrocities.
Wholly to expunge the odious overpowering longing to return to a
state of nature is the cruelty produced by an abortive civilization:
barbarism, the other face of culture. ".
. . Them all!" Annihilation
allows of no exception. The will to destruction is totalitarian. "I go
so far," says Juliette to the Pope, "as to wish Tiberius that all
mankind had but a single head, that I might have the pleasure of
severing it at one blow!" The signs of powerlessness, sudden
uncoordinated movements, animal fear, confusion, awaken the
thirst for blood. The justification of hatred for woman that
represents her as intellectually and physically inferior, and bearing
the brand of domination on her forehead, is equally that of hatred
for Jews. Women and Jews can be seen not to have ruled for
thousands of years. They live, although they could be
exterminated; and their fear and weakness, the greater affinity to
nature which perennial oppression produces in them, is the very
element which gives them life. This enrages the strong, who must
pay for their strength with an intense alienation from nature, and
must always suppress their fear. They identify themselves with
nature when they hear their victims utter over and over again the
cry that they dare not themselves emit. 42
What is the cause of this dialectical reversal, whereby dominated
nature once again overpowers reason? Is it due to the modern narrowing
of rationality to instrumentality, or is this result an inevitable
consequence of the development of reason in general? According to
42Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 1 12.
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Seyla Benhabib, there is a tension between the views expressed in the
two excursuses. On this view, the first excursus considers the dialectic
of enlightenment to be a result of western reason in general; while the
second excursus places the blame for the terrible consequences on the
radical instrumentalizing of reason accomplished in modernity
.
43 We have
already seen that for Adorno and Horkheimer the dialectic had its
beginnings in the earliest emergence of reason out of myth. This
emergence was based on subjectivity's self-separation from nature as
witnessed in Odysseus' adventures. But if the separation from nature is
already sufficient to launch the dialectic, can there possibly exist a form
of rationality and subjectivity which can elude the regression into myth
and barbarism? Odysseus' rationality was already purposive and
instrumental. Can there ever be a rationality which is noninstrumental?
Adorno and Horkheimer use immanent critique as a way of letting
the contradictory nature of the object express itself. Immanent critique
does not import criteria from the outside with which to evaluate its
object, but rather attempts to draw from its object the standards it has
set for itself and the distance that exists between itself and those
standards. Adorno's reflections upon this topic in Negative Dialectics44
clarify the nature of immanent critique. There Adorno points out the
43Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia .
44Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics , translated by E.B. Ashton (New
York: Continuum, 1 987).
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difference between his own methodology and that of previous
philosophic systems. Adorno rejects thinking which attempts to bring the
concrete and particular into the order of a system which operates
according to general principles. This type of thinking, which Adorno calls
identity thinking," smooths over the differences and tensions inherent in
reality by subsuming all particular objects under universal laws. In this
way, contradictions are apparently resolved (or, as in Hegel, synthesized
at a higher level) and their critical force is thereby nullified. The result is
an illusory vision of a unified whole; the reconciliation of contradictory
particulars provided is a false consciousness. Adorno and Horkheimer, in
refusing to bring the particulars under the rule of a unifying theory that
points unambiguously to its culmination in a single telos (as do, for
example, the Marxist or Hegelian versions of history), allow the
contradictions to speak for themselves. Their negative power is accented
rather than suppressed. Thus, Benhabib is correct in her insight that there
is a tension between the two excursuses, for there is a tension in the
reality of a reason which is both instrumental and simultaneously non-
dominating, both myth-driven and opposed to myth. Furthermore, the
contradictory nature of reality pervades the particulars "all the way
down," so to speak, to their smallest "atomic" level, for, as we have
seen, early instances of myth and magic are already purposive (as is
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nature), so that the contradictory poles of myth and reason can never
be entirely separated, even analytically. And as we have already
discussed, critical reason, even as it attempts to be non-oppressive,
contains elements of instrumentality, for it too is motivated and
sustained by purpose.
The critique presented in Dialectic of Enlightenment is
accomplished by means of a pointing up and sharpening of
contradictions. Adorno and Horkheimer pit the particulars against each
other. This method can be seen to be critical praxis insofar as the
acceleration of the enlightened awareness of contradiction propels the
dialectic forward. Thus they write that "Enlightenment which is in
possession of itself and coming to power can break the bounds of
enlightenment ." 46 This assistance given to the dialectic presupposes that
the dialectic contains within itself the possibility of its own self-
overcoming. Thus the job of the critic is to reveal the contradictions
without forcing a resolution . 47 The text therefore rejects totalization,
45There is obviously plenty of instrumental rationality in nature, as any
viewer of television nature shows knows. Turtles bury their eggs; animals hide
their nests; brightly colored animals mimic their surroundings to avoid becoming
prey; traps are laid, etc. It is therefore just as impossible to expunge nature of
instrumentality as vice versa.
46Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 208.
47This method of pitting the particulars against each other can be seen
especially clearly in Adorno' analyses of "emphatic" art works. See Aesthetic
Theory , translated by C. Lenhardt, edited by Gretel Adorno, and Rolf Tiedmann
(London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).
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even formally, for it comprises a series of essays rather than an
architectonic system with a single logical structure. No grand summation
is given; the text ends with fragments
.
48 Adorno and Horkheimer are fully
aware that the repressive aspects of reason are also necessarily
contained within enlightened reason. For they believe that "The only kind
of thinking sufficiently hard to shatter myths is ultimately self-
destructive. 49 But the self-destruction of enlightened reasoning contains
the possibility of a future transcendence to non-oppressive, liberatory
rationality
.
50
If instrumental reason "shatters myth," perhaps a "mimetic
reconciliation which extends and develops reason's non-oppressive
aspects is possible, after all. Although this possibility cannot be
theoretically justified or guaranteed within the terms of Adorno and
Horkheimer's work, it is the only hope with which they are left.
We have thus seen how, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, a
purely theoretical grounding for the possibility of critical reason is elusive,
in that no transcendent normativity outside of the status quo can be
justified. Any employment of reason is marred by the dark side of the
48The first fragment is significantly titled, "Why it is better not to know all
the answers" Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 209.
49Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , page 4.
50Thus, Martin Jay points out that the Dialectic of Enlightenment represents
a dialectic of hope and despair. See Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality , (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), page 242.
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dialectic, so that to isolate the nondominating, non-oppressive aspect of
reason appears impossible. We have also seen that, for Adorno and
Horkheimer, Kant's critiques can be seen as marking the triumph of
reason’s instrumentality. If this is so, perhaps the liberating aspect of
critical reason (Vernunft) can be more readily apparent within the concept
of reason upon which, and with which, Kant enacts his procedure. I
would therefore propose that before following Adorno and Horkheimer all
the way, and giving up on the possibility of a purely theoretical solution
to the problem of critique, and correlatively but more importantly, the
actuality of a resistant critical reason that can fully transcend and oppose
domination, we explore Kant's procedure of the critique of reason by
reason and its resulting product in a theory of reason's limitations and
capacities. This exploration will be taken up in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DILEMMA OF THE KANTIAN CRITICAL SUBJECT AND THE
HEGELIAN ALTERNATIVE OF IMMANENT CRITIQUE
We have seen that for Adorno and Horkheimer the strategy of
immanent critique was their means of attempting to elude the bind of the
philosophical totalizing critic, since the standards and criteria for the
critique were considered to derive from the object of critique itself. This,
however, as we have seen, resulted in an inability to purge completely
the instrument of critique (critical reason), as well as the post-critical
knowledge found by that critique, of the elements of barbarism which the
critique was concerned to eliminate or transcend. Thus, Adorno and
Horkheimer ultimately appeal to a reconciliation with the partly mythical
and nonrational aspects of nature as a solution to the unenlightened
aspects of reason. Their critique is ultimately grounded in a faith in the
(possible) progress of the dialectic they identify as governing reason's
evolution through the opposing tendencies of enlightenment and myth,
and their own attempt to nudge that dialectic along by pointing out and
sharpening those tensions. But perhaps this strategy is too timid in its
reluctance to step outside the dialectic it studies, even for a critical
moment.
As we have seen in Chapter One, one way to understand the
critical dilemma is to focus on the critical perspective, the subjective
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position from which a totalizing critique is conducted, as paradoxical and
problematic. Viewed as such, the critic finds herself in a bind with
respect to the status of her own critical pronouncements, for she can
neither exempt these pronouncements from the rigors of critique, nor
trust the legitimacy of these claims insofar as they, too, are under
suspicion and should therefore be held in critical suspension. But perhaps
a more detailed focus on the critical perspective and the subject's
capacity to conduct critique will yield a way out of the dilemma. In this
respect, Kant's critique of the instrument of knowledge becomes
relevant. Kant closely and critically examined the subject who knows,
and in so doing was compelled to consider explicitly his own activity as
subject of critical knowledge. In what way did he see himself as attaining
the necessary transcendence out of the object of critique in order to be
that object's judge?
The ability of consciousness to grasp itself— consciousness'
reflexivity— is seen as essential to the production of knowledge for both
Kant and Hegel. It is this reflexivity which, for both philosophers, allows
consciousness to engage in critique. This reflexivity of consciousness can
also be seen as underlying the problematic and paradoxical structure of
philosophical critique as it necessarily assumes perspectives which are
both immanent within and transcendent to its object. My aim in this
chapter will be to show the way in which both Kant and Hegel make use
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of the ambiguous structure of critical consciousness which I've
elaborated in Chapter One, and to identify the particular tangles and
failures in which each critical epistemology becomes caught.
I will therefore argue that the "empirical realism" which Kant
claims to justify depends upon a view and strategy of critical
consciousness which constitutes a pragmatic contradiction of the very
strictures on legitimate knowledge that his epistemological theory
establishes and his empirical realism requires. What I mean by this is that
Kant illegitimately, in his theoretical-critical practice, steps outside of the
bounds of knowledge which his critical theory draws. Furthermore his
theory itself makes this explicit, for the bounds of knowledge which Kant
sets up will be, even in empirical consciousness, transgressed. Kant's
realism holds only for a particular and proscribed perspective of cognitive
consciousness, yet this proscribed perspective presupposes a
transgression of its own boundaries— a transgression for which it is
ultimately unable to account, and which it explicitly repudiates. Thus, I
will argue that Kant's attempt to examine "the instrument" of cognition
prior to putting it to use itself surreptitiously uses that very instrument in
a way which his theory explicitly claims to be illegitimate. As we will
see, Hegel's criticism of Kant is also along these lines. But Hegel believes
that he can avoid the mistakes he identifies in Kant by means of a
phenomenological approach which relies on the immanent critique
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intrinsic to the process of coming to know. My interpretation of Hegel
will argue, however, that his epistemological progress over Kant (i.e., his
proclaimed success in grounding a greater amount and type of
knowledge) is illusory, and that he too fails to ground either the point of
view or the knowledge which his faith in immanent critique leads him to
profess. I therefore intend to show that both Kant and Hegel fail to elude
the critical dilemma which I have elaborated in Chapter One.
In this chapter my focus will be primarily on the
manifestations of the paradoxical nature of critique in the epistemological
writings of Kant and Hegel. This is because my prime concern in the
dissertation is for a theoretical grounding of the possibility of critique; my
concern is with what the critic can know with respect to her own
activity. Although it may be that the best we can achieve will be a
theoretical statement of the necessity and logical priority of a practical-
ethical foundation for the critical capacity, it is to theoretical reason as
the standard of truth and knowledge that I intend to look first. Thus my
inquiry into the legitimacy of the critical capacity should begin with the
similar attempts of others to uncover that which critical reason can
know. However, as I have argued in Chapter One, it should not be
forgotten that there is always a practical-ethical component to critique,
which will necessarily assert itself in what follows. I will therefore
identify a way in which Kant’s epistemology falters in what can be seen
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to be an ethical mis-step. Hegel, on the other hand, does not keep the
ethical and epistemological as separate as does Kant, so that Hegel sees
cognitive perspectives to be simultaneously ethical-practical attitudes.
Thus to discuss Hegel’s epistemology is to be already within the circle of
his totalistic system. Since according to Hegel, the "path to science" is
already "science itself," his understanding of and methodological use of
critical reason in one area of his system should be in accord with the
whole.
Authorization and Limitation in the Critique of Pure Reason
Kant's task in the Critique of Pure Reason 51 was to navigate
between the precritical positions of both rationalist dogmatism (in
particular, the theories of Leibniz and Wolff), and empiricist skepticism
(Hume). The problem with rationalism, as relevant to the critical dilemma,
is its assumption of a too transcendent point of view which led it to
claim the ability of reason to know things-in-themselves (including such
things as God, the soul, and the totality of existence). Empiricism, on the
other hand, denies the ability of reason to go beyond (or transcend) the
phenomena at all, so that the first principles of even empirical
knowledge, insofar as they attribute necessity and universality to
51 lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason , translated by Norman Kemp
Smith (Toronto: Macmillan, 1929; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).
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phenomena (e.g., all events have a cause), are considered illegitimate.
Empiricism is therefore completely mired in its immanence within the
phenomenal realm of sensation. Kant's critique is therefore double-edged:
against the inflated claims of rationalism, he must limit reason to its own
realm; at the same time, against empiricism, he must establish and
authorize reason's appropriate power as a "lawgiver to nature." Critique
must both proscribe and prescribe; remain within its bounds (maintain
immanence) and establish propriety over its realm (attain transcendence
as sovereign authority and normativity).
Kant's answer to Hume's skeptical denial of the possibility of
scientific knowledge took the form of a demonstration or "deduction"
that pure concepts or "categories" must be applicable to our sensible
intuitions in order for us to have conscious awareness at all. According to
Kant, the faculty of knowledge is the understanding, whose function is to
bring unity to the manifold of sense. What Hume had argued was that
sensibility does not receive a unity or necessary connection of its
intuitions (or "impressions"), but rather apprehends a manifold. Thus it is
the mind's job to connect together our sensible intuitions according to
concepts. Hume concluded from this that the combinations of
impressions supplied by the mind were merely subjectively valid — a result
of mental habit or custom — and therefore couldn't guarantee the
necessity or universality which we attribute to them. But for Kant, our
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mental structuring concepts are rules which govern the mind's activity of
bringing the intuitions apprehended by sense together in such a way that
these intuitions refer to an empirical object This mental activity of
unification, which Kant calls "synthesis," is thus responsible for the
objective validity of empirical knowledge, for we know an object,
according to Kant, when we have synthesized its representations
according to the rule which is its concept.
Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge.
This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given
representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept
of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all
unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in
the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of
consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of
representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity
and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it rests
the very possibility of the understanding. 52
Kant's deduction argument, simply put, is that if we are to be
conscious of mental representations as representations of our own
consciousness, then we must apply the categories of the understanding,
by means of an act of synthesis, to the flux of intuitions which constitute
the manifold of sense. The rock-bottom premise of this argument is the
undeniable (even to Hume) fact that consciousness is a unity. But
consciousness, as awareness of mental representations, is awareness of
52 Kant, Critique
,
page B137.
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a manifold of intuitions from sense (e.g., hot, humid, heavy, soft buzzing,
light blue, etc.). My awareness must therefore relate each representation
to an "I think" if these representations are to be recognized as contents
of my consciousness. Thus the unity of consciousness presupposes an
act of synthesis which grants unity to the manifold. The analytic
proposition that consciousness is a unity presupposes the synthetic act
of bringing intuitions together in relation to the "I think." This
fundamental synthesis is analyzed by Kant in the first edition
transcendental deduction (CPR A 95-130), which constitutes the
subjective side of Kant's deduction argument. The three mental
syntheses identified therein 53 along with the transcendental unity of
apperception as their ground and source are the "subjective grounds" of
the necessary connection of appearances. On the objective side, there
must also be an "affinity" of the manifold of sense, to allow that it be
capable of being combined by the threefold synthesis. Kant argues in the
B edition deduction (also known as the "objective deduction," CPR B
129-169) that the syntheses are performed in every case according to a
rule which grants necessity to the manner of combination of the
intuitions. This necessity of following a rule comes about by means of
the intentional or referential function of the mental syntheses which refer
53Namely, the "synthesis of apprehension in intuition," the "synthesis of
reproduction in imagination" (which "runs through and holds together" the
contents of the manifold), and the "synthesis of recognition in a concept."
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my representations back to their object which is presupposed to be the
source of their objective validity. The rules, which are the concepts or
categories of the understanding thus confer objective validity on the
knowledge of objects of empirical intuition.
Thus Kant claims to be able to salvage objective validity for the
empirical sciences, whose legitimacy had been destroyed within Hume's
skeptical analysis. Positively, Kant's critique establishes the
understanding's jurisdiction over its proper realm. But Kant's victory over
Humean empiricism is not without its price. The negative function of
critique as drawing limits requires that something be given up. Since the
concepts or categories are rules for the synthesis performed by the
understanding on a manifold which it receives from sensibility, their
legitimate employment can only be to gain knowledge of empirical
phenomena. Intuition brings a manifold of sensibility to the
understanding, which proceeds to synthesize this manifold according to
its concepts. Thus the concepts may refer only to sensible objects.
They [i.e., the categories] are merely rules for an understanding
whose whole power consists in thought, consists, that is, in the
act whereby it brings the synthesis of a manifold, given to it from
elsewhere in intuition, to the unity of apperception— a faculty,
therefore, which by itself knows nothing whatsoever, but merely
combines and arranges the material of knowledge, that is, the
intuition, which must be given to it by the object. 54
54Kant, Critique
,
page B145.
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Furthermore, since objectivity is itself a product of an activity of mental
synthesis, we cannot claim that empirical objects are in-themse/ves as
they appear to us. What has been sacrificed by Kant's critique is the
possibility of gaining knowledge of things-in-themselves. Kant is thus
committed to the position that the categories of the understanding
cannot legitimately be applied beyond the realm of sense. Nor can
"ideas" of reason, whose function is to synthesize and organize the
result of understanding s conceptualized knowledge according to its rules
of combination, apply to objects not previously given in sensibility and
synthesized according to the understanding's concepts. The idea of
noumena, or non-sensible objects known by an intellectual intuition, thus
functions as a limiting concept which sets the upper boundary on our
possible knowledge.
The Reflexivity of Consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
As we have seen, knowledge, for Kant, involves the mind's active
relating of its representations to an apperception of its own unity.
Consciousness must be able to recognize its mental contents as its own,
hence it must be able to relate each of its representations to an 'I think'.
All knowledge, according to Kant, involves the logical possibility of self-
conscious awareness of that knowledge as a content of consciousness.
Cognitive consciousness is, for Kant, inherently self-relational; the mind
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must be able to refer to its own mental contents in such a way as to be
able to grasp those mental contents as states of its own consciousness.
The deduction arguments have shown that knowledge is ultimately
grounded in "transcendental apperception," which is the ability of the
mind to think itself as a unitary consciousness, or to self-reflect. This
reflexivity of consciousness is important for Kant in terms of both the
content and method of his epistemology. As regards content, not only
does the doctrine of "inner sense " 55 require that consciousness has the
ability to intuit itself, but, more importantly, the theory of threefold
mental synthesis
,
56 which is crucial to Kant's transcendental deductions,
consists entirely of an account of continual cognitive self-relating. This
account narrates the act of cognition, describing the mind's work upon
its disparate contents, as it brings them together, and at each turn
through a "higher" procedure yields a new synthetic unity, culminating in
recognition in a concept, and empirical knowledge. Cognitive
consciousness is thus seen to operate at different levels for Kant; there
are epistemic activities which Kant shows to take place necessarily
"beneath" empirical consciousness, as the necessary conditions of
cognitive experience. It is consciousness' reflexivity which links these
different levels or perspectives of mental functioning together and which
55See e.g., Kant, Critique , pages A 33-B49-50, B 153-7.
56Kant, Critique , pages A 97-104.
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allows consciousness to move through the various levels of acquaintance
with empirical objects from the most immediate intuition of sensory
phenomena to the most sophisticated syllogistic reasoning about them.
Methodologically, Kant's reliance on the reflexivity of
consciousness is also crucial to his epistemological enterprise. Kant's
theory comes to understand intuitions to be "appearances." In order for
this to be possible, the epistemological mind must be able to reflect upon
its own nature as contributing to its apprehension of intuitions. Kant
therefore identifies and makes use of two different perspectives of
cognitive consciousness; one, more immediate, the other, more reflexive;
both of which contribute to his epistemological understanding of
empirical cognition . 57 These two perspectives can be seen at work in the
account Kant gives in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the functioning
of the forms of sensibility.
When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition
of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and
in time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear, I do not
mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion. For in an
appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe
to them, are always regarded as something actually given. Since,
however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, such
properties depend upon the mode of intuition of the subject, this
57As will be discussed later, these two perspectives can be seen to
correspond to the two perspectives of cognitive consciousness which I will
identify in Hegel's epistemological method, namely, the "phenomenological we"
and the consciousness which is its object of study.
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object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in
itself. 58
In this textual passage Kant identifies two levels or perspectives of
cognitive consciousness. From within the first level, consciousness
distinguishes illusion and object, for it regards the empirical object and its
properties as "actually given." It is this distinction between object as
given and subjective representation, or between reality and appearance,
which the mind draws as it apprehends intuitions, which defines the
realm of experience for this ordinary level of consciousness. This ability
to distinguish allows this ordinary empirical perspective to make use of a
standard of objectivity, and so to attain what it regards as objective
knowledge. However, there is another "higher" level or perspective of
consciousness operative in this passage, and this is the epistemological
or critical consciousness. To reflect upon the "givenness" of empirical
objects is to be conscious of their mode of relating to the knowing
subject. Thus, empirical consciousness, when it self-reflects, gives way
to a more reflexive epistemological point of view from which it considers
its mode of apprehension of intuitions. Epistemological consciousness is
then forced to consider these intuitions to be appearances, rather than
things in themselves, for they are now understood to be dependent upon
the subject's mode of sensible intuition. This higher order,
58Kant, Critique , page B69.
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epistemological and critical consciousness is less limited than the first-
order empirical consciousness with which Kant's reflections began, for
this critical perspective sees the reality of empirical consciousness to be
a reality only in relation to the perspective of empirical consciousness.
This higher order perspective is attained only as consciousness
transgresses the limits of its previous perspective and reflects upon this
perspective which is then the object of the new perspective's conscious
attention. Thus, the self-conscious reflection upon its passive mode of
intuition brings consciousness to a different order of awareness, one
which sees the reality of its prior state as limited. The new perspective
therefore enlarges its bounds by drawing another distinction between
appearance and reality, that between the empirical object and the object
in-itself. Thus for Kant, cognitive consciousness operates as a
continuum, whose different levels or positions on the scale of reflexivity
afford it different perspectives from which its intentional objects likewise
differ. What is grasped as reality at one level of consciousness is seen to
be appearance from the more transcendent 59 perspective which is able to
apprehend the lower order awareness along with what is objective reality
for that lower order. To the perspective of empirical consciousness which
is immanent to empirical reality, phenomena are real, independently
59
lt is important to differentiate the terms 'transcendent' and
'transcendental'. Kant uses the term 'transcendental ' to refer to the conditions
for the possibility of experience; while 'transcendent' simply means 'beyond' or
'outside of'.
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existing objects. But as cognitive consciousness attains transcendence
from that more immanent perspective by assuming a self-reflexive
epistemological pose, empirical objects are now understood to be
appearances. Kant s doctrine of the "Transcendental Aesthetic," that
external objects in space and time are appearances dependent upon our
mode of sensibility, is therefore an epistemological truth known only to a
higher order of cognition than the everyday empirical consciousness
which is immanent to empirical reality as it is circumscribed by space and
time. Kant's critical epistemological method is therefore structured by the
same logic of critique which I have elaborated in the previous chapter.
Both the immanent pose of empirical consciousness and the transcendent
perspective of the self-reflexive epistemological consciousness are
necessary to Kant's enactment of critique. One of the ways in which
Kant experiences, interprets, and attempts to avoid the critic's dilemma
can be seen as he assumes in turn each of these two perspectives in the
two versions of his "refutations of idealism."
Immanence and Transcendence in the Refutations of Idealism
Kant's "transcendental idealism" (i.e., the theory that empirical
objects, space and time as their forms of intuition, and the categories of
the understanding as their structuring concepts are not things in
themselves, but rather appearances resulting from the spontaneous
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activity of the transcendental mind), as we have seen, was intended to
preserve the objective validity of empirical knowledge. In the Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant attempts two different "refutations" of the charge
that his theory constitutes an idealism of the sort that would render
empirical knowledge merely subjectively valid. 60 In the refutation of
idealism given in the fourth "paralogism" of the first edition Critique .
Kant explicitly distinguishes his "transcendental idealism" from what he
calls "empirical idealism" on precisely this score. "Empirical idealism" is,
according to Kant, the view that external objects cannot be known with
certainty, since they are not perceived immediately, but must be inferred
to exist as the causes of our immediately perceived mental
representations. Empirical idealism's error, as Kant explains it, lies in its
presupposition of a "transcendental realism," which regards space and
time as existing in themselves, as conditions for the existence of external
objects, which also exist in themselves and independently of our
sensibility. 61 Thus, in our terms, Kant's criticism amounts to charging the
empirical idealists with an illegitimately transcendent perspective which
would allow them to know space and time "in themselves."
60Kant's main target here is Berkeley, and to a lesser extent, Descartes.
Although Descartes was not technically a metaphysical idealist, his
epistemological rationalism entailed the position that ideas are known more
directly than physical objects. Additional confusion on this issue is due to the
fact that Kant's position attempts to be idealist in epistemological terms (and
indeed only transcendentally, but not empirically); while metaphysically, Kant is
necessarily committed to an agnosticism.
61 Kant, Critique , page A 369.
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Kant sees his "transcendental idealism," however, as allowing for
an empirical realist position with respect to the existence of external
objects. This is because Kant's position, in regarding space and time to
be merely the forms of our sensible intuition, does not regard sensible
objects to be things-in-themselves. External objects are, on this view,
merely appearances, and thus nothing more than our mental
representations. Thus our minds are just as capable of having direct
access to external objects as to any of our representations of our own
inner mental states. The appearances of inner and outer sense are on an
equal epistemic footing according to Kant, since both species of
appearance are immediately perceived. There is, therefore, no need to
infer the existence of external objects as the causes of our mental
representations, as is done according to the empirical idealists. As
appearances, empirical objects are known directly as their concepts are
synthesized by the mind. In the act of mental synthesis, governed by the
categories of the understanding, the mind directly apprehends its object,
for this object is none other than that which corresponds to the concept,
which is the form or rule for the act of mental synthesis.
62 Thus, for Kant
the empirical distinction between objectively valid judgment and merely
subjective illusion is preserved.
62According to Kant, ". . . an object is that in the concept of which the
manifold of a given intuition is united. Critique, page B137.
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From perceptions knowledge of objects can be generated, either
by mere play of imagination or by way of experience; and in the
process there may, no doubt, arise illusory representations to
which the objects do not correspond, the deception being
attributable sometimes to a delusion of imagination (in dreams)
and sometimes to an error of judgment (in so-called sense-
deception). To avoid such deceptive illusion, we have to proceed
according to the rule: Whatever is connected with a perception
according to empirical laws, is actual. 63
Empirical error and subjective illusion are thus distinguished from
empirical knowledge on the basis of compliance with a rule of the
understanding . 64 Since experience is, as the "Analytic" has shown and as
discussed above, the result of mental syntheses according to rules,
empirical error is easily accounted for as a matter of not following, or
incorrectly applying the rules (i.e., the concepts and principles of the
understanding). This distinction between empirical knowledge and
subjective illusion could not be maintained by empirical idealism,
according to Kant, because the empirical idealist, as a transcendental
realist, demands that knowledge be of things-in-themselves . 65
63Kant, Critique , page A376.
64
ln the above case the rule cited is the second postulate of empirical
thought, Critique , page B266.
65 Hilary Putnam gives a strikingly similar argument to show that what he
calls "metaphysical realism" leads inevitably to skepticism. See Putnam,
Reason. Truth and History (Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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Transcendental realism
. . . inevitably falls into difficulties, and
finds itself obliged to give way to empirical idealism, in that it
regards the objects of outer sense as something distinct from the
senses themselves, treating mere appearances as self-subsistent
beings, existing outside us. On such a view as this, however
clearly we may be conscious of our representation of these
things, it is still far from certain that, if the representation exists,
there exists also the object corresponding to it. In our system, on
the other hand, these external things, namely matter, are in all
their configurations and alterations nothing but mere appearances,
that is, representations in us, of the reality of which we are
immediately conscious. 66
Empirical idealism cannot distinguish experience from illusion according
to Kant for it can never be certain that the independent reality which it
seeks is as it is represented in our mental perceptions. Kant's position, on
the other hand, preserves the empirical distinction between real
externally existing object and merely subjective appearance precisely
because it takes empirical objects to be appearances, in the
transcendental sense, rather than things-in-themselves. Thus, according
to Kant's first edition "refutation of idealism," the distinction between
empirical reality and subjective illusion is grounded in the transcendental
distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself. Realism, at the
empirical level of consciousness, is therefore made possible by an idealist
perspective at the transcendental level, one which takes the objects of its
66Kant, Critique
,
page A372.
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experience to be relative to its mode of perceiving them. Kant, in his first
edition refutation, is speaking from this transcendental perspective.
The second edition refutation, however, takes a different level of
consciousness as primary. It begins from the premise that "I am
conscious of my own existence as determined in time" ( Critique B275).
Thus Kant s premise is of an act of self-reflection, or an experience of an
intuition of the self. Kant's argument then draws from this premise the
conclusion that external objects must exist. Kant argues as follows: If I
have an awareness of myself as an existence in time, then I must also be
aware of something permanent which could serve as substratum against
which change would be perceptible. 67 Whatever this permanent is, it
cannot be in me, i.e., it cannot be part of the self which I perceive as
existing in time, for this self-perception can be made only on the
condition of this something permanent. This permanent cannot then be a
representation, for to understand it merely as a representation would be
to see it as contingent upon the self which I have temporally determined,
as a mental state of that same self, rather than as the condition for the
ability to make a determination of that self.
67According to Paton, this follows from the proof for the "first analogy,"
which argues that all perception of determinations in time requires a
representation of the permanent substratum which underlies change. Since time
itself cannot be perceived (since time is not an object), the permanent in
appearances must be the object itself. H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphvsic of
Experience . 2 vols., 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1951), vol.2, pages 278-279.
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This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is
only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself
be determined. Thus perception of this permanent is possible only
through a thing outside me; and consequently the determination
of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of
actual things which I perceive outside me. 68
According to Kemp-Smith, this second edition refutation of idealism
offers a more "realist" position than the first. Thus, he concludes that the
two refutations are directly contradictory; the first position leading to a
Berkelean idealism, and the second, as the more mature, critical position,
resulting in an empirical realism . 69 But, notice that this necessity of the
existence, rather than merely of the mental representation of external
objects is demonstrated from the perspective of an empirical awareness.
The conclusion of this refutation of idealism is that if I am to determine
myself in time, then I must grant the existence of empirical objects
outside myself. Both the determination of self and the awareness of
empirical objects existing outside myself occur within the field of
awareness of empirical consciousness. Kant begins this refutation by
assuming in the first person ("I am conscious . . . ") the level of
consciousness which places its existence in time, and is, therefore,
68Kant, Critique
,
pages B275-276.
69Kemp-Smith, A Commentary , pages 312-313. Strawson similarly is unable
to reconcile Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time with his claim that
outer objects are immediately perceived to be the causes of our mental
representations of them. This view will be discussed more fully below.
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immanent in the present experience. This perspective is no longer the
higher order level of transcendental reflection which Kant adopted in the
first edition refutation. Rather, it represents an attempt to grasp
immediacy, to intuit the sensation of a present mental state. The
existence of objects as a necessary presupposition of our ability to be
aware of ourselves is an empirical
,
and not a transcendental existence.
The "actual things" which are shown to exist are not things-in-
themselves, but are empirical objects, which exist as such for empirical
consciousness. Thus, rather than being in contradiction, the two
refutations differ because they are written from two different points of
view. In the first edition refutation, Kant concluded that empirical objects
do not require any inferential mediation in order to be perceived, for their
immediate relatedness to empirical consciousness has been established
on the basis of their being understood by transcendental idealism to be
appearances. The second edition argument, however, begins from the
premise of Descartes, from within the perspective of ordinary, pre-
critical, empirical consciousness as it grasps itself . 70 It is Kant's
assumption of the point of view of empirical consciousness which allows
70
lt would appear that I am claiming something paradoxical here— that there
is an immediate awareness of self, or that the least reflexive conscious posture
is already self-reflective. Indeed, this is exactly correct; the immanence and
transcendence of consciousness coexist all the way down to the lowest level,
or as Hegel would put it, consciousness is already self-consciousness. As we
shall see, this realization is basic to Hegel's attempt to go beyond Kant's
philosophy.
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him to conclude that empirical objects necessarily exist (for it is certainly
not the case that to the transcendental-epistemological point of view,
empirical objects are "permanent things outside me," for this point of
view grasps the ideality of space and time, and thus of all spatio-
temporal appearances, including that of the phenomenal empirical self).
Bad Faith as a Strategy of Avoidance 71
Seen in the above way, we can now ask whether Kant's
"refutations of idealism" really refute the position that they profess to.
Each refutation gives a different view of what is essentially the same bi-
leveled position . 72 Because empirical objects are appearances (an
observation only accessible to the perspective of transcendental
epistemology), we perceive them immediately, as already there, present
in the world prior to our conscious attention (an observation from the
perspective of an act of empirical consciousness). Thus Kant's position is
71
l borrow the term 'strategy of avoidance' from Dick Howard
,
whose use
of it will be discussed below. See Howard, The Politics of Critique .
72Although I agree with Kemp-Smith that the second edition refutation
demonstrates our acquaintance with empirical objects to be even more
immediate than our intuitions of self, while the first only claims that outer
intuitions are as well known as those of inner sense, I think that this difference
is accounted for on the basis of the different perspectives of the two
refutations. From within empirical consciousness, one experiences external
reality as preexisting any conscious thought; however, from a transcendental
point of view, it makes sense to say that all intuitions in space and time are
appearances, without articulating the different ways in which empirical
consciousness may experience an appearance. Thus the two views are
combined coherently in my reading of Kant's position as bi-leveled. See Kemp-
Smith, A Commentary .
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two-tiered, a transcendental idealism" and an "empirical realism." Kant
becomes a realist only insofar as he is able to leave behind the
perspective of the epistemologist, and adopt the more immanent pose of
empirical consciousness. But the idealist position which he claims to
refute is an epistemological and metaphysical position. Berkeley never
attempted to deny the claim that empirical objects appeared to ordinary
consciousness as real and independently existing. There is thus a sense
in which Kant's "refutation" is more of an avoidance or dissolving of the
problem, for Kant does not confront idealism on its own terms, but
demonstrates a way to escape it by circumscribing a limited perspective
of cognitive consciousness in relation to which empirical objects have the
ontological status of independent reality. But the empirical realism of the
second edition refutation, if it is to supply an answer to Berkeley, must
be viewed in terms of its significance for the higher-order epistemological
perspective. Since the realism itself describes the epistemic situation
immanent to the empirical, not to the second-order epistemological
consciousness, it fails to refute the empirical idealist charge. Kant's
position thus takes advantage of the ability of consciousness to take on
points of view which can be increasingly reflexive and more self-aware,
or, like empirical consciousness, more immersed in immediacy. The
limited experience of empirical consciousness thus supplies, for a higher
order epistemological perspective, the solution for a problem which crops
68
up for that epistemological understanding. Empirical consciousness is not
itself skeptical of the external existence of empirical objects. Idealism is
rather a higher order position attained by reflection upon the operation of
empirical consciousness. Kant's epistemological consciousness,
therefore, must cross into the empirical consciousness in order to gain
experience, and then recross the limit which separates the empirical from
the epistemological, in an act of self-reflection, in order to gain the
epistemological significance of the experience. But this "double crossing"
into the immanence of the empirical perspective and back out into the
transcendence of the epistemological represents a strategy of avoiding
the problem posed by idealism. Kant answers the charge that he is an
idealist by displacing his idealism to a higher plane, then answering the
accusation either solely in reference to (the A edition refutation) or from
within ( the B edition) the more immediate level. The perspective from
which Kant's idealism is visible is kept out of the discussion; while the
realism which he professes to uphold only operates at a level other than
the one at which the charge is made. Kant thus "dodges" the issue of
idealism.
This avoidance of the problem of idealism follows a similar logic as
that traced by Sartre in his analysis of the existential-psychological
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phenomenon of bad faith," or self-deception
.
73 According to Sartre it is
possible for self-consciousness to oscillate between its immanent and
transcendent perspectives in order to avoid unpleasant truths about
itself. Sartre analyses this phenomenon in Being and Nothingness in
several concrete hypothetical cases. Thus, for example, a woman who is
being romanced "becomes all intellect" when her suitor responds to her
only in her bodily being as a sexual object. She then shifts her self-
awareness to her physical self when she fears that her intellectual
performance has been too successful and that her suitor has lost sight of
her as a sexual being. The upshot of Sartre's amusing analyses is that
bad faith is motivated by consciousness' fear of its own radical
ungroundedness— there is no preexisting essence or blueprint for
conscious being, which it is incumbent upon each of us to create for
ourselves. Thus for Sartre we are without excuse or ground, and thus
"condemned to freedom. "
Similarly, Kant escapes from the (perhaps uncomfortable)
transcendental truth of his idealism — a position which would render
knowledge merely subjective and thus ungrounded— into empirical
awareness to claim a (familiar, comfortable, and solid) realist identity,
thus denying idealism at the empirical level. But Kant simultaneously
73Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness , translated by Hazel Barnes (New
York: Washington Square Press, 1965), part 1, chapter 2.
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denies that the realism applies at the higher level, even though this is the
level at which any idealism which he ostensibly refutes must be
understood to operate. What remains to be shown here is that each
perspective— the empirical and the transcendental
— necessarily has
access to the point of view of the other, so that the escape into the
immediacy of the empirical perspective is a purposive and feigned
"forgetting." Thus empirical realism is based on bad faith or self-delusion.
Furthermore, it is for Kant the higher-level position (/'.e., the
transcendental story) which is supposed to guarantee or ground the
lower-order realism. Since Kant denies the actual (metaphysical) truth of
his transcendental idealism, for he denies the legitimacy of metaphysical
knowledge, thus his idealism is not metaphysical, but transcendental,
how are we to understand this grounding as secure? If Kant cannot
establish the actual truth of the transcendental-idealist position, (i.e., the
metaphysical claim that empirical objects really are mere appearances,
rather than things-in-themselves) then the empirical realism which
depends upon the transcendental idealism for its legitimation collapses.
Thus, the transcendental truth is illegitimate in its function as grounding
empirical realism, for its own status as knowledge must be considered
problematic according to the requirements of Kant's theoretical critique.
Kant's transcendental idealism credits itself with establishing the
legitimacy of empirical realism, yet the empirical realist point of view is,
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from either its own or the idealist perspective, merely apparent; while the
transcendental idealist position is itself insecure and fails to meet its own
criteria for legitimate knowledge.
If Kant s claim to have established the legitimacy of empirical
realism is to hold even prima facie plausibility, then it cannot be more
true to say that empirical objects are appearances than it is to say that
they are real. Each claim must be "true" or legitimate relative to its
appropriate perspective. In fact, for Kant, it is the empirical
consciousness which is the basic level of consciousness from which
objective knowledge may be attained (i.e the understanding legislates in
the faculty of knowledge; reason and the imagination do not alone
provide knowledge without the rules of the understanding being applied
appropriately). It is therefore paradoxical and perhaps ironic that Kant's
theory demonstrates the way in which this empirical consciousness
presupposes and is dependent upon operations of consciousness which
transgress the limits of the empirical perspective, and which do not
regard empirical objects to be independently existing realities, but know
them to be only "in-themselves" for a particular level of consciousness.
Furthermore, empirical consciousness itself is shown by Kant necessarily
to have a degree of awareness of these presupposed transcendental
operations if it is even to have experience of empirical reality. For Kant,
empirical consciousness must be able to transcend its limited
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perspective, for its consciousness of objects necessarily presupposes
some degree of awareness of the relation of those objects to itself. As
we have seen in the "Transcendental Deduction," a sensible intuition
involves mental synthesis, whereby consciousness relates the intuition to
the unity of apperception in order to bring the intuition into its own field
of experience. The Critique analyzes this general process of synthesis
into three moments which reflect different levels of mental awareness
prior to full-blown knowledge. The mind must be aware of each level of
synthesis which it performs, for it is that awareness which relates the
level of unity of representations already attained to a higher form of unity
as expressed ultimately in the 'I think' of apperception, thus resulting in
conceptual cognition.
The word 'concept' [Begriff] might of itself suggest this remark.
For this unitary consciousness [dieses eine Bewusstsein] is what
combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also
reproduced, into one representation. This consciousness may
often be only faint, so that we do not connect it with the act
itself, that is, not in any direct manner with the generation of the
representation, but only with the outcome [that which is thereby
represented]. But notwithstanding these variations, such
consciousness, however indistinct, must always be present;
without it, concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are
altogether impossible. 74
74Kant, Critique
,
page A104.
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Thus we see that the mental operations which take place
"beneath" the experience of empirical consciousness contain an
awareness of the contribution made by the mind to its own experience.
Underlying the experience of empirical consciousness is a transcendental
process of cognitive development. In the second edition refutation, Kant
argued from within the experience of empirical consciousness for the
immediacy of the mind's acquaintance with empirical objects. The
original premise of this refutation is an act of self-intuition, an
assumption of the perspective of empirical consciousness which takes
itself as its intentional object. But this awareness, according to Kant,
presupposes a mental act of temporal determination, whereby the mental
representation is related to time as the form of inner sense in accordance
with the rules for the temporal synthesis. Consciousness must be aware
of its act of temporal synthesis as rule governed, if it is to recognize the
representation as existing in an objective time order. Consciousness must
therefore have, at a pre-experiential level, an awareness of its
contribution to its self-intuition. This pre-experiential cognitive
development continues, according to Kant, as the mind regards the
intuition of self to be dependent upon the act of mental synthesis which
places it in objective time. Consciousness at this level searches for the
unconditioned and objective reality which makes possible its own self-
representation, which it now regards as conditioned appearance. The
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objective cause of consciousness' self-representation is considered to
exist prior to and hence independently of the mental synthesis which first
brings an intuition of self to consciousness. The final stage of pre-
empirical mental functioning which results in conscious experience thus
occurs as this causal judgment is made, positing empirical objects, now
considered to be the independently real, as temporally and ontologically
prior to the mind s representations, which are now understood to be
effects of those empirical objects.
But given this necessary pre-experiential awareness on the part of
empirical consciousness, it is no longer clear how Kant can maintain that
the empirical consciousness must itself be convinced that its own
experience is of a preexisting and independent reality. The empirical
consciousness, as it seeks self-knowledge, must come to the same
conclusion about what has necessarily taken place at the transcendental
level as does Kant. Thus, it will appear to an empirical consciousness
seeking epistemological understanding that it must have transcendentally
synthesized a given manifold, and thus its empirical objects are really
appearances. It cannot then be true on Kant's theory to say that the
empirical consciousness appears, even to itself, to have immediate
access to external reality. The transcendental account will be accessible
to empirical consciousness, for empirical consciousness has been shown
to have a necessary degree of awareness of its transcendental
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preconditions in order to be able to distinguish subjective representation
from objective experience. Empirical consciousness must therefore be
aware that it has, at the pre-empirical level, performed a synthesis of a
manifold under the direction of the causal rule, for the distinction
between illusion and objectively valid perception requires a recognition
that the synthesis of representation has been rule-governed. The
empirical consciousness cannot be a completely closed sphere, but is
necessarily open to the "experiences," so to speak, of the perspectives
of consciousness which lie beneath or beyond it as its transcendental
presuppositions. But then the legitimacy of cognitive consciousness'
claim to empirical knowledge is, for it, or from within its own
perspective, grounded in its denial or in its having "forgotten" that it has
itself contributed to the creation of the objective time-order and the
phenomenal objects that exist within it. Empirical consciousness has the
ability to view its own self-certainty as based on this forgetting, and thus
to contain an element of "bad faith," for it is open to it to know that its
own causal syntheses produced its experience, yet it pretends to believe
that its experience is independently given. Empirical consciousness is a
particular point along a continuous spectrum of consciousness; however,
if it is to maintain (or pretend to) a realist self-understanding, it must
choose to remain partially blind. Thus there can be no completely closed
empirical consciousness to which external reality is indubitable, so that
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Kant s attempt to circumscribe a perspective of consciousness for which
realism is true must be considered illegitimate and based on empirical
consciousness' act of self-delusion.
Enter Hegel
As we shall see, Kant's understanding of the transcendental
activity of consciousness is formally similar to the dialectic of
consciousness described by Hegel, whereby a lower order awareness
gives way to a higher position of knowledge. But for Kant, as we have
seen, in distinction from Hegel, the continuous spectrum of
consciousness, from less to more self-aware, is not considered to ascend
from less to more truth. Kant privileges the empirical perspective; other
levels of conscious activity are open to truth only if they can claim the
proper relation to empirical reality. For Hegel, it is not the empirical
consciousness, but rather the highest point on the spectrum of reflexive
consciousness, which grasps the fullest truth. Kant's denial that the
transcendental perspective is acquainted with a more truthful reality than
the empirical puts Kant in a difficult situation, which Hegel was able to
recognize.
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In t ^*e Phenomenology of Spirit
,
75
Hegel, in an obvious criticism of
Kant s epistemological method, discusses the "natural assumption" that
philosophy s proper procedure is to begin its work with a study of its
instrument," i.e., human cognition. Hegel argues that this natural
assumption is self-refuting, for although this view professes to doubt its
ability to reach truth, it fails to doubt the truth of its own assumptions.
These assumptions include the beliefs that cognition is a medium or
instrument, that it is possible to set ourselves, as skeptical examiners,
apart from this instrument in order to examine it, and that cognition
exists in complete independence of the true reality which is held to be
unattainable, even though this cognition must take itself to be real or true
( Phenomenology
,
page 47: #74-75). The point of this argument is that
complete skepticism, or skepticism which presupposes nothing as true, is
impossible, for the skeptical position must always posit its own
assumptions to be true. Thus, according to Hegel, it is not possible to
critique one's cognitive "instrument" without at the same time using it,
for, as we have seen in Chapter One, critique always requires the
positing of a criterion or standard if it is ever to be able to discern the
truth. Cognition, and its faculties, cannot be set aside to await rational
justification, for how could it ever receive such justification if the criteria
75G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit , translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977).
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for knowledge, the epistemic marks of self-evidence, or the fundamental
principles of reasoned argument are not to be employed? Hegel therefore
turns the tables on Kant, asking whether a totally critical skepticism is
not itself a mistake in the search for knowledge.
Meanwhile, if the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust of
Science, which in the absence of such scruples gets on with the
work itself, and actually cognizes something, it is hard to see why
we should not turn round and mistrust this very mistrust. Should
we not be concerned as to whether this fear of error is not just
the error itself? Indeed this fear takes something-a great deal in
fact— for granted as truth, supporting its scruples and inferences
on what is itself in need of prior scrutiny to see if it is true. To be
specific, it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an
instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there is a
difference between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it
presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition
on the other, independent and separated from it, and yet is
something real; or in other words, it presupposes that cognition
which, since it is excluded from the Absolute, is surely outside of
the truth as well, is nevertheless true, an assumption whereby
what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the
truth. 76
Hegel thinks that the impossibility of a presuppositionless
beginning is not a problem for his own epistemology, for he sees a link
between natural consciousness, insofar as this attitude makes any
knowledge claims at all, and true knowledge. Since consciousness is self-
76Hegel, Phenomenology , page 47, #74.
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reflective, since it knows itself, it carries its criteria for knowledge with
it. True knowledge or science according to Hegel exists from the
beginning, in the simplest most naive pose of consciousness. The criteria
for knowledge are, therefore, necessarily present within the first claims
of consciousness to possess knowledge, since implicit in a knowledge
claim is a presupposed characterization of what knowledge is. If I claim
to know, I am simultaneously claiming to know that I know, which in
turn requires that I know, in some sense, what it is to have knowledge.
Thus consciousness is able to use its presupposed standard of
knowledge as a telos to guide its search. The fact that cognition begins
within a perspective which already contains a determination of truth, and
is possessed of an "instrument" which cannot be set aside, is to Hegel
that which grants the possibility of arriving at unconditioned knowledge.
Due to consciousness' self-reflexive structure, its reach will always
exceed its grasp until it has fully actualized itself by attaining what Hegel
calls "the Absolute," which is a knowledge of the whole. Hegel therefore
places positive value on the perspectival nature of cognitive
consciousness, for it is consciousness' original orientation, and the
presuppositions about truth contained therein, which ultimately lead it to
true and complete knowledge. But is Hegel's criticism of Kant warranted?
Does Kant attempt to critique the object of knowledge without at the
same time using it? If not, what restrictions does the "instrument"
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impose on Kant's methodological perspective? Is his perspective itself
legitimate according to the standards for knowledge at which his
epistemological inquiry finally arrives, or does his epistemological
perspective transgress the limits of cognition which his theory
determines?
Kant's Transgression
That Kant believed it both necessary and possible to examine and
critique the faculty of knowledge is uncontroversial. A critique was
necessary, according to Kant, in order to guarantee freedom from the
error which could result from the "dogmatic" employment of reason to
produce metaphysical knowledge a priori. 77
It is upon this enquiry, which should be entitled not a doctrine,
but only a transcendental critique, that we are now engaged. Its
purpose is not to extend knowledge, but only to correct it, and to
supply a touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of all a priori
knowledge. Such a critique is therefore a preparation, so far as
may be possible, for an organon; . . . what here constitutes our
subject-matter is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible,
but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of
things; and this understanding, again, only in respect of its a priori
knowledge. These a priori possessions of the understanding, since
they have not to be sought for without, cannot remain hidden
from us . . .we are concerned only with the critique of the faculty
of pure reason itself. Only insofar as we build upon this
77See, for example, Kant, Critique , page A12 = B26.
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foundation do we have a reliable touchstone for estimating the
philosophical value of old and new works in this field. 78
Until, therefore, the faculty of knowledge could be legitimated by means
of a critique which would determine its proper domain, it would be
necessary to tread carefully, to avoid using the faculty of knowledge
dogmatically in a way productive of any new knowledge. 79 It was thus
Kant s intention to avoid the production of new knowledge until after the
faculty of knowledge could be determined to have passed inspection;
however, this intention is problematic for Kant. Kant's transcendental
epistemology, in studying the operations of mental synthesis performed
by the understanding, is a reflection upon the understanding's use of
concepts as applied to an immediately given sensible manifold. How is
this reflection possible? For, if this epistemological reflection is to yield
knowledge, it appears that it must employ the very faculty which it
studies, for the understanding is the faculty of knowledge. But Kant's
alleged intention is to refrain from the actual use of the faculty of
knowledge until its abilities have been determined by the critique. There
is thus from the outset an ambiguity with respect to the ability of the
mind to gain knowledge of itself and the status of this "knowledge" once
it is achieved. Even if we consider Kant's critique to be using primarily
78Kant, Critique , pages B26-27 = A13-14.
79See, for example, Kant, Critique , pages A xii, and B 22-23.
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the higher level faculty of reason rather than the understanding, as
various textual passages suggest, 80 the reflexivity problem remains, for
reason in this case is still being applied to itself.
There is, however, one advantage which may be made
comprehensible and of interest even to the most refractory and
reluctant learner, the advantage, that while the understanding,
occupied merely with its empirical employment, and not reflecting
upon the sources of its own knowledge, may indeed get along
quire satisfactorily, there is yet one task to which it is not equal,
that namely, of determining the limits of its employment, and of
knowing what it is that may lie within and what it is that lies
without its own proper sphere. This demands just those deep
enquiries which we have instituted. 81
Kant, in the very next paragraph, denies the legitimacy of the
"transcendental" employment of the understanding, which he equates
with the application of the concepts and principles of the understanding
to things-in-themselves. 82 Thus it would seem that, although it is
perfectly appropriate to regard empirical objects as the causes of our
representations of them at the empirical level, it is illegitimate to make an
80See for example "The Doctrine of Pure Reason" Critique, pages A721,
B749 for passages which suggest that Kant's critique is a self-reflective use of
reason rather than merely the understanding.
Also see Gilles Deleuze for a lucid and masterful interpretation of the
confusing issue of the various faculties of reason and their relationships to each
other in Kant's writings. Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine
nf the Faculties , translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
81 Kant, Critique , page A238 = B298.
82 Kant, Critique , page A239 = B298.
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analogous inference from the perspective of a transcendental inquiry and
to regard things-in-themselves as causes of appearances. But this
restriction is problematic when we consider that Kant's critique offers a
transcendental account of faculties, syntheses, judgments, principles,
rules and concepts whose function is to bring about, to synthesize, the
realm of appearances and our objective knowledge thereof. Kant's
transcendental account of the functioning of empirical consciousness
appears to be the same account given by the empirical idealists, except
that, for Kant, the mind's use of a causal inference (from mental
representation to object) appears to itself to take place at the
transcendental level. Thus empirical consciousness, when it self-reflects,
must come to the realization that its experience is the result of a
synthetic activity which, in accordance with a causal rule, is forced to
take its own perceptions as secondary in the objective temporal order,
and as therefore causally dependent upon the externally existing objects.
A pre-experiential employment of the concept of causality has been
shown to be necessary as the ground of the original and immediate
experience of objects as already there, temporally prior to empirical
awareness. This transcendental employment of the understanding's
category of causality allows empirical consciousness to view empirical
objects as real and as the causes of mental representations. External
objects are known, at the level of empirical experience, immediately
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because the transcendental understanding determines that something
given from without must have caused its mental representations. Thus,
for Kant, as the empirical idealists held, an acquaintance with the mind's
inner contents logically precedes empirical knowledge of objects
(although this logical order is then reversed by the pre-experiential mind
when the mental representations are themselves placed in the objective
temporal order of experience and considered to be effects of the
empirical objects as their cause). Kant's transcendental account thus
appears to require an illegitimate extension of the category of causality
beyond the possibility of experience. As we have seen, this use of
causality is embedded in the theory itself as part of the explanation of
the workings of the transcendental mind.
But this illegitimate transcendental employment of causality is also
methodologically employed as part of the explanation for the grounding
of empirical realism by the transcendental account; for the transcendental
theory is Kant's story of the pre-empirical mental operations of synthesis
which causally contribute to our empirical experience. Not only then does
Kant's theory violate its own strictures on legitimate knowledge, but it
appears that his progress over the empirical idealists is merely illusory.
We have to ask, as did the empirical idealists at the empirical level,
whether the mind operating transcendentally could not have entirely
created the totality of its representations. It again appears that Kant has
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merely displaced the idealism and skepticism which he has claimed to
refute. The transcendental story, as we have seen, if it is to explain and
ground the possibility of objective empirical knowledge, must be taken as
a description of the behind the scenes mental activities which function to
cause the appearances to empirical consciousness. Thus the theory must
apply the understanding's concepts (for example, of causality) to these
transcendental operations. How then can Kant claim the right to engage
in transcendental critique?
Analytic Entailment as Another Strategy of Avoidance
Kant's critique gives us a cognitively significant discourse about
the transcendental functioning of reason and its various faculties. If this
discourse should not be understood to be knowledge, lest a transgression
of the theory of knowledge be entailed, just what is its significance and
how then can it provide a foundation for empirical knowledge? Kant's
apparent answer is that the transcendental story is not itself synthetic
knowledge, but is merely an analysis. Thus, although the empirical
understanding is capable, at its extreme limit, of achieving synthetic
knowledge a priori about the forms of possible experience in general, the
faculty which examines the understanding itself may yield only analytic
propositions.
Accordingly the Transcendental Analytic leads to this important
conclusion, that the most the understanding can achieve a priori
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is to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general
and the proud name of an Ontology that presumptuously claims
to supply, in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori
knowledge of things in general (for instance, the principle of
causality) must, therefore, give place to the modest title of a
mere Analytic of pure understanding. 83
Thus, the Transcendental Aesthetic," in its analysis of sensibility, entails
the theory of space and time as the pure forms of all possible intuition.
Likewise, the "Transcendental Analytic," in its deduction of the
functional necessity of the categories of the understanding for empirical
awareness, analytically arrives at the theory of transcendental syntheses.
If Kant is correct that "transcendental analysis" may be used to produce
a critique of the faculty of knowledge in such a way that the
understanding need not be self-referentially employed in the very manner
which is to be the object of investigation, he has successfully eluded one
horn of the critic's dilemma, and perhaps Hegel's criticism is ill-founded.
An analysis of experience is not a transgression of the limits of
experience, but merely a drawing out of the implications of that
knowledge which we already appear to possess. Kant has then found a
way to critique the instrument of knowledge without illegitimately using
that instrument. But is this answer really open to Kant?
As we have seen, Kant was forced to posit operations of the
understanding at a level beneath empirical consciousness, as the
83 Kant, Critique
,
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necessary preconditions of our experience of objective reality. If, as Kant
wants to claim, our understanding of these pre-experiential operations is
no more than an analysis of the experience of empirical consciousness,
he cannot draw by analysis any account which is less open to doubt than
the experience which he seeks to justify. Since prior to Kant's
epistemological inquiry the legitimacy of empirical knowledge is precisely
that which is held in question, he cannot then rely upon empirical
experience as an established premise to support the truth of its analytic
entailments. Even if we allow Kant the use of the most incorrigible
premise possible for his deduction arguments, the premise that
consciousness is experienced as a unity, 84 the transcendental account
which he demonstrates as following cannot make more certain the truth
of that premise than it already is. Furthermore, as Kant makes clear in his
discussion of the "paralogism of rational psychology" ( Critique . B407-
414), the "I think" of self-apperception which serves as the basis for the
deduction arguments must be understood not as an intuition, but as an
analytic proposition. Thus the premise of the deductions is not, strictly
speaking, an instance of knowledge, but a mere thought. Further
entailments of this thought can therefore never attain the status of
84This reading is of course controversial in Kant scholarship; some
commentators think that Kant's premise is the proposition that we do possess
legitimate synthetic knowledge a priori in the form of math. See the
Prolegomena for the clearest textual support. I follow Robert Paul Wolff and
others in reading Kant as arguing from the more foundational premise of the
unity of consciousness. See Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity.
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knowledge. If the thought of the 'I think' does not securely ground an
inference to the existence of an I which thinks, then how can it ground
additional inferences to knowledge? If the mere appearance, thought, or
mental representation of empirical knowledge is not good enough for the
epistemological skeptic (such as Hume), then neither should be the
logical entailment of that appearance. Since, as Kant famously shows in
the "Transcendental Dialectic," "existence is not a predicate" which can
add synthetic content to our concept of an object, no argument can take
us from a concept, or mental representation, to an actuality. Mere logic
cannot ground synthetic knowledge in the way in which the skeptic who
is unsatisfied with an idealism can accept. Kant's argument therefore
amounts to the following: the transcendental meaning of the apparent
experience of empirical consciousness of itself as a unity appears to be
that, at some (apparently) deeper, more transcendental level, (apparent)
syntheses of the (apparently given) manifold (apparently) take place.
Kant's empirical realism therefore collapses back into an idealism which
holds the entire realm of experience of empirical consciousness to be an
appearance.
Furthermore, the transcendental story is a meaning at which the
empirical perspective arrives in its self reflections. Once again, we must
wonder why the empirical consciousness does not itself accept the
deeper belief that objects are appearances as the "real truth," but holds,
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as Kant claims, to an empirical realism. The empirical idealists were
wrong, according to Kant, because they believed that legitimate
knowledge must be of things-in-themselves. Kant denies the possibility of
knowledge of things-in-themselves, and so relies upon the concepts of
necessity and universality in order to justify empirical knowledge by
distinguishing it from empirical illusion. However, at a higher level of
reflection, 'objectivity' and 'necessity' must be taken to mean
'synthesized by the mind according to rules'. But the knowledge that
actual syntheses according to actual rules have actually taken place
cannot itself be certain, for the epistemological theory follows, as an
analytic entailment, from the apparent experience of empirical reality.
Empirical knowledge is therefore grounded in its apparent objectivity and
necessity. But how is this grounding any more secure than a grounding in
its apparent independent reality (which the empirical idealists already
had)? Thus, Kant's attempt at avoiding the charge of self-refutation with
respect to his own theoretical position requires that he deny his own
epistemic access to an independent reality, but this denial then
undermines his ability to offer a theory which has sufficient certainty and
substantiality to ground our (merely) apparent empirical knowledge . 85
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lt has been suggested that perhaps we should see the transcendental story
not as an analytic entailment of empirical consciousness, but as a hypothetical
induction from the possibility of empirical knowledge. But this doesn't change
the basic criticism. In fact, this interpretation is one that was commonly
attributed to the Critique, although other defenders of Kant (such as R.P. Wolff,
see Kant's Theory of Mental Activity ) see it as only operative in the
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Other Commentators
My analysis of the ways in which Kant fails to justify his own
critical method, as well as to ground his result (in the confinement of
knowledge to its appropriate sphere), offers one way of looking at the
matter. As I've already pointed out, my interpretation has been
necessarily limited to a portion of Kant's philosophy. Indeed, other
commentators have identified additional areas of contradiction and
inconsistency in Kant's critical enterprise which can be attributed to the
fundamental tension between the dual requirements (of immanence and
transcendence) of a critique of reason by itself. In this section, I will
examine several of these interpretations with a view toward the
significance these commentators attribute to the various ways in which
Kant fails at his critical project.
Prolegomena, where Kant employs it for the purpose of giving a popularly
accessible exposition. If the transcendental deductions are merely attempts to
explain how knowledge is possible, given the already presupposed premise that
empirical knowledge is firmly and factually in our possession, then Kant s
project is not to legitimate or ground that knowledge, but only to speculate on
why we do indeed have it. The critical force of Kant's epistemology as an
answer to Humean skepticism is thus forfeit.
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Strawsonian Discipline
P.F. Strawson, in his extremely influential study, The Bounds n f
Sense
,
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attempts a reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that
separates out the unpalatable "metaphysics of transcendental idealism,"
and keeps only the arguments and doctrines that Strawson considers
acceptable those which identify the structural necessities and
preconditions for empirical knowledge in the presupposed concepts of
the understanding, as well as Kant s specification of the requirements for
meaningful discourse, or what Strawson calls Kant's "principle of
signification. According to Strawson's reading, this principle draws the
boundary between the realms of meaningful discourse and nonsense by
demonstrating the lack of ability to verify metaphysical claims about
things-in-themselves. On this reading, metaphysics is meaningless and
Kant becomes a logical positivist. Strawson realizes of course that this is
not Kant's intention; nevertheless he holds that Kant's contribution can
best be understood in this manner. Strawson therefore rejects in its
entirety Kant's transcendental idealism, which he reads as a disguised
phenomenalism. 87 Strawson sees Kant's idealism as entailing a
86
P.F.. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason
.
(London: Methuen & Co LTD, 1966).
87Phenomenalism is the theory that physical objects are nothing more than
constructions of sense data; thus our mental representations are accorded more
reality and logical priority over those objects. Major proponents of
phenomenalism have included Berkeley (on some interpretations), and Russell
(at some times).
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metaphysical position such that Kant holds not merely that we cannot
know supersensible reality, but rather that “reality is supersensible and
we can have no knowledge of it." 88 Given this reading, it is obvious that
Kant has violated the terms of his own theory of knowledge (for, of
course, Kant should not claim to have any knowledge of the nature of
ultimate reality), but Strawson's analysis is more interesting than this
general criticism in his particular accounts of the variety of
inconsistencies and failures which Kant's insistence on maintaining the
transcendental idealist posture entail.
Strawson's reading of particular inconsistencies in Kant's theory
takes as basic the “principle of significance," which he attributes to Kant
as one of Kant's major insights. The way in which Strawson sees
transcendental idealism as itself a violation of this principle can be seen
to embody Strawson's understanding of the nature of critique. According
to Strawson, a basic mistake Kant makes is to misunderstand the realm
of application of a reality/appearance distinction. Transcendental
idealism, according to Strawson, parallels a legitimate and natural
epistemological line of reasoning, but it simply goes too far. In order to
draw a meaningful distinction between reality and appearance, two
criteria must be met according to Strawson. The critic who draws such a
distinction must have access to two standpoints —one will be the view
88Strawson, Bounds , page 38.
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to which the object merely appears (in our model of the structural
requirements of critique, this is the immanent standpoint); while the
other will be what Strawson calls "the corrected view" (for us, this is the
transcendent and normative perspective). Furthermore, these two
standpoints must connect in such a way that identity of reference can be
established, so that the object as appearance and the object seen by the
corrected view are guaranteed to be the same object. (In our discussion
of the immanent and transcendent perspectives used by Kant, it was
important to establish that the empirical consciousness was connected to
the transcendental consciousness in order to claim, as I did, that the
transcendental consciousness should have been taken by the empirical
consciousness as its own "corrected view.") As Strawson points out,
these two requirements for the meaningful use of a reality/appearance
distinction are met in the account of sense-perception given by such
empiricists as Locke, who apply the distinction within experience to
objects of the senses versus objects of epistemological theory and of
natural science. The former have "secondary" qualities such as color,
which are the result of the interaction of the object with our perceptual
apparatus. But science and epistemology can discern the objects in their
"real" constitution with only their "primary" qualities which cause our
perceptions . 89 These requirements are not however met, according to
89See Strawson, Bounds , pages 250-253.
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Strawson, when we attempt to apply the distinction beyond the realm of
possible experience as, he claims, does Kant, to argue that all spatio-
temporal objects, even those of scientific theory, are appearances, while
the real reality is beyond the possibility of our acquaintance. This type of
talk, according to Strawson, is nonsense and gets Kant into all sorts of
trouble. Stemming from this initial crossing of the boundary into the
transcendental, other incoherences arise.
That Kant fails to satisfy the conditions for a significant
application of the contrast between things as they really are and
things as they appear— that, indeed, he violates his own principle
of significance both in his application of this contrast and in the
associated use of the concept of cause— is, perhaps, a point
evident enough. We are left with the task of trying to explain, if
we can, the striking parallel which we have noted and the even
more striking failure of that parallel, the extraordinary
transposition of the whole terminology of things affecting
faculties which takes that terminology entirely outside the range
of its intelligible employment, viz. The spatio-temporal range. . . .
The extraordinary generality of Kant's thinking is constantly
90Further inconsistencies in Kant's theory are seen by Strawson as resulting
from the basic absurdity of transcendental idealism. For example, Strawson
points out the problem we've already discussed in the above section on the
"Refutations of Idealism" of reconciling the claim that external objects are only
representations and the claim that we are immediately conscious of external
objects as independently existing. Although Strawson sees the solution I have
offered that each claim comes from a different perspective, he does not feel
that this is sufficient to diminish the inconsistency. Given my interpretation of
the connection between the two perspectives of consciousness, and my
consequent charge of bad faith on the part of the empirical consciousness, and
Kant himself, I end up, although by a different route, in agreement with
Strawson that the inconsistency remains.
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straining against what he himself recognized as the limits of
intelligibility. 91
In an attempt to rehabilitate Kant and render his work useful and
meaningful for contemporary philosophy, Strawson's interpretation
isolates what he considers to be the positive and insightful aspects of
Kant's critique. The relevance of this attempt for our purposes is that
Strawson can be seen as offering a way to make Kant's critical
enterprise successful at eluding the critical paradox of self-refutation.
According to Strawson, we must simply ignore the transcendental
idealist metaphysics. But then are we left with anything resembling a
secure foundation for knowledge? Or have we not given up on the
authoritative and normative functions of critique and resigned ourselves
to the anxious uncertainty of skepticism and self-doubt? The answer, I
believe, is the latter; for, as I have already argued above, if the force of
Kant's critical epistemology is merely that of a logical analysis of our
present (i.e., before the critique) state of cognitive consciousness then
our epistemic certainty after the analysis cannot be any greater, for the
entailment is logically dependent on the premise. Although it may seem
tempting to follow Strawson in excising from Kant everything that
violates the requirements on legitimate knowledge, to do so would be to
lose the normative force of the theory. Without the transcendental
91 Strawson, Bounds
,
page 255.
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account of the synthetic activity of the transcendental mind, and the
epistemological- transcendental perspective according to which space
and time are forms of intuition, Kant may no longer be guilty of self-
refutation, but neither could he claim the victory over Humean skepticism
of his "Copernican revolution." Thus Strawson's way of solving the
problem of inconsistencies in Kant's critical theory sacrifices the
achievement which motivated the theory in the first place. The
authorizing and normative aspect of critique, the transcendent ability of
critique to establish legitimacy by setting standards, is forfeit on
Strawson s reading, as it insists too rigorously upon the maintenance of
an immanent posture which restricts even the epistemological critical
perspective to the empirical as the sole arena of meaningfulness.
The Transcendence of Theory: Deleuze
Deleuze, in Kant's Critical Philosophy
.
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offers a way of reading
Kant's critical project which can be seen in our terms as embracing the
directly opposing horn of the critical dilemma as that taken by Strawson.
Rather than insisting upon the necessity of immanence of the critic in the
object of critique, and thereby losing the capacity to achieve the
92 Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy, translated by Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1984).
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transcendence which the positing of critical standards requires, Deleuze
emphasizes the transcendent capacity in such a way that theoretical
reason is seen to be itself subordinate to reason in its ethical and
aesthetic, or practical modes. Deleuze engages in a reading of the entire
critical corpus, seeing the variety of rational faculties that Kant
investigates as operating in a hierarchical harmony. Theoretical reason on
this reading will necessarily be limited and must yield to the higher
authority of reason as judge . 93 Thus, according to Deleuze, Kant's first
two Critiques" (The Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of
Practical Reason ) find their completion and ground only in the third (The
Critique of Judgment) .
Deleuze's understanding of the faculties in Kant sees them as
being ordered according to the principle of reason's natural and proper
interests. Deleuze, quite rightly, points out that Kant's critiques stand
against empiricism's position that reason is purely instrumental and that
it is only nature in the form of human desire and instinct that can have
interests and range over ends. For Kant, reason's interests are served by
93Among contemporary readers of Kant, this view is becoming increasingly
popular. The most rigorous and committed attempt that I know to work this
view out, not only as an interpretation of Kant, but also as an independently
argued ontology of human being, can be found in Hannah Arendt's The Life of
the Mind . To our great misfortune, she died leaving the third and according to
her own admission, most fundamental, functional capacity of reason— that of
judging — incompletely analyzed. Other readers of Kant who see theoretical
reason as grounded in the aesthetic and/or the political (for Arendt, aesthetic
judgment is the political faculty) include Howard Caygill, Susan Meld Shell, and
Kimberly Hutchings.
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Its various faculties; for example the speculative interest is given to be
met by the faculty of knowledge
.
94
Furthermore, within this functional
division of faculties according to their ends, there are additional faculties
depending upon the source of the mental representation each provides.
Thus, for example, the faculty of knowledge comprises the faculty of
sensibility (which provides intuitions), and the active faculties of
imagination, understanding, and reason. The various faculties have an
optimal manner of relating to each other, one which will meet in the
highest, or most autonomous way, the larger interest or end of reason
which is to be served. On this point, we can see (as Deleuze points out)
that Kant's epistemological theory (as embodied in this faculty
psychology) differs from rationalism (as well as empiricism) by holding
that reason's true ends are given not from without, as rationalism (in
agreement with empiricism) holds (e.g. God, Truth, the Good), but
autonomously. Thus Kant's theory of faculties, according to Deleuze,
enables him to establish for reason its autonomous power over its
objects and itself and hence its ability to engage in critique. It is,
according to Deleuze, the theory of faculties that constitutes the essence
of Kant's critical transcendental method. We can therefore see that
Deleuze's reading provides an additional explanation for the failure of a
94There are also the faculties of desire and that of the feeling of pleasure and
pain, obviously corresponding to the other two of Kant's "Critiques."
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reading like Strawson's to account for or to allow the possibility of
Kantian critique. The critical capacity as Deleuze understands it is a
function of the transcendental account of the nature of the mind.
There is however, a problem that Deleuze identifies in Kant's
faculty theory which bears on our project to find in Kant a theoretical
ground for his capacity of critique. The problem is that the theoretical
transcendental account of faculties still falls short of grounding the
certainty of knowledge. The faculties of knowledge ( e.g ., sensibility and
understanding) differ in nature such that one is legislative and active, the
other passive. But then Kant needs to explain the way in which these
two radically different faculties accord with one another. To do so, he
invokes the action (called the "schematism") of the imagination which
will prepare the sensible intuition for the application of the
understanding's concepts. But this solution doesn't really solve the
preexisting problem of epistemology (in both rationalism and empiricism)
of relating the unformed data of sensation with the general forms of
concepts and principles.
... in order to explain how passive sensibility accords with active
understanding, Kant invokes the synthesis and the schematism of
the imagination which is applicable a priori to the forms of
sensibility in conformity with concepts. But in this way the
problem is merely shifted: for the imagination and the
understanding themselves differ in nature, and the accord
between these two active faculties is no less 'mysterious'
(likewise the accord between understanding and reason).
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It would seem that Kant runs up against a formidable
difficulty. We have seen that he rejected the idea of a
preestablished harmony between subject and object, substituting
the principle of a necessary submission of the object to the
subject itself. But does he not once again come up with the idea
of harmony, simply transposed to the level of faculties of the
subject which differ in nature? 95
Deleuze thus in essence agrees with my conclusion that Kant's
empirical realism isn't sufficiently established by his transcendental
idealism; that there remains a contradiction or gulf between these two
realms, perspectives, discourses, or aspects of knowledge. For Deleuze,
this gulf is not adequately bridged in theory, but is left to be accounted
for in the nature of reason's "higher" non-speculative faculties.
Oscillation: Howard and Hutchings
In addition to the above two examples of interpretations of Kantian
critique that embrace the two extremes of immanence (Strawson) and
transcendence (Deleuze), there is another logical theoretical possibility for
those who accept the paradoxical nature and dual necessities of critique
as both immanent and transcendent. This is to embrace the paradox and
to require that critique remain in an ambiguous tension, never grounded
or stabilized in either pole. Two recent commentators have held such a
view. Dick Howard, whose characterization of critique as comprising
95Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy , page 22.
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both a genetic and a normative moment we have already discussed in
Chapter One, explores this characterization through a reading of Kant. 96
Thus according to Howard, Kant's first Critique offers both a genetic
explanation or ground for the possibility of critical reason which is given
in the A edition deduction; and an attempted legitimation via grounding in
normative objectivity for our purely rational knowledge in the B edition
deduction. Kant found it necessary to give both versions, according to
Howard, because neither alone is capable of grounding the double nature
of critique. Howard therefore sees the theoretical solution to the
grounding problem as consisting in an admission that there are structures
of meaning which elude characterization in simple terms, but which are
ontologically "originary" or symbolic. Thus critique as an activity which
combines a need for both normativity and genesis, theory and practice,
philosophy and politics can be reduced to neither, and will constantly
alternate between the two poles. Thus Howard insists that philosophy
must be supplemented with politics and critique with criticism (which is
self-consciously biased in a way which it doesn't attempt to defend) if
these two poles are to be adequately addressed. But the problem with
this so called solution lies in the nature of the relation between these two
poles. Since the relation is "symbolic" and neither conceptually necessary
96Howard, The Politics of Critique , and From Marx to Kant (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1985).
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nor actual or real, there is no way of answering the skeptic who denies
that the theory is adequate to the practice or that the beliefs or
knowledge we profess to have are justified on the basis of anything
either empirical or theoretical. The legitimation or grounding is insecure,
based upon a structural entity that eludes rationality. Once again we
might as well appeal to mysticism, a god, or faith in human freedom.
Similarly, Kimberly Hutchings 97 sees critique as structured by the
needs of immanence and transcendence, and finds this paradoxical
construct in Kant's critical theory. She argues that it is not possible either
to escape or to instantiate the duality, but that the critic's task is to
"oscillate" between the two poles.
Kantian critique is premised on both the limitation of reason and
the assumption of the capacity of reason to transcend that
limitation in the process of critique. From the beginning, therefore,
critique is an impossible task. The philosophical richness of
critique lies in the ways in which it is an exploration of its own
impossibility. In an effort to deduce the legitimate scope of
theoretical reason, practical reason and judgement, the Kantian
critic takes on the roles of legislator, warmonger and judge, but
each time the authority of critique appears to be grounded it is
always undermined. The alternatives of dogmatism and
speculation which critique was intended to transcend continually
threaten the work of the critic . 98
97 Kimberly Hutchings, Kant. Critique and Politics (New York: Routledge,
1996 ).
"Hutchings, Kant. Critique, and Politics , pagel.
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Again, I would have to say that this solution to see critique as
impossible, tempting as it may be, is unsatisfactory to the theoretical
skeptical critic. Before giving up and embracing such a "cop out" I
suggest that we continue to explore the theoretical attempts to ground
the possibility of critique and to perform a critique of reason itself. One
such attempt lies in Hegel's critical extension of the Kantian project.
Hegel: Phenomenology as Immanent Critique
Hegel's Phenomenology 99 can be seen as a deduction of the
possibility of authentic or "absolute" knowledge from the premise of a
basic and ordinary "stage" ( Gestalt ) or act of consciousness. In this
respect, Hegel's critical epistemology is comparable to Kant's
"transcendental deductions," which likewise attempt to deduce the
possibility of knowledge that was held by skepticism to be questionable
(synthetic a priori propositions) from the fundamental premise of an
aspect or feature of consciousness which he held to be irrefutable . 100 As
"Although many of Hegel's writings contain criicisms of Kant, in what
follows I will be focusing on the Phenomenology as my main souce. This is
because, as several commentators have pointed out, the Phenomenology can be
seen as Hegel's attempt to deduce the possibility of "absolute knowledge" from
a preliminary and basic stage of consciousness. Thus a close comparison with
Kant's "transcendental deductions" of the possibility of knowledge is
warranted.
100There is certainly (at least one) basic and important difference between
Kant's and Hegel's starting points even though both have to do with a
fundamental feature or pose of consciousness. For Hegel, the premise with
which he begins is actually performed or taken up— it is an experience of
consciousness; for Kant, however, the "I think" of consciousness is of
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we have seen above, Hegel took issue with Kant's methodological
presupposition that epistemology needs to examine its "instrument" prior
to its actual use. This original assumption of skepticism, this "mistrust,"
according to Hegel, is a mistake which resulted in Kant's inability to
realize the full potential of human reason. We need not, and indeed
cannot "examine" the instrument, but simply should put it to use (if we
must look at cognition as an instrument at all). For Hegel, then, the
"proof" of the possibility of genuine knowledge comes via its
demonstration in the process of knowing.
Thus, the Phenomenology offers a narrative account of the
development of philosophical consciousness or knowledge from out of its
pre-reflective origin. The foundation or starting point of "Absolute
Knowledge" is, for Hegel, the pre-theoretical orientation of the subject to
the object of cognition, out of which self-reflective, philosophical
cognition develops as a matter of course. Hence, Hegel's method is one
of immanent critique, for the motor for the development of
consciousness comes about from within the consciousness itself. The
development cannot be a consequence of the imposition of external
necessity a proposition. For Kant, the transcendental unity of consciousness is
never experienced, for experience can only be of the phenomenal self. See The
"Paralogisms" where Kant explicitly argues that we have no experience of the
transcendental or noumenal self; and that Descartes and others have simply
confused the "unity of experience" with the "experience of unity." This point is
obviously crucial for my analysis of Kant's failure discussed above, for the
inability of Kant's analysis to ground the actuality of knowledge depends on his
analysis remaining outside of experience.
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standards of correctness, under whose dictates consciousness purges
itself of whatever does not measure up. The standards used are
prescribed by the consciousness to itself. Every form of consciousness is
therefore for Hegel already critical, and he has no need, prior to the
enactment of his study, to identify and to separate out critical reason
from its non-critical or instrumental use in order to use the former to
study the latter (as we have seen to be Kant's procedure). The
normative-transcendent aspect of critical reason belongs immanently to
every form of consciousness (or instance of attempted cognition),
according to Hegel, so that the epistemic development (from less to
greater knowledge) proceeds from within the object of Hegel's critique.
The self-movement of consciousness that Hegel studies thus
proceeds "dialectically," as the consciousness under study becomes
aware of its internal contradictions and attempts their resolution. The
nature of consciousness, for Hegel, is, therefore, a dialectical tension
between what we have been calling the immanent and transcendent
poles of critical reason . 101 Since this dialectical development takes place
within the object under study, i.e., the form of consciousness which is
undergoing the critique, the task of the philosopher who narrates this
account will be that of an observer who merely describes. Hegel
101 Thus Hegel can be seen as an important forerunner of Adorno's and
Horkheimer's view of the dialectical nature of reason.
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therefore apparently eludes one horn of the critical dilemma by avoiding
an illegitimate transcendence out of the object of critique. His position,
as the philosophic observer of the form of consciousness under study, is
not one of normative outsider, but merely of passive observer. The
critique is enacted solely on the "inside," so to speak, of the form of
consciousness which is the object of the critique. The story of the
developing consciousness will be a "phenomenology," while its subject
matter, the object of study of the phenomenologist, will be the self-
development of consciousness through its various forms of cognition.
But is this distinction (between the phenomenologist as observer and the
active critical consciousness that exists on the inside of the object of
critique), which enables Hegel to escape the critical dilemma by engaging
in critique without transcendent activity on his part, really tenable?
The Dialectical Experience of Consciousness and Immanent Critique
For Hegel, as well as for Kant, the reflexivity of consciousness is
its most essential feature. It is this feature that allows Hegel to see
consciousness as a connected continuum, ranging from less to more self-
reflective. Thus the foundation or starting point of Hegel's "deduction" of
the possibility of authentic knowledge can, like Kant's, begin in a basic
act of consciousness, which Hegel follows as it then takes itself as
object, in self-reflection. We find in the Phenomenology that
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consciousness is self-relational, reflexive, always aware of both its object
and itself. It is this feature of consciousness which grounds the
possibility of the critique within each form of consciousness, as each
given act, stage, or form of consciousness in turn transcends itself
toward greater knowledge. Consciousness, according to Hegel, moves
itself by means of acts of progressive self-reflection, and thereby gains
"experience" (Erfahrung).
Hegel therefore relies upon a link between natural consciousness,
insofar as this attitude makes any knowledge claims at all, and true
knowledge or science. Thus it will not be necessary for Hegel (the
phenomenologist) to apply standards from the outside in order to judge
of a knowledge claim or instance of knowing whether it measures up to
some independently determined essence of knowledge. It is, therefore,
according to Hegel, by means of its own immanent essence that
"Science" is able to distinguish itself from its mere appearance or the
pretension to knowledge of an instance of cognition. Science, according
to Hegel, "liberates itself" from its mere appearance or semblance by
"turning against" its false manifestation ( Phenomenology, #76). This
process of "turning against" its appearance in which science engages is a
progressive realization or actualizing of the "Notion" or concept
("Begriff") of science, which any consciousness claiming to have
knowledge must presuppose. Cognitive consciousness is self-relational,
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for its activity is to think or make a concept or "notion" of itself— i.e., to
presuppose true knowledge as its essence or standard.
Consciousness, however, is explicitly the Notion of itself. Hence
it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits are
its own, it is something that goes beyond itself. 102
Consciousness' continual movement of self-transcendence is propelled by
the discrepancy between its self-posited essence or "notion," and its
actual state of knowledge. Due to this self-reflective structure, Hegel
appears to be capable of maintaining immanence in the totality which he
critiques. He does not need, as did Kant, to try to transcend the
capabilities of the pre-critical object of knowledge. Hegel, therefore,
believes that he has a solution to the "problem of the criterion," for it is
not necessary to know, explicitly and in advance, what knowledge is in
order to attempt to learn about the nature of knowledge. All that is
necessary is to let consciousness' self-posited standards guide the
epistemological inquiry.
"Experience" is gained, according to Hegel, as consciousness
"reverses itself" ( Phenomenology . #87) by reflecting upon the
discrepancy or gap between the object in-itself and the object for-
consciousness. By means of this self-reflection, consciousness is made
aware of its own active involvement in determining the nature of its
object. Consciousness realizes that the object which it has posited as in-
102Hegel, Phenomenology . #80.
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itself is really only in itself" for consciousness. This realization denies
the "in-itself" existence of consciousness' first object, and in so doing,
implicitly posits as a presupposition another object "in-itself," which
becomes the truth or standard in comparison to which the previous
object (which is now understood to be only "for-consciousness") is
judged inadequate. This self-movement proceeds via the following steps:
first, consciousness splits its awareness into an awareness of its object
as it exists apart from consciousness, or as it is "in-itself," and an
awareness of its awareness of the object, or an awareness of the object
"for consciousness."
For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the
object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness
of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of
the truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, this
consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for this same
consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object
corresponds to the object or not. The object, it is true, seems only
to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it;
it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind the
object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the
object is in itself, and hence, too, cannot test its own knowledge
by that standard. But the distinction between the in-itself and
knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness
knows an object at all. Something is for it the in itself; and
knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is, for it,
110
another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact,
the examination rests. 103
The Phenomenological Consciousness as Transcendent to its Object
But this same pattern of movement must also constitute the
experience of the consciousness which is doing the study, or the
epistemological-phenomenological consciousness. If Hegel is right about
the structure of conscious experience in general, then the same structure
must likewise characterize his conscious experience insofar as he is
involved in a cognitive endeavor as the phenomenological observer. Thus,
Hegel's phenomenological consciousness must likewise immanently
contain a standard of knowledge which it will use to judge of its object
whether it is satisfactory. This standard is, of course, none other than
the actual development of the stage of consciousness under study— that
development as it takes place "in-itself," for Hegel's methodological
directive is to let the object of study perform its own critique . 104
103Hegel, Phenomenology . #85.
104Kenley Royce Dove sees the importance of this methodological point, and
accepts Hegel's characterization of the passive (i.e., non-transcendent) role of
the phenomenologist. According to Dove, "Hegel's method is radically
undialectical. It is the experience of consciousness itself which is dialectical and
Hegel's Phenomenology is a viable philosophical enterprise precisely to the
extent that it merely describes this dialectical process. The "new object"
therefore must not be introduced by the philosopher; it must arise out of the
course of the experience described-and not merely qua described, but through
itself."
See Kenley Royce Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," in Review of
Metaphysics , volume xxiii, 1970, pages 615-641.
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Consequently, we do not need to import criteria, or to make use
of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the
inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed
in contemplating the matter in hand as it is in and for itself
.
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But this standard is determined and presupposed nonetheless by the level
of consciousness of the phenomenologist, from which the inquiry is
being conducted. Since Hegel is concerned to avoid the illegitimacy of
transcendent critique, he attempts to "apprehend" rather than to
"comprehend" (Begreifen), for to comprehend is to posit a concept or
"notion" which serves as standard. But is this really possible? Hegel
believes that it is, so he refrains from allowing his consciousness to
interfere with the process of cognition being studied. He, therefore,
attempts to preserve the standard of truth posited by the object of study.
It is the essential truth of the object in-itself— independent of its being
studied — that Hegel, the phenomenologist, is after. Thus Hegel's method
must begin by "bracketing" the natural activity of his own
consciousness — that of positing the criterion or normative standard for
the truth of his investigation— so that this criterion may come from the
consciousness under study. What Hegel's method assumes is that the
essential reality or truth of the consciousness under study is accessible
to the unmediated and passive apprehension of the phenomenologist.
105Hegel, Phenomenology . #84.
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But isn't this initial assumption of the phenomenological method
already the positing of a standard or criterion — an "in-itself" against
which the object of knowledge can be measured? That Hegel collapses
the "in-itself" assumed by his own consciousness into the "in-itself" of
the object of study, does not absolve him of responsibility for originally
engaging in the transcendent-normative moment of critique. The
phenomenologist takes the "in-itself" of the object of study as the
standard for what is really going on in the process of consciousness'
coming into knowledge. Thus Hegel cannot claim, as the
phenomenologist, not to have drawn a distinction between appearance
and reality, for the intention of the phenomenologist, to let reality appear
for it as it is "in-itself," holds out as its own criterion the criterion or
reality of its object of study. The phenomenologist's truth is its object of
study as it is "in-itself." The phenomenological method presupposes the
object "in-itself" to be the source of true knowledge. Thus the
phenomenological consciousness is indeed critical, in the full sense which
includes the deployment of a standard or criterion for truth.
There is further evidence at Hegel's starting point that the
phenomenological consciousness begins its study by presupposing a
normative standard for knowledge. Hegel begins his exposition of the
progression of the forms of consciousness with "sense-certainty." The
rationality of this choice becomes clear once we realize that sense-
113
certainty is the simplest, least complex structure of cognitive
consciousness. Consciousness of sense-data comprises the least amount
of subject-object relations; sense-certainty is the least mediated, most
direct relation of consciousness to its object, for it is simple awareness of
a sensation. Thus sense-certainty must also be consciousness' most
general and universal form of experience. Every consciousness has
necessarily experienced sensory awareness. Hegel's choice of beginning
is therefore justified given that he seeks the essential nature of
consciousness and knowledge, in general, or the most basic features that
underlie all forms of consciousness. If Hegel can demonstrate the
possibility of a continual progression from sense-certainty to "Absolute
Knowledge," he will have shown that this experiential path exists for all
consciousness, and is therefore the truth of the totality of knowledge.
Thus, it is Hegel's intention at the start of the phenomenological
enterprise to seek the essential and total truth of knowledge, to grasp
knowledge, his object of study, in-itself. To "apprehend" the truth of
knowledge, must therefore be seen as simultaneously comprehending
that truth. Hegel's choice of starting point must then be seen as the
assumption of a normative standard for truth. Thus the phenomenological
consciousness, according to Hegel's own theory of the dialectic, and in
spite of Hegel's denial, must begin its inquiry with implicit
114
presuppositions about what counts as true knowledge, and, therefore,
with a normative criterion which will guide his search.
Furthermore, the phenomenological consciousness becomes aware
of its own activity as necessary to its dialectical progression toward
Absolute Knowledge." There comes a point at which the
phenomenological consciousness realizes that its own contribution to
knowledge is essential, and so gains its own experience and goes beyond
its own limits. That this point must occur is suggested by Hegel in the
Introduction to the Phenomenology
, where he makes explicit the
contribution of the phenomenological (or observing) consciousness to the
dialectical progression being studied. According to Hegel, the necessity
of the progression of consciousness from one form to another is seen
and understood only by the phenomenological consciousness; this
necessity is actually the "result" only of the perspective of "we
phenomenologists.
"
This way of looking at the matter is something contributed by us,
by means of which the succussion of experiences through which
consciousness passes is raised into a scientific progression — but it
is not known to the consciousness that we are observing. But, as
a matter of fact, ... in every case the result of an untrue mode
of knowledge must not be allowed to run away into an empty
nothing, but must necessarily be grasped as the nothing of that
from which it results—
a
result which contains what was true in
the preceding knowledge. . . But it is just this necessity itself, or
the origination of the new object, that presents itself to
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consciousness without its understanding how this happens, which
proceeds for us, as it were, behind the back of consciousness. 106
It is, according to Hegel, due to this necessity of the emergence of the
new object within the experience of the phenomenal consciousness being
studied, that "the way to Science is already Science" ( Phenomenology
#88). But since this necessity (of a "determinate" rather than of a merely
"abstract" negation) is the contribution of the phenomenological
consciousness, that consciousness must be understood as actively
involved in the dialectical progression toward Absolute Truth. Thus, the
phenomenological consciousness must gain cognitive experience by
means of a dialectical development which presupposes a normative
transcendence of its object.
Furthermore, there will come a point where the phenomenal
consciousness catches up, so to speak, and coincides with the
phenomenological consciousness. The phenomenal consciousness must
learn at some point that it has undergone a necessary dialectic, for the
"Absolute Knowledge" which it ultimately attains is knowledge of the
entire "Science of Consciousness." Thus the contribution of the
phenomenological consciousness must at some point be recognized by
the phenomenal consciousness to be essential to its own development.
At this point, the experience of the "phenomenological we" will become
106Hegel, Phenomenology . #87.
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bound up with the dialectical progression of the consciousness under
study. The phenomenal and phenomenological consciousnesses must
arrive at “Absolute Knowledge" together, for in the "Absolute," nothing
can be left out. But this means that Hegel's attempt to elude the critical
problem by avoiding the transcendent activity of his own
phenomenological consciousness is an illusion. Hegel is simply "playing
both sides" of the critical dilemma, by oscillating between the
perspectives of the phenomenal (immanent) and phenomenological
(transcendent) perspectives, requiring both for the progression of the
dialectic.
The Ground of Hegelian Transcendence
The transcendence enacted by Hegel is legitimated, according to
Hegel, because he posits it as immanent to the object of study, which is
the nature of consciousness in general. But, this view of the nature of
consciousness is only fully justified at the end of the study when
"Absolute Knowledge," which knows the total truth, has been attained.
This feature of the Hegelian dialectical critique has been remarked by
Michael Rosen, who calls it the "post festum paradox."' 01 This paradox is
similar to the critical dilemma as I have developed it. According to Rosen,
107Michael Rosen, Heael's Dialectic and its Criticism , New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
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... to criticize Hegel is to claim that the system does not attain
validly its point of completion. But to criticize from any point
other than the point of completion violates a crucial
presupposition of the system itself, namely, that only someone
who has really attained its final point can perceive the rationality
of its attainment. I shall call this the post festum paradox. 108
Thus, the proper critical stance requires both immanence and
transcendence, since the system must be gone through, but can only be
evaluated at its endpoint. This form of the dilemma is specific to
immanent critique, for it requires that the system be entered into and
followed out. But this immanent strategy encounters the horn of the
dilemma facing the immanent critic, for it also requires that the endpoint
be reached, since it is the totality which must be grasped, which requires
a degree of transcendence out of any particular point within the system.
According to Rosen's view, another way of looking at this is to see the
endpoint of Hegel's system, the "Absolute Knowledge" that the system
seeks, as always present in the stages of consciousness that precede its
attainment. Rosen thus points up the criticism I have been here
developing that the transcendence necessary to critique is simply
displaced by Hegel to within the nature of consciousness, thus allowing
Hegel to maintain an apparent posture of immanence.
But can Hegel justify this assumption that the endpoint is always
already immanent within every pre-critical stage of phenomenal
108Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic, pages 23-24.
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consciousness? Although Hegel has made the self-transcendence of
consciousness toward the Absolute immanent to the structure of
consciousness itself, he cannot show the necessary attainment of
Absolute Knowledge to be imminent or even possible, without
presupposing a faith in its necessary existence as the te/os of his
cognitive-critical journey. As Rosen points out, Hegel believes that he is
writing from the point in historical time when the dialectic has achieved
completion in the Absolute. Thus, for Hegel, the possibility of the
attainment of the Absolute has already been actualized, so that it is
merely a matter of drawing out of natural consciousness the explicit
awareness of what it already possesses. But if we reject the assumption
that we are at the historical endpoint of the development of Spirit, the
implicit knowledge of the Absolute which Hegel assumes to exist in
every instance of ordinary cognition must be seen to be rationally
without ground. His avoidance of the critical dilemma, is, therefore,
based on an always presupposed faith, which cannot be rationally
grounded until the end of the journey, in a manner again similar to
Descartes, who needed God to justify his cognitive capability, and to
Plato for whom the practical demonstration of knowledge was required
(e.g., in the Meno, as discussed in Chapter One, above) as the
justification for his theoretical position that knowledge was possible.
Thus Hegel, like Adorno and Horkheimer, falls back upon a faith in the
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dialectic's ability to transcend the limitations of the form of
consciousness which he is concerned to critique. Furthermore, he
presupposes this faith from the outset. Thus his critical epistemology, in
maintaining its posture of radical immanence in its object, cannot
independently justify or ground its own activity.
The Oscillation of Immanence and Transcendence in Kant and Hegel
The choice between Kant and Hegel therefore seems to be a
choice between the two horns of the critical dilemma. Kant's
epistemology has been shown to enact an illegitimate transcendence;
while Hegel, in remaining immanent, is unable to offer a legitimation of
itself which does not presuppose its own critical capacity to transcend
from the start. Neither Kant nor Hegel, then, have been successful in
escaping the critical dilemma, but rather oscillate between the two poles
of uncritical immanence and unjustified transcendence. But perhaps the
attempt to elude the dilemma by focusing on reason's capacity, in its
purely theoretical and abstract form, has been too stringent in what it
will allow of reason and of rational critique. As we have seen in our
discussion of Adorno and Horkheimer, reason is always necessarily
intermixed with the nonrational. To attempt to purify reason as Kant has
done, and to focus on reason in its most abstract and universal features,
as Hegel does, fails to allow for the possibility that the critical
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perspective may be justifiable insofar as its rationale may be broadened
to encompass its concrete instantiation in its bodily and historical
situatedness. If Adorno and Horkheimer are right, reason is never pure. In
fact, as was hinted at in Chapter One, the rational is always already
practical and political. Thus, the practical- political motivation for the
enactment of critique, if it is recognized and accepted, may offer a
contribution to its theoretical groundedness. The problem, of course, is to
justify this practical-political component. We will examine this possibility,
and its attempted justifications, in the next two chapters, where the
subject of critique is brought down to earth as embodied, situated, and
politically motivated in the person of the feminist.
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CHAPTER 3
IS THERE A GROUND FOR A FEMINIST STANDPOINT?
The basic critical dilemma that I have thus far explored is a
fundamental problem for feminist theory, especially feminist
epistemology. For feminist theorists, the attempt to critique the values
and beliefs of patriarchy requires both the critical distancing of the
outsider, and the simultaneous acknowledgment of patriarchy's deep
influence on the very tools and ideas needed to engage in feminist critical
thought. This deep ambivalence and dual position of feminists with
respect to the patriarchal tradition has been recognized and commented
upon by a great many feminist theorists. Myra Jehlen gives us one of the
most pithy and easily understood expressions of the problem in her use
of the image of Archimedes and his fulcrum. 109 According to Jehlen,
Somewhat like Archimedes, who to lift the earth with his
lever required someplace else on which to locate himself and his
fulcrum, feminists questioning the presumptive order of both
nature and history— and thus proposing to remove the ground
from under their own feet— would appear to need an alternative
base. For as Archimedes had to stand somewhere, one has to
assume something in order to reason at all. So if the very axioms
of Western thought already incorporate the sexual teleology in
question, it seems that, like the Greek philosopher, we have to
find a standpoint off this world altogether.
109Myra Jehlen, "Archimedes and the Paradox of Feminist Criticism," in
Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, edited by Nannerl 0. Keohane, Michelle
Z. Rosaldo, and Barbara C. Gelpi, (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1981,
pages 189-215- 215).
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question, it seems that, like the Greek philosopher, we have to
find a standpoint off this world altogether.
But, of course, this is impossible, so Jehlen continues:
Archimedes never did. However persuasively he
established that the earth could be moved from its appointed
place, he and the lever remained earthbound and the globe stayed
where it was. His story may point another moral, however, just as
it points to another science able to harness forces internally and
apply energy from within. We could then conclude that what he
really needed was a terrestrial fulcrum. My point here, similarly,
will be that a terrestrial fulcrum, a standpoint from which we can
see our conceptual universe whole but which nonetheless rests
firmly on male ground, is what feminists really need. 110
The feminist standpoint epistemologists (Harding, Hartsock, Smith,
Rose, Flax, Jagger) can be understood, like Jehlen, to be looking for a
"terrestrial fulcrum," which will enable them to critique the tradition
while simultaneously remaining embedded in it and true to those
traditional values which must be preserved in order to engage in a
struggle for greater truth and political freedom. Standpoint theorists are
deeply aware of the difficulties which the critic's dilemma poses for their
own attempts to develop an epistemology that will avoid the pitfalls of
male bias, while simultaneously preserving that with which they cannot
do without, namely the commitment to objectivity and truth that the
standard epistemologies also claim to respect. It is, in fact, the
110Jehlen, "Archimedes," page 190.
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the necessary implication of their own ideals in those very values, that
led to the development of standpoint theory as a means to elude the
difficulty by devising a "successor science" which constitutes a more
radical break with the tradition than does a more stringently adhered to
empiricism. But does this approach, which does not completely
relinquish, but merely revamps values such as objectivity, work? Many
other feminists 111 claim that it doesn't; thus we have grounds for
embracing a postmodernist feminism which breaks even more radically
with tradition, by relinquishing even the dream of objectivity and truth. In
this chapter, I will examine the standpoint approach in order to determine
its success or failure in solving or escaping from the critic's dilemma.
The Ground of Standpoint Theory
The basic question I will ask of standpoint theory is for its ground
and justification. Standpoint epistemology, as a critical alternative to the
already existing mainstream-malestream epistemologies of empiricism,
functionalism/relativism (e.g., sociology of knowledge), and Marxism,
must be able to provide adequate legitimation for both its necessity and
its possibility. The arguments for grounding standpoint theory's
ni These feminist theorists who embrace a more radical post modernist
position can be seen to include Jane Flax, in her later articles, Donna Haraway
(who has also argued for a standpoint approach, see "Situated Knowledges"),
Judith Butler, and Luce Irigaray. Irigaray's position will be discussed below in
Chapter 4.
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must be able to provide adequate legitimation for both its necessity and
its possibility. The arguments for grounding standpoint theory's
legitimacy that have been put forward by its main proponents seem to
rely on five basic appeals: (1) an appeal to the Marxian-Hegelian theory
of the development of the enlarged consciousness of the oppressed; (2)
an appeal to women's common experience in reproductive and nurturing
labor; (3) an appeal to the dual or bifurcated consciousness developed by
women as an oppressed class; (4) an appeal to object relations
psychoanalytic theory, in its understanding of the construction of
gendered identity; (5) a revised notion of "objectivity," such that a
feminist standpoint yields greater objectivity (of this new and improved
sort) than the standard masculinist view. These appeals are not
completely separated or mutually exclusive, but are overlapping and
interrelated in the various expressions of standpoint theory. However, as
I will argue below, standpoint epistemology's use of these appeals is
insufficient to solve or to evade completely the critic's dilemma in a
satisfactory theoretical way. The upshot of my critique of standpoint
epistemology will be that it must be supplemented by a political
commitment, for which there can be no purely theoretical ground.
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viewpoint
.
112 Marx, in turn, bases his position on the work of Hegel,
whose master/slave dialectic offers a hypothetical model for the
development of an enlarged consciousness by the oppressed as s/he
struggles with her/his oppressor. Standpoint epistemology takes off from
Hegel's master/slave parable, and Marx' use of it, to try to ground its
own feminist epistemology, which privileges the achievement of a
feminist standpoint born of struggle. As Hegel argues in the
Phenomenology
,
the relationship between master and slave is one
whereby the slave gains in knowledge and power, while the master, who
doesn't perform labor for himself, but commands the slave to do it,
atrophies. The slave, in developing the skills necessary to meet the
master's demands, grows in understanding both the master's
consciousness and her own. Thus the slave develops a double
consciousness, which is more comprehensive and less one-sided and
distorted than the master's. Similarly, Marx's epistemology argues that
112The basic elements of Marxist epistemology are scattered throughout his
entire corpus. In particular he makes use of the standpoint of the proletariat as
he analyzes the real relations of production under capitalism in Capital, as he
develops his theory of alienation, historical materialism, and base-superstructure
in the early writings (including The German Ideology ). The idea of the proletariat
as a revolutionary class with the ability to penetrate the appearances generated
by capitalism is introduced in the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right." The theory is much further developed and explicitly stated
by Georg Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness, translated by Rodney
Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), pagesl 49-209.
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consciousness, which is more comprehensive and less one-sided and
distorted than the master's. Similarly, Marx's epistemology argues that
the proletariat, as the class which labors under capitalism, develops its
own more comprehensive and unclouded view of the social reality
.
113
Marx's theory of the superior standpoint of the proletariat attempts
to provide for Marxism a way out of the critical paradox . 114 According to
Marx, all thought is superstructural, that is to say that it is conditioned
by the materialist economic base of a society. But, of course, this charge
equally implicates Marx's historical materialism along with the bourgeois
thought which he was concerned to refute. Marx's answer to this charge
is to argue that although all thought is materially conditioned, the
stratification of society into two distinct classes— the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat— positions those classes in ways that offer an advantageous
perspective on the really existing social relations to the oppressed class.
The dominant class in a stratified society will be unable to problematize
those social beliefs and theories which support and uphold their
113For Sandra Harding's discussion of the Hegelian-Marxian history of
feminist standpoint theory, see Is Science Multi-Cultural (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1998), pagesl 49-1 50.
114The success or failure of Marxist theory at eluding the critic's dilemma
cannot be adequately addressed within the scope of the dissertation. Obviously
the literature on this topic is huge and would require a major study. However,
given the focus on praxis in Marxist theory, I believe that it is safe to say
preliminarily that Marxist theory, like the theoretical orientations that form the
basis of this dissertation, requires a political/practical commitment to freedom
and democracy that cannot be grounded in a solely theoretical proof.
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domination. But for the worker class, the exploitation underlying social
economic production is clearly visible. As Alison Jagger expresses this,
The standpoint of the oppressed is not just different from
that of the ruling class; it is also epistemologically advantageous.
It provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial
than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive. It is
more impartial because it comes closer to representing the
interests of society as a whole; whereas the standpoint of the
ruling class reflects the interests only of one section of the
population, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and is able
to explain the standpoint of the ruling class. 115
Marxist economic theory, unlike bourgeois economic theory, bases
itself on the standpoint of the proletariat, for whom the labor-capital
relation is one of exploitation rather than free and equal exchange. Due to
the basic fact of historical materialism that the material conditions of life
influence consciousness, the consciousness of the oppressed worker will
necessarily be different from that of a member of the ruling class . 116 The
115Alison Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature. (Rowan & Allenheld,
1 983), page 371
.
116According to the early Marx, "In the social production of their existence,
men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will,
namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development
of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation,
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life
conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social
existence that determines their consciousness." Karl Marx, Preface to "A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," in Early Writings, translated
by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage Books, 1975),
page 425.
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worker will be capable of seeing and comprehending the real relations
which underlie the superficial appearance of equal exchange, because the
worker will have an intimate acquaintance with the process of
production. The point of view of the capitalist is tied to his interest in
obtaining profit. As such, he will see the labor provided by the worker to
be an exchange value, like any other, for which he will believe he has
paid equal compensation its total value. What the capitalist misses is
that the value paid in the labor exchange is less than its use value in
producing a surplus, and that the reason he is able to get away with this
underpayment is due to his privileged position as owner of the means of
production, which puts him in a position of power over those who lack
such ownership. Thus, under capitalism, the relation between worker and
capitalist is based as much on material force as was the case under
feudalism, although this force is hidden from view, disguised by the
appearance of equal exchange which presents itself to the capitalist
consciousness. For the worker, however, the force and necessity which
compels him to sell his labor power on the market is real and visible, as is
the difference between the value he creates in the production of the good
and the exchange value for which it is sold as a commodity on the
market— a difference which becomes the profit of the capitalist.
Exploitation can be seen by the worker in a way which is impossible for
the capitalist to see. Thus the standpoint of the proletariat as a class will
129
be more comprehensive and penetrating than the standpoint of the
capitalist class.
Similarly, feminist standpoint epistemology will base itself on the
standpoint of women, as the oppressed class under patriarchy.
Furthermore, women as a class are like the proletariat in Marx's analysis
in that their relationship to the dominant class is dual— their labor is both
essential but unrecognized by the dominant perspective
.
117 This dual
positioning gives to women a more comprehensive understanding of
social relations, for women are required, due to their subservient position,
to understand and to operate according to the beliefs and knowledge of
the dominant class, while the dominant class need know nothing of the
knowledge specific to the experiences of women as a subservient class.
Likewise, according to Marx's theory, the proletarian standpoint
encompasses the viewpoint of the capitalist class, as well as its own
specific experience of alienation and exploitation. It was not simply the
marginality of the proletariat, their outsider status, but also their
117 For an illuminating discussion of this point, see Bat Ami Bar-On,
"Marginality and Epistemic Privilege," in Feminist Epistemologies (New York:
Routledge, 1993). See also Flartsock, Money. Sex, and Power: Toward a
Feminist Historical Materialism (Northeastern University Press, 1985) and "The
Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology,
Metaphysics. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , edited by Sandra
Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1983), and Ann
Ferguson. Blood at the Root: Motherhood. Sexuality & Male Dominance
(London: Pandora Press, 1989), especially chapter 6 on women as a
revolutionary class.
130
essentiality to capitalist production, that granted them the unique status
as the revolutionary class. This same dual positionality and
consciousness characterize Hegel's slave, who is both radically other to
and essential to the master. Since women under patriarchy do most of
the subservient necessary labor employed with caring for bodily needs,
while maintaining outsider status when it comes to sharing power, they
too can claim the duality which Marxist and Hegelian standpoint theory
argue allows for epistemic privilege. Furthermore, the marginality of
women to the patriarchal order, their outsider status when it comes to
sharing positions of power, is directly due to the fact that their
responsibilities for what Ann Ferguson calls "sex/affective labor" 118 leave
them with no time, energy or opportunity to occupy the positions of
domination. 119 Thus women's marginality is a function of their
essentiality, which allows both insider and outsider, both immanent and
transcendent, points of view to overlap. Moreover, the feminist
standpoint epistemologists trace this dual positioning through to the
meta-level of the production of knowledge, where feminist scientists'
118See Ferguson. Blood at the Root, chapter 4, pages 77-100. Sex/affective
labor, according to Ferguson, produces four goods: domestic maintenance,
nurturance, children, and sexuality.
119Bar On claims that although standpoint theory is successful at showing
that women are marginalized, and simultaneously central to patriarchy, it is not
the case that women's marginality is a function of their centrality, and so the
parallel with Marx's epistemological theory fails at this point. See Bar On,
"Marginality." I disagree, as I state above, as does Hartsock. See Money, Sex
and Power.
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positions, as both inside and outside the patriarchal symbolic order, grant
them a more comprehensive viewpoint. Thus women, and feminists as
their spokespersons, are a privileged knowledge class under patriarchy,
for their simultaneous immanence and transcendence in the patriarchal
order offers the possibility of their embarking on the dialectic of critique.
Another important appeal standpoint theory makes is to the
different experiences of women as laborers, mothers, and nurturers. The
standpoint theorists who make this appeal include Dorothy Smith, Nancy
Hartsock, Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, and Hilary Rose . 120 These
theorists can be seen as drawing, in turn, upon the work of such thinkers
as Sara Ruddick, Nel Noddings, and Carol Gilligan, who have elaborated
an "ethics of care," and of "maternal thinking," based on the work
women do in the home . 121 The basic point that connects all these
theorists is that women's domestic labor gives rise to their unique and
120See Dorothy Smith, ""Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of
Sociology," Heidi Hartmann, "The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and
Political Struggle: The Example of Housework," both in Feminism &
Methodology, edited by Sandra Harding (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1987; Nancy Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism," in Discovering Reality: Ann
Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, "The Unhappy Marriage of Capitalism and
Patriarchy," in Lydia Sargent, editor, Women and Revolution (Boston: South End
Press, 1981); and Hilary Rose, "Hand, Brain and Heart; A Feminist Epistemology
for the Natural Sciences," in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society,
1983, vol.9, no.1, pages 73-90.
121 See Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking /'Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), Nel
Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education
(Berkeley: Univ. of CA Press, 1986) and Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
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alternative (to men's) skills and ways of thinking, which in turn will yield
epistemic and ethical norms and values that are different from those
developed solely on the basis of men's experiences as individuated,
competitive, Cartesian subjects of knowledge, and Hobbesian subjects of
practice. The bearing of and caring for children, for example, cannot be
adequately understood on the model of the production of objects, nor can
the relationship between mother and child be seen as one of two
completely individuated consciousnesses confronting one another in a
competitive struggle over scarce resources. Furthermore, the repetitive,
concrete labor performed by women in the home involves the inextricable
collaboration of intellect, emotions, and the body, in a way which
privileges neither the mental nor the material, and which therefore cannot
be understood in the analytic terms used to account for labor in the
public sphere of patriarchal capitalist work. Thus, maternal and domestic
work merge "hand, brain, and heart," in a way that renders the
mainstream categories inadequate.
Nancy Hartsock's analysis is perhaps the most clear expression of
this appeal. She argues from the sexual division of labor to the possibility
of a specifically feminist epistemological standpoint. According to
Hartsock, a major claim made by standpoint theory is the following: "If
material life is structured in fundamentally opposing ways for two
different groups, one can expect that the vision of each will represent an
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inversion of the other, and in systems of domination the vision available
to the rulers will be both partial and perverse." 122 This claim is crucial, for
without it, the superiority, rather than merely the equal legitimacy, of the
feminist standpoint is groundless. But how is this claim justified?
Hartsock first appeals to Marxist theory to argue that Marx was
successful in showing that the ruling class had indeed inverted the order
of significance of the spheres of use and exchange in understanding
capitalist social relations. The real point and purpose of production (even
under capitalism) is (and should be) for human subsistence and need.
However, the bourgeoisie, whose viewpoint is necessarily limited to the
realm of exchange, fail to see the logical priority of the proper endpoint
and purpose, and rather privilege exchange as the goal of production.
This focus on exchange can arguably be seen as a "perversion" of the
proper order (and in fact the excesses of capitalism, and the misery
capitalism thereby causes, as it produces not for need but for the market,
have been remarked repeatedly by many and various critics of
capitalism). Furthermore, the inequities that exist in the productive realm
are likewise hidden from the point of view of the equality of exchange.
Viewed from the perspective of exchange, it appears that the worker and
capitalist engage in fair and equal trade of labor for wages. But once the
perspective of the worker is adopted, the illusion of equal exchange
122Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint," page 285.
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proper and revolutionary perspective was, of course, Marx's fundamental
and essential contribution, and enabled him to develop his entire critique
(e.g., the theories of alienation, exploitation, and ideology). Can the same
be said for a feminist standpoint? Can its adoption enable a less
"perverse" or less distorted theory of society and nature?
Object Relations Theory
In order to understand more clearly the argument Hartsock gives
for the greater perversity of the traditional, patriarchal standpoint, it is
necessary to examine more closely the explanation given for women's
differently structured conceptual and value systems. This explanation is
given by the feminist development of object relations psychoanalytic
theory . 123 According to object relations theory, boys and girls construct
their genders differently due to their different relations with their
mothers. Object relations theory accepts the account given by Freud of
the little boy coming to distinguish himself as an individual by negotiating
the oedipal conflict. But Freud, as many feminists have held, was unable
to give a satisfactory account of the gender construction of the little girl.
Feminist object relations theorists thus supply an account that stresses
123 See, for example, Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering:
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley; University of California
Press, 1978), Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (New Haven; Yale
University Press, 1989), and Jane Flax "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal
Unconscious; A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics,"
in Harding and Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality .
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Feminist object relations theorists thus supply an account that stresses
the girl's more relational identity. The reason for this is that for both boy
and girl, their primary object of identification is the mother— a female
person. Both girl and boy must learn to separate themselves from this
primary object in order to develop an identity as an individual, separate
human being. For the boy, this separation is easier and cleaner, since he
sees himself as fundamentally unlike his mother. Furthermore, the boy is
helped in his individuation by all the societal cues regarding what is
appropriate behavior for masculinity. He establishes his identity based on
an intellectual appropriation of the rules and principles of male behavior
he is given by society and by a father who is, in most cases, largely
absent and removed. The girl, on the other hand, has a concrete daily
example of what she is to become. Her mother is like her, and is present
to maintain and nurture this likeness. Consequently, the girl never fully
individuates herself, but sees herself as continuous with and related to
others. Thus all women
,
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according to the theory, whether they, in
124This universalizing move has been much criticized. Obviously, it is
problematic to extend the conditions of the modern, bourgeois, oedipal family to
all humans, so that women always and everywhere can be understood to
exhibit the same qualities as they have developed under a particular historical
situation. For this reason, I believe the appeal to object-relations theory cannot
strongly support a standpoint epistemology applied universally. I do, however,
believe that the previously discussed appeal to women's specific mode of
domestic labor is both more legitimately universalizable (as empirical studies
have shown), and more analogous to the Marxist model, which bases the
legitimacy of the proletarian standpoint on their specific praxis. The problems of
universalization and essentialism will be discussed further in the last section of
this chapter, and in Chapter 4 below.
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turn, become mothers themselves, are socialized in a way that preserves
continuity with their own mother, and prepares them for the profound
relationality with another that constitutes the activity of mothering. This
greater relationality on the part of women, according to standpoint
theorists, leads women to embrace the values of cooperation, rather than
domination, unities of body and mind, subject and object, nature and
culture; connectedness, rather than separation; life rather than death.
Thus, the fundamental perversion of the patriarchal viewpoint is,
according to Hartsock, its substitution of death for life . 125 As Hartsock
expresses this,
The substitution of death for life results at least in part from the
sexual division of labor in childrearing. The self-surrounded by
rigid ego-boundaries, certain of what is inner and what is outer,
the self experienced as walled city is discontinuous with others.
Georges Bataille has made brilliantly clear the ways in which
death emerges as the only possible solution to this discontinuity
and has followed the logic through to argue that reproduction
itself must be understood not as the creation of life, but as death.
The core experience to be understood is that of discontinuity and
125 Also see Mary Daly, Gyn-Ecoloay for an elaboration of the claim that
patriarchy is "necrophilic." Gyn-Ecoloav: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1978. Also, see Hilary Rose, "Hand, Brain, and Heart,"
(in Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 1983, vol. 9, no. 1),
where she argues that the continued following of male scientific norms will lead
to nuclear annihilation. In addition, many feminist theorists have pointed out the
emphasis on the death of the other as the desire that motivates the
master/slave dialectic in Hegel. It seems that Hegel could not conceive of
another possibility for relation, but is arguing that the most basic attitude
toward the other is to eliminate its threat to one's own independence and
autonomy.
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its consequences. As a consequence of this experience of
discontinuity and aloneness, penetration of ego-boundaries, or
fusion with another is experienced as violent. Thus, the desire for
fusion with another can take the form of domination of the other.
In this form, it leads to the only possible fusion with a threatening
other: when the other ceases to exist as a separate, and for that
reason, threatening being. Insisting that another submit to one's
will is simply a milder form of the destruction of discontinuity in
the death of the other since in this case one is no longer
confronting a discontinuous and opposed will, despite its
discontinuous embodiment. This is perhaps one source of the
links between sexual activity, domination, and death. 126
Certainly, it is a reasonable position to argue that substituting
death for life is a "perversion" of what should be. Even so, I do not think
this view can be upheld solely on theoretical grounds, but entails an
ethical commitment
.
127 Notwithstanding whether this would indeed be a
perversion, I do not think that Hartsock has shown adequately that
patriarchy does value death over life. There seems to be a gap in
Hartsock's argument. To move from women's greater tendency to uphold
126Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint," pages 299-300.
127
It could be argued that to value death over life is self-contradictory and
therefore a purely logical error, in that death would negate the ground of the
possibility of the enunciation of the position in a manner similar to the way in
which, in Kantian ethical theory, contradiction arises when an attempt is made
to universalize a maxim which underlies an action which is forbidden by the
"categorical imperative." But this seems a little sophistical, since it could be
perfectly consistent to hold that the best life is one which is short and sweet,
so that death at the proper time becomes of greater value than life. And, of
course, contemporary public ethical discussion on such topics as the right to die
holds just such a view, and can be seen as quite reasonable.
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the more life-affirming values of nurturing, connection, and relation, to
the claim that the entire patriarchal symbolic order is based on a
prioritizing of death over life appears to me to be an overstatement. Is it
not the case that such traditional values as rational self-interestedness,
autonomy, and the control of nature have had some life-affirming
consequences, at some times and for some people, in addition to their
well-documented (by feminists) neglect of other, more traditionally
women experienced values? Furthermore, as we have seen above, such
male critics as Marx, Horkheimer and Adorno, Heidegger, and Gadamer
have argued for a shift in traditional values away from the stress on
domination of nature and others, separation of subject from object, self-
interested individualism and autonomy. If these newer, more feminist
style values can be extracted from the (malestream) tradition, then it is
not the case that it is only with a feminist standpoint that perversity can
be overcome, or even that the entire patriarchal viewpoint is guilty of
perversity. Based solely on the logic of Hartsock's claim, the material
conditioning of the vision of the ruling class results in its having only a
partial viewpoint, but not necessarily a "perverted" one.
But what about the complementary claim that a feminist
standpoint will necessarily be more comprehensive than the traditional
androcentric one? Although here I believe there is some reason to
support this claim, there are also some problems. In support of the claim,
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we should consider the fact that the members of an oppressed group in a
social hierarchy must, in order to survive, learn to read their masters.
Thus, the oppressed will be forced to follow the dictates and act on the
knowledge of the dominant class, and so must understand their point of
view. However, isn't it also possible that there will be knowledge in the
possession of the dominant class that will be unavailable to the
oppressed? Part of the problem for any oppressed group is to gain access
to the education and skills that the elite take for granted. Furthermore,
the experience of oppression is oftentimes damaging. Not only does an
impoverished social existence prevent access to education and
knowledge, but it can also lead to misunderstandings, distortions,
delusions, and mental incapacity. Thus, it seems that the feminist vision
is necessary as a complement to render more complete the knowledge
gathered on the basis of male experience, but not in all cases will it be
less perverse or more correct . 128
Moreover, the analogy with Marxist epistemology breaks down on
this point. Part of the reason for the objective superiority of the
proletariat's standpoint is that the proletariat, according to Marxist
theory, is the universal class. As such, the proletariat represents the
interests of society as a whole, and not just those of a particular
128Certaintly, the Lysenko affair has taught us this in the example of a
misguided proletarian science. See Hilary Rose, "Hand, Brain, and Heart," for a
discussion of this episode in proletarian history.
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segment of society. This fact is based upon Marx's historical materialist
analysis of capitalism, and its inevitable contradictions and crises.
Capitalism is, according to the "science" of historical materialism,
doomed
.
129 The proletariat is the continuously expanding class, for as
capitalism develops, the bourgeoisie, who are in competition with each
other for profit, will continue to shrink in numbers as more and more
former capitalists are forced to join the ranks of the working class. The
proletariat thus represents the fate of the vast majority. Furthermore, the
historical destiny of the proletariat is to abolish the antagonistic class
structure altogether. The proletariat both represents and brings about the
classless society, according to Marxist theory. But is there a
corresponding "scientific" or theoretical analysis which renders the
abolition of patriarchy inevitable? Without such, how can feminist
standpoint theory claim that women's interests are identical with the
interests of society as a whole, in order to argue that the feminist
standpoint is more comprehensive, and not merely equally legitimate ? 130
129
lt is not my aim in the dissertation to evaluate this claim. I merely want to
point out that Marxist theory does have a theoretical basis for claiming the
inevitability of an end to oppression, such that the class responsible for its end
can be seen to be a universal class. My question is whether feminist theory can
make an analogous claim.
130As Ann Ferguson argues, women do meet the Marxist criteria for a class.
These criteria include relations of exploitation, political cohesiveness, historical
cohesiveness, domination relations, and lack of autonomy. See Blood at the
Root, chapter 6. However, it is not clear from this analysis whether, as a class,
women possess a privileged and superior epistemic standpoint, such that the
real social relations are visible only to their viewpoint.
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granting to the previously oppressed the power to speak and to be heard.
The necessity of this political commitment will also be evident in Sandra
Harding s arguments for the necessity and legitimacy of feminist
standpoint epistemology. Furthermore, Harding's theoretical-critical
method, as itself an instance of a standpoint approach, will demonstrate
the necessary appeal on her part to a political rather than a purely
theoretical ground. My discussion of Harding will therefore focus on the
question of her critical method and its instantiation of the principles and
failings of critique that I have discussed in the dissertation above.
The Conflictual Nature of Feminist Empiricism
Sandra Harding's argument for the necessity of a feminist
standpoint epistemology begins with a critical examination of the
alternative feminist epistemology— feminist empiricism. Feminist
empiricism, like traditional empiricism, is a metatheory of scientific
practice that espouses the empirical method and scientific objectivity, but
that also claims that feminist inspired research more closely
approximates the traditional empiricist ideals. This epistemological
position arose in response to the increasing instances of feminist
research in the natural and social sciences of the last few decades.
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131 For a recounting of some of this research, see Donna Haraway,
"Primatology is Politics by Other Means," and Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, "Empathy,
Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female," both in Feminist Approaches to
Science, edited by Ruth Bleir (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988; also Sandra
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research in the natural and social sciences of the last few decades
.
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With the increasing numbers of women in the sciences, hitherto
unexamined research topics were and are now being investigated,
yielding conclusions not previously known. One example of such a
research topic is the existence of a sex/gender system. The sex/gender
system is the system of male domination and control of women's
productive and reproductive labor that permeates society and oppresses
women . 132 In an early essay, Harding analyzes the reasons for the
visibility of the sex/gender system only at this particular historical
time . 133 Why was this pervasive societal phenomenon not noticed by
earlier social scientists? According to Harding, this is an important
question for epistemology, but it cannot be asked within the traditional
epistemologies. The existence of such a system had been invisible to
131 For a recounting of some of this research, see Donna Haraway,
"Primatology is Politics by Other Means," and Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, "Empathy,
Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female," both in Feminist Approaches to
Science, edited by Ruth Bleir (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988; also Sandra
Harding, The Science Question in Feminism. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986), and Evelyn Reed, Sexism and Science. (New York: Pathfinder Press,
1978).
132The existence of the sex/gender system was first proposed and analyzed
by Gayle Rubin. See Rubin, " The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political
Economy" of Sex," in Alison M. Jaggar and Paula S. Rothenberg, editors
Feminist Frameworks: Alternative Theoretical Accounts of the Relations
Between Women and Men, second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984).
133Sandra Harding, "Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only
Now?" in Discovering Reality. Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology.
Metaphysics. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , edited by Sandra
Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983).
143
scientists operating within the traditional epistemologies, according to
Harding, because the basic tools and assumptions of these theories, as
products of the social situatedness and biases of their agents, are
inadequate to the task. Traditional empiricist, functionalist-relativist, and
Marxist epistemologies were thus unable to identify the system of sex-
gender oppression.
Again, in a later essay, Harding makes a similar point . 134 Claims
made by feminist scientists, guided by their political agenda, according to
Harding, appear more objective than those made by traditional (male)
scientists. Her epistemological question is how to explain this increased
objectivity.
. . . Some social scientists and biologists have made claims that
clearly have been produced through research guided by feminist
concerns. Many of these claims appear more plausible (better
supported, more reliable, less false, more likely to be confirmed
by evidence, etc.) than the beliefs they would replace. These
claims appear to increase the objectivity of our understandings of
nature and social life. . .These claims raise epistemological
questions. How can politicized inquiry be increasing the
objectivity of our explanations and understandings? 135
134 Sandra Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," in Women,
Knowledge, and Reality. Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, edited by Ann
Geary and Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), page 190.
135 Harding "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 190.
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This same question guides Harding's epistemological research in "Is
There a Feminist Method?," 136 where she begins her inquiry with the
"paradox" that politically engaged research yields greater objectivity in its
results than does traditional research, which is supposedly free of
political interest and bias. However, a basic problem in Harding's critique
arises here. Harding uses empiricism's inability to explain the superiority
of the feminist view as evidence for its inferiority to a more radical
successor science— feminist standpoint theory. But Harding appears to
be begging the question. She has not yet independently established the
superiority of feminist research in general, but seems to take this
superiority as a self-evident given. This method of proving legitimacy by
assuming it, and then asking for an explanation, has been criticized
already in the history of philosophy, when it was perceived by many to
be Kant's epistemological strategy. 137 Although Harding's attempt at
justification may be satisfying to the already converted, it cannot prove
that feminist generated research is more objective to the skeptic who
136Sandra Harding, "Is There a Feminist Method?" in Feminism &
Methodology
.
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987). Harding uses
this same strategy to argue the need for a specifically feminist epistemology
throughout all of her writings.
137
I disagree with those who find Kant guilty of this in the Critique, (see
chapter 2, above), however, it is certainly his method (at least of exposition) in
the Prolegomena to Anv Future Metaphysics, which was his more popular
statement of his epistemology.
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doesn't already believe it to be so. In fact, Harding readily admits this
point.
(While one need not find any particular claim more
plausible than the beliefs it would replace, one must find some
such feminist-inspired claim or other more plausible, less false,
more likely to be confirmed by evidence, etc. in order to enter the
discourse of this essay. It is the justification of this kind of claim
that is at issue. If you cannot find any scientific claim generated
by feminist-inspired research to be reasonable, then do not waste
your time reading further!). 138
But in order to ground, explain, or justify the superior objectivity of
feminist guided research, isn't it rather necessary to "bracket" its
apparent superiority and to try to inquire whether there are independently
established grounds for believing that a feminist vision really is more
comprehensive, more clear, more adequate to its task, than the
supposedly "neutral" viewpoint of the tradition? After all, the old beliefs
appeared to be the truth at the time they were proposed. (For example, it
appears to many to be the natural order of things that women care for
babies at home; that it is predominantly men, rather than women, who
engage in business and politics; that the abstract principles of justice
upon which modern, western jurisprudence relies must be applied equally
regardless of context or relationship; that "man, the hunter," was
responsible for the advance of human civilization; that human subjectivity
138Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 190.
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IS most fully achieved in opposition to, rather than in connection with,
others, etc.) Harding's strategy thus appears circular, for it seems that
she presupposes the superiority of the view which she ostensibly seeks
to establish. However, Harding has not yet claimed that feminist
conducted research is per se more objective than non-feminist guided
research. In fact, feminist empiricism cannot establish this claim, which
is one of the reasons that Harding believes that a standpoint
epistemology makes better sense. All empiricism can claim so far is that
some feminist inspired research is superior.
From the point of view of the superiority of some feminist-inspired
research, Harding then goes on to critique the less radical attempt at
justification for feminist scientific research given by feminist empiricism.
The feminist empiricist legitimation strategy argues that "it is social
biases— sexism and androcentrism — that are responsible for the false
claims that have been made in biology and the social sciences." 139 These
biases operate as "blinders," making it impossible to perceive the full
story of social reality, including the oppression of women and
marginalized others. Liberatory social movements, like feminism, remove
those blinders, thus allowing a clear view of social reality. Again, Harding
is careful to point out the logic of this empiricist mode of legitimation. It
is not the case, according to feminist empiricism, that the feminist bias
139Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 191.
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itself guarantees greater correspondence with truth. According to
Harding, It is not that all feminist claims are automatically preferable
because they are feminist; rather, when the results of such research
show good empirical support, the fact that they were produced through
politically guided research should not count against them ." 140
Harding is rightly aware of the problems with this justificatory
strategy. The superiority of feminist inspired research is here grounded in
the fact that it produces results that are more in accord with the same
norms of objectivity and truth of traditional empiricism. However, this
cannot adequately explain the paradox of feminist research's greater
objectivity, for in other ways, this very success of feminist research flies
in the face of traditional empiricist commitments. There are three basic
problems which Harding identifies that prevent a feminist empiricism
from being an adequate justificatory strategy . 141 Firstly, feminist
empiricism cannot accommodate the value of disinterested neutrality on
the part of the scientific researcher. According to standard empiricism,
the social identity of the scientist, and the context of discovery, are
irrelevant to the matter of justification and truthfulness. But if, as
feminist empiricism shows, a feminist viewpoint can yield greater
objectivity in the results of its studies, this commitment to value
140Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 191.
141 Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from
Women's Lives. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 991 ), p. 117.
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neutrality cannot be held. Secondly, according to Harding, rigorous
enforcement of empiricist methods doesn't eliminate all social biases,
especially those that enter research via the questions that form the
research project.
. . Feminist empiricism argues that an androcentric
picture of nature and social life emerges from sciences that do not take
feminist concerns seriously.
. . Traditional empiricism does not direct
researchers to locate their scientific projects in the same critical plane as
their subject matters ." 142 Since researches do not adequately reflect upon
the questions that they ask, biases can be present from the beginning of
a research project which cannot be overcome via the answering of the
biased question. Thirdly, feminist empiricists, according to Harding, have
recognized that it is oftentimes the very following of the traditional
empiricist norms and methods that lead to androcentric results. ". . . The
particular methods and norms of the special sciences are themselves
sexist and androcentric ." 143
It appears, from Harding's analysis, that feminist empiricism wants
to have it both ways— to hold onto the traditional empiricist standard of
142 Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? page 1 16.
143Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? , page 1 17. For feminist
theory that argues this point convincingly, see Evelyn Fox Kei'er, Reflections on
Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), Genevieve
Lloyd, The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy ,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), and Andrea Nye, Words of
Power : A Feminist reading of the History of Logic, ( New York: Routledge,
1990).
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objectivity, holding that it is this standard alone that proves or grounds
the superiority of its research, while insisting that it is only research
guided by feminist concerns that meets that very standard of objectivity
more readily than other "value-neutral" research. Both claims cannot be
consistently held, for if it is merely the fact of increased objectivity that
recommends feminist science as superior, the fact of its feminism should
be irrelevant. As feminist empiricism argues, social biases are exactly the
stumbling blocks in the way of a disillusioned vision of reality that
resulted in the falsities of traditional empiricist male-conducted science.
But if biases are a problem, why isn't a feminist bias equally problematic?
Feminist empiricism wants to hold that feminist research is more
objective, but this claim cannot be upheld according to the theory of
what makes empirical science lead to objectivity (in particular, researcher
disinterestness). The problem with the feminist empiricist approach is
that if, as feminist empiricism holds, traditional scientific norms are
already adequate to truth, why is it only with a feminist perspective that
greater truth has been achieved? These considerations lead Harding to
reject feminist empiricism as a successful justificatory strategy for
feminist scientific research, and to seek a more radical epistemology that
both abandons some, and modifies other, traditional empiricist norms and
standards.
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Harding s Strategy of immanent Critique
Harding clearly sees that feminist empiricism relies on its
successful compliance with the already accepted norms and standards of
good science. What is wrong with feminist empiricism is that its
paradigm examples of good science also violate at least some of those
norms, particularly the normative standard of value neutrality on the part
of the researcher. And here we can see the way in which Harding’s
rejection of feminist empiricism relies on a strategy of immanent critique.
In her defense of the standpoint approach, Harding begins again with the
alleged fact that feminist research projects yield more objective results
than mainstream research does. However, from a traditional
epistemological perspective, there appear to be solid reasons that Harding
should not be permitted access to this traditional concept of objectivity.
Since there are, as I've already pointed out, scientists who disagree that
feminism's claims are objectively superior to mainstream claims,
Harding's original premise is hardly uncontroversial, and is therefore
inadequate as a firm premise for her further argument. Harding thus goes
on to modify the traditional concept of objectivity to include the notion of
researcher social situatedness. But if this is the case, then the success of
feminist science at instantiating traditional objectivity (which Harding
cites for her evidence of feminist science's superiority) seems to be
disingenuous. It was not the old concept of objectivity that feminist
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research instantiated, but the new one. Harding's new concept of
objectivity was present in the first instances of successful feminist
inspired knowledge (like a Trojan Horse, those original feminist studies
snuck the feminist values inside). Although this may appear circular to
the traditional empiricist epistemology, this circle may also, perhaps by
other epistemological standards, be seen as non-vicious, and a legitimate
mode of immanent critique, in its teasing out the presuppositions of what
has been already accepted as true. Thus, Harding's epistemological
practice is itself in accord, not with traditional empiricist epistemology,
but with the standpoint theory she articulates. She doesn't shun her
political commitment to feminism, but places it front and center in her
research project. Thus Harding openly admits that she is attempting to
find the reasons for, and not to prove the fact of, the success of feminist
research.
Another way to look at this strategy is to see it as an instance of
standard empirical practice. Harding observed an anomaly to the existing
epistemological theory (i.e., the fact of some feminist-directed research's
greater objectivity), and then adjusted the theory accordingly. What she
has thereby shown is that the old epistemology was inadequate to
describe even standard scientific practice. Harding makes use of this
interpretation in Whose Science?. Whose Knowledge? . Although
traditional epistemologies have argued for the principle of researcher
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disinterestedness, in actual practice the giants of modern epistemology
(Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant) have developed their theories in
response to, and as explanations for, the historical changes in scientific
knowledge gathering. According to Harding,
When we look at the history of epistemology and philosophy of
science, it is perfectly clear that the "Greats" in these fields are
attempting to theorize adequately the historical changes in the
kinds of beliefs that their age finds reasonable and the difficulty
of appealing to conventional grounds to justify them. Thus,
virtually all the leading epistemologists of the modern era attempt
to make sense out of the difference in the ways scientific beliefs
are generated and legitimated and the consequences of these
differences for other kinds of belief, such as religious or political
and social belief. Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and other
philosophers are quite explicit about what they see as the social
causes of their problematics and the new kinds of standards of
adequate belief they must keep in mind. 144
Thus, Harding sees herself as continuing the tradition. For Harding,
epistemologies are explanations of the success of our knowledge-seeking
activities. The modernist dream and conception of epistemology as
providing firm foundation and certainty in response to skeptical
questions, is not one she subscribes to. She rather sees her task as
developing a meta-level explanation of what she already takes to be well
established — namely the success of feminist inspired research in the
natural and social sciences. She will do so insofar as she can with the
144Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? , pages 170-171.
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already existing tools of science, and she will modify those tools and
invent new ones as needed. Thus, as an immanent critic, she does not
altogether give up the commitment to objectivity. To do so, she believes,
could lead to relativism, and the forfeiting of the right to claim the
superiority of feminist science. Thus, Harding is forced to play the critic's
game, which requires a balancing act between the traditional standards
immanent to the tradition which she is critiquing, and the simultaneous
development and modification of those standards to accommodate her
theoretical needs.
Harding's strategy of immanent critique is very Hegelian. As we
have seen in Chapter Two of the dissertation, the development of a
greater or more enlarged consciousness comes about via a realization of
problems, tensions, or contradictions in the attitude of consciousness
being studied. In an attempt to resolve those contradictions, a move is
made to a higher-level theoretical orientation that explains the previous
attitude as an appearance arising out of a limited perspective. This
dialectical, critical pattern is first instantiated in feminist epistemology at
the level of women scientists' practice. The move from traditional
science to feminist science was made necessary as women scientists
reflected upon the conflicts between their own experiences, on the one
hand, and the descriptions of social reality and the questions being asked
by traditional scientific research, on the other. And as we have seen,
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Harding's analysis follows a similar pattern. She first investigates
feminist empiricism as a justificatory strategy, and is led to seek an
alternative epistemological theory, on the grounds that feminist
empiricism comes into conflict with some of traditional empiricism's
values. These conflicts require the move to a more radical justificatory
strategy, one which will question more deeply into the fundamental
values and central tenets of the traditional theory— feminist standpoint
theory.
Harding thus criticizes feminist empiricism on the grounds that it
is "too immanent," i.e., too mired in the norms and values of male
oriented science. In this way, Harding gains a degree of transcendence
out of that which she is criticizing, as did Hegel as he critiqued each prior
perspective or attitude of consciousness in the Phenomenology
. But in so
doing, does Harding, also like Hegel, gain too much "altitude" out of the
totality of which she is a part? Does Harding's "strong objectivity"
assume an illegitimately too transcendent normativity? Or, on the other
hand, and as some postmodern feminists will argue, isn't an appeal to
the value of objectivity merely an echoing of the universalist claim and
desire of mainstream/malestream science? In which case, Harding's
position is not too transcendent, but rather still too immanent in the
tradition? Just what does Harding mean by "strong objectivity," and how
does it differ from the dominant conception of scientific objectivity?
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conceived
.
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Traditional scientific objectivity, in its application only to
the context of justification, and not the context of discovery, cannot
eliminate from research those social biases that are held by the entire
research community. Obviously, in cases where that research community
exists in a stratified society, and consists of the dominant racial, socio-
economic, gender group, their biases concerning marginalized groups will
not be recognized or eliminated by their peers. Thus, objectivity, as
traditionally conceived, is too narrow. Traditional scientific objectivity is,
however, simultaneously too broad, according to Harding, as it claims
that all social biases and interests should be eliminated from objective
scientific research. This was, as we have seen, the violation that
disqualified feminist empiricism as an adequate feminist epistemology.
Harding's proposal is to alter the traditional conception of objectivity to
include the context of discovery— to place the researcher's social biases
and questions in the same "critical plane" as the object of study, thus
"strengthening" the concept of objectivity to accommodate the fact, as
she sees it, of politically motivated research yielding better, more
empirically supported results.
We can see that Harding's critical methodological strategy
manifests both the immanent and transcendent aspects we have come to
expect in all modes of critique. In fact, her attempt at modifying and
145See Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? , pages 143-144.
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she sees it, of politically motivated research yielding better, more
empirically supported results.
We can see that Harding's critical methodological strategy
manifests both the immanent and transcendent aspects we have come to
expect in all modes of critique. In fact, her attempt at modifying and
extending the traditional notion of objectivity to accommodate the needs
of feminist science is similar to the attempt by Horkheimer and Adorno,
discussed in Chapter One above, of preserving the desirable aspects of
the concept of rationality, while modifying those which were seen as
detrimental to the project of continued Enlightenment. Harding's "strong
objectivity" similarly shores up what she sees as progressive in the
standard concept, by extending the concept to include norms governing
the context of discovery and the researcher's state of mind.
Methodologically, Harding's critique itself is guided by her modification of
standard empiricist norms. She adheres to traditional empiricist
methodology as she accepts the "givenness" of feminist inspired
research's superiority, and then she modifies the epistemological theory
to accommodate the observation of her "given." This is standard
empiricist practice.
What is not so standard, and what she believes to constitute a
transcendence out of the tradition, however, is her extension and
modification of the concept of objectivity. According to Harding, it is
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necessary for her ideal of increased objectivity to place the researcher's
values and interests "in the same critical plane" as the object of study.
She, herself, accomplishes this. Thus, Harding, unlike traditional
empiricists, admits that her "given" is already theory-laden, and that this
theory-ladenness is politically motivated. She takes as premise the
superiority of feminist research. Although she claims that this research is
more objective than traditionally inspired allegedly "value-neutral"
research, she then uses this fact to argue that the concept of objectivity
is inadequate. But we can quite clearly see here that Harding's critique is
not purely epistemic. For, if traditional objectivity as it stands is
inadequate because it cannot accommodate the fact of feminist
research's greater objectivity, then she must be relying on something
other than objectivity at the beginning of her inquiry to tell her that
feminist research is superior. This something else can only be the political
value of allowing greater participation of previously marginalized people
in the power discourse of science. Harding's epistemological grounding of
feminist standpoint theory, in a way similar to the critical theorists we
have previously examined, is not entirely epistemic-theoretical, but must
be seen as equally political.
Furthermore, this extension of the concept of objectivity is hardly
original, nor is it distinctly feminist. For example, this epistemological
development constitutes one of the main contributions of the
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phenomenologists, Husserl and Heidegger, as well as the
hermeneuticists, Gadamer, and Dilthey whose “Verstehen" philosophy
elaborated just such a theory of researcher interestedness and its
necessary consequences for and involvement with the results of
research. Thus, Harding's attempt at developing an epistemology that is
distinctively and uniquely feminist fails. (Although it may still be true that
there are scientific truths that are distinctly feminist, the methodology of
their attainment is in accord with the newer modifications of the
tradition, such as hermeneutics and phenomenology.) It is not only
feminists who are capable of reflecting upon their own values and
presuppositions. In addition, as I have argued above, unless the feminist
standpoint is taken to be not just complementary to research conducted
from other standpoints, but necessarily superior, the most we can
conclude from the work of Harding and others is that the epistemology
required by feminism is merely one type of alternative epistemology, but
not, perhaps, the only epistemically legitimate one . 146 Although I agree
with the feminist epistemologists that the sum of human knowledge will
benefit from additional research based on the lives of women and other
146
ln her latest work, Harding admits that the standpoints of other oppressed
groups offer equally legitimate knowledges. Thus Harding fails to justify the
superiority of the feminist standpoint over that of any other oppressed group,
but, more importantly, my point above is that she cannot even justify the
standpoint of the oppressed over that of the dominant group, if all she can
prove is that researcher interestedness must be part of the object of study. See
Sandra Harding, Is Science Multi-Cultural . (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1 998).
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necessarily yield superior epistemic results. Thus, the choice to adopt a
specifically feminist epistemology must be made on ethical and political,
rather than purely theoretical, grounds.
Subject and Object in Feminist Critique
As we have seen, Harding's attempt at constructing a theory of
knowledge adequate to feminist experience centered on reformulating the
concept of objectivity. Her relative neglect of developing a critique of the
subjective side of the knowledge-formula led her to accept, without
sufficient epistemic ground, the superiority of feminist conducted
research. This lack in Harding's view of the subject of knowledge also
opened her to the charge of essentialism for her uncritical view of
women as possessing skills, attitudes, and values which enable them to
have superior insight into social and natural reality. Thus Harding can be
seen to remain too immanent in the patriarchal order, too accepting of
the universalizing tendency of patriarchal reason to abstract from
important differences among subjects of knowledge (and agents of action
as well). Although she attempted to adjust the view of the subject's role
in knowledge-creation by arguing for the feminist perspective as an
important guarantor of objectivity, she did not question the possibility of
the traditional conception of a subject of knowledge who is ultimately,
once social biases are accounted for, capable of perceiving an
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as well). Although she attempted to adjust the view of the subject's role
in knowledge-creation by arguing for the feminist perspective as an
important guarantor of objectivity, she did not question the possibility of
the traditional conception of a subject of knowledge who is ultimately,
once social biases are accounted for, capable of perceiving an
independently existing reality in an undistorted manner. Harding merely
replaced the traditional male subject of knowledge with a female or a
feminist subject, and "corrected" the traditional concept of objectivity to
allow for this. Thus, Harding operates with an old-fashioned
epistemological dualism of subject and object, and her theoretical
revolution consists of adding value-interestedness to the formula which
connects these disparate epistemic terms. In this respect, Harding is less
radical and revolutionary than her classic standpoint theorist
predecessors, Marx and Lukacs, whose fundamental epistemological
position denies dualism by theorizing objectivity as itself a product of the
constructive laboring activities of theory and action. According to
Lukacs, it is a basic mistake of bourgeois thought to equate the objective
with the immediate; rather the object of knowledge and action is always
necessarily mediated by theoretical and practical activity. The objective
reality is constructed by such activity and does not pre-exist it, as
Harding's static analysis seems to imply. For Lukacs and Marx it is this
mediated construction of reality itself that allows the proletariat
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standpoint its privileged grasp of the reality. The proletariat can grasp the
objectively existing social relations because the proletariat has
constructed them and has the power to terminate them. Marxist
epistemology theorized the relation between subject and object as
dialectically mediate in a way that Harding does not. Thus Harding loses
another aspect of the possible relation between knower and known
which could account for the superiority of the feminist standpoint which
she seeks to establish
.
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But even Harding's new concept of objectivity is too uncritical, still
too dependent upon the standards and values of the tradition, to be
sufficient to the revolutionary project of constructing a theory of
knowledge which escapes the problems of the traditional biases, but
remains theoretically justified or grounded in its legitimacy. For, if "strong
objectivity" is simply traditional objectivity plus value interestedness, as
turns out to be the case for Harding's reformulation, what could this
mean? Either a naive realism is still presupposed, except that now
women (or, more precisely, feminists) can more adequately access the
147This criticism of Harding can perhaps be corrected by appealing to the
work of other feminist standpoint theorists. Thus, for example, Hartsock and
Smith can perhaps accommodate a more dialectical relation between feminist
subject and the really existing social relations. Part of the problem for Harding, I
believe, is that she wants her standpoint epistemology to apply equally well to
natural, and not only social, scientific knowledge. This gives her a more difficult
case, since it is more readily acceptable to view human social relations as the
products of human activity and interpretation. A more thorough inquiry is here
in order which would examine the grounds for proletarian natural science and
their applicability to the feminist situation.
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objective, universal, unchanging reality; 148 or the perspectivism of
women's position points to a changing, fluid structure for reality. In the
former case, the traditional concept of objectivity remains untouched and
the strength of Harding's argument is concentrated solely in the greater
comprehensiveness and perspicacity of the feminist viewpoint. Thus,
Harding's new objectivity would simply fall back upon her reassignment
of the appropriate subject of knowledge (i.e., feminists) and she will now
be open to the postmodernist critique of traditional concepts of
subjectivity and the charge of essentialism. In the latter case, an
epistemological and ontological relativism results, for if women's reality
is merely different from men's, on what basis can we argue that one is
superior? Thus we have an inability to ground theoretically the feminist
superiority-the superiority can, at best, be assumed for ethical/political
reasons.
149 Harding's position thus succumbs to the critical dilemma, as
148 Jane Flax also sees this implication of Harding's position and argues that
standpoint theory does indeed presuppose a naive realism. See Flax, Thinking
Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary
West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) .
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It may appear that if we assume a "coherence" rather than a
correspondence theory of truth, Harding's claim for the superiority of the
feminist perspective can be upheld, and relativism avoided. Indeed it seems
plausible that this is what Harding herself envisions. Nonetheless, assuming a
coherence theory of truth does not completely avoid an appeal to such
nontheoretical standards of justification as greater inclusiveness in discourses of
power for those who have been oppressed. Also, although a coherence theory
can account for the normative preference of greater comprehensiveness, if we
assume an incommensurability between the perspectives of feminists and those
of the tradition, coherence theories cannot supply a decision method. What is
needed, if a coherence theory is to be made to work, is an explanation of the
objective and necessary overlap between the feminist perspective and that of
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her position oscillates between a too transcendent modernist objectivism,
or a self-refuting relativism.
On a positive note, what we have learned from Harding's attempt
is the necessity of the proper perspective for the activity of critique. As
we have seen, feminists are (although, I would argue, not uniquely)
capable of formulating critical questions and proposing alternate visions,
since they are directly acquainted with contradictions, tensions, and gaps
in the accepted theories of reality. The feminist experience is quite often
at odds with the stories being told about reality, so that feminists must
develop a bifurcated and alienated consciousness. This is hardly a new
position, and for centuries it has been a commonplace of dialectical
philosophy (from Plato through Hegel to Marx) that the starting point of
critical thought is in the identification of contradictions and the attempt
to overcome and resolve them through theoretical (and, practical, in the
the tradition; and as we shall see, this is what I argue Irigaray supplies. But in
the case of Harding, the superiority of the feminist perspective relies upon the
claim that it can see everything that the traditional perspective can see, and
more; thus it reduces back to the first pole of the dilemma that grounds
Harding's work in the belief in women as a special subject class, resulting in an
uncritical notion of objectivity. I believe that this general line of reasoning can
be made to work, once the theoretical account is given that demonstrates the
objective necessity of the greater comprehensiveness of the feminist
perspective. Thus some type of coherence theory is the best we can have. On a
traditional desire for a theoretical and formal ground for the possibility of critical
knowledge, standpoint theory, like the other critical theories we have examined
thus far, comes up short. In fact, my conclusion will be that it is time that we
give up the dream for a narrowly rational ground for human thinking, knowing
and acting, and that we accept the necessary implication of our standards for
thinking in political and ethical values. It is my further contention that feminist
theory can help us do just that.
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case of Marx) development. Furthermore, as we have seen in Chapter
One above, an essential aspect of critique is the identification of a crisis
in the object of critique which leads to the development and employment
of a criterion of adequacy for the new theory (action or institution). What
makes feminism so promising as a critical orientation is just this change
of perspective which allows the possibility of an alternative vision. When
this vision is truly other and is fully sustained as such, it can result in
radically new instances of knowledge, which in turn can lead to radically
new criteria for what counts as knowledge
.
150 Thus, not only has
feminism's critique of the traditional (male) subject of knowledge
produced new instances of knowledge (e.g., those mentioned previously
in this chapter, such as the existence of the sex/gender system or
sex/affective labor), but feminism's epistemological contributions to the
concept of the subject of knowledge should also yield a new concept of
what there is to know (a new ontology) and of what counts as knowing
it. (Harding's "strong objectivity" failed to meet this expectation, and
thus failed at overcoming the terms of the critical dilemma.)
Perhaps, however, another deeper look at the subjective side of
the knowledge equation can yield some suggestions for the desiderata of
150 This seems to be an echoing of the traditional Cartesian methodology.
Descartes identified an instance of certain knowledge, and then extracted from
that instance the criteria for its certainty. Similarly, as Harding argues, feminists
can produce new instances of knowledge; the task is then to analyze those
instances (as Harding attempted to do) and to make explicit what it is about
them that accounts for their being knowledge.
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a theory of the epistemological object that can help us overcome the
problem of grounding critique. I believe that Irigaray can be seen as
providing some of what we need to accomplish this task. Irigaray's
interpretation of the subject theorizes women as radically "other" than
the traditional subject of patriarchal knowledge and power. In so doing,
she too invokes the charge of essentialism. Perhaps, however, feminists
have been too hasty in dismissing essentialism as (an essential?) crime or
sin against the radicalism of feminist critique. In fact, it has been argued
that anti-essentialism is itself essentialist, for in order to dismiss
essentialism, it is first necessary to define it . 151 Isn't it then possible that
the use of essence— the notion of what a thing is— is required in order to
theorize at all ? 152 Perhaps there can be an essentialism which is
"strategic" rather than metaphysical. If so, might this type of
essentialism further the feminist project in the face of the critical
dilemma of finding a justified theory which is sufficiently radical? I now
turn to Irigaray in hopes of answering these questions.
151 See Naomi Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips
with Irigaray ."in Enaaaina With Iriaarav edited by Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor,
Margaret Whitford, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
152 Interestingly, this idea is explicitly expressed in Plato's Gorgias, where it
is argued that without definitions, distinctions and universals, the known world
would collapse into indistinguishable matter, according to the principle of
Anaxagoras. See Plato's Gorgias, 465d.
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CHAPTER 4
IS POSTMODERN FEMINISM THE ANSWER?
What poses problems in reality turns out to be justified by a logic
that has already ordered reality as such. Nothing escapes the
circularity of this law— Female sexualization is thus the effect
of a logical requirement, of the existence of a language that is
transcendent with respect to bodies, which would necessitate,
in order-nevertheless-to become incarnate, "so to speak,"
taking women one by one. Take that to mean that woman does
not exist, but that language exists. That woman does not exist
owing to the fact that language—a language—rules as master,
and that she threatens-as a sort of "prediscursive reality"?—to
disrupt its order (Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One).
In the last chapter, we began to examine the way in which the
critical dilemma arises for feminist theory. Sandra Harding, as we have
seen, distinguishes three different epistemological approaches to the
critical dilemma and the problem of justifying feminist theory: feminist
empiricism; feminist standpoint theory; and postmodern feminism. This
tripartite division is in keeping with the work of much other feminist
theory which seems to maintain a similar schematic division, depending
upon the emphasis or aspect of feminist theory being categorized . 153
153 For instance, earlier generation feminist theorists held to a categorization
scheme that consisted of radical feminism, socialist feminism, and beyond; or
there was the scheme of equity (or liberal) feminism, difference feminism, and
postmodernist feminism; or according to Kathy Ferguson, we now have
rationalist feminism, cosmic feminism, and linguistic feminism; or as C.
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What all these classification schemes seem to hold in common is the
third category of postmodern feminism. This third category seems in
every case to be a catch-all category for theory which doesn't fit the
previous two, much better understood and more fully analyzed,
categories. Obviously, it is this third category that is in most desperate
need of clarification. In fact, it seems that most work thus far has
characterized this third category not in terms of its positive theoretical
attributes, but rather in opposition to or negation of that which it is
not— namely modernist or enlightenment values concerning the nature of
the subject, the object of knowledge and action (e.g., nature and society)
and the tools with which we know (e.g., language, reason). Even the
name, postmodern, designates a relational, rather than a positive or
absolute, identity in terms of a transcendence or succession.
Thus, for example, Jane Flax has summarized postmodernism as
announcing or holding the death of Man, History, and Metaphysics, as
these terms have been understood according to their importance for the
Enlightenment view of a unified, autonomous subject endowed with
reason, capable of knowing the true story of history and the hidden,
DiStefano sees it, rationalist feminism; anti-rationalist feminism; and
postmodern feminism. See Alison Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature,
(New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983); Kathy E. Ferguson, The Man
Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993); and Christine DiStefano, "Dilemmas of Difference:
Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism," in Linda Nicholson, ed.
Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990).
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universal truths of natural and social reality
.
154 But what can be the result
of these deaths," especially for feminism, which seems to rely
fundamentally on its ability to argue in the name of progress, reason, and
justice for the emancipation of an identifiable social group, whose
subjectivity and hence correlative rights have been denied? Can there be
postmodernist feminist critique, or is feminist critique necessarily
embedded in the modernist tradition?
Immanence and Transcendence in Irigaray's Postmodern/Difference
Feminism
According to Rosemarie Tong, postmodern feminism takes off
from Simone de Beauvoir's claim that woman is the "other" of the
masculinist order . 155 Certainly this claim has been instantiated in the
work of Luce Irigaray, who sees woman's otherness as the necessary
mirror that reflects the male image back to him and thus assures him of
his legitimacy and superiority. Thus, most commentators see Irigaray as
an essentialist, since she theorizes the differences between men and
women, the necessity of those differences for the upholding of the
patriarchal order, and the apparent grounding of those differences,
154 Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism. &
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990), page 214.
155 See Rosmarie Tong, Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), Chapter 8.
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oftentimes, in women's biology. It would therefore seem that it is
mistaken to identify Irigaray as a postmodernist; however, I believe that
her critical methodology demonstrates postmodernist principles, in spite
of her (alleged) essentialism and affinity with the position of the
"difference" or radical feminists
.
156 Since it is her critical methodology
that I am interested in, I am classifying her as a postmodernist critic for
the purposes of this study. As we shall see, the greatest influences on
Irigaray s work, as reflected in her methodology, come from post-
structuralist and post-modernist sources; Irigaray employs Lacanian
psychoanalytic principles and strategies; Heideggerian and Nietzschean
anti-metaphysical critiques; Derridian-style deconstruction; and linguistic
and aesthetic rhetorical tactics and tropes, all in her provocative feminist
reading of the history of western philosophical and psychoanalytic
theory.
Furthermore, Irigaray's critical target is not simply the content of
theoretical descriptions and characterizations of women and gender; her
focus is more precisely understood as a critique of modernist
representationalism itself. For Irigaray, the very conceptual structure,
156 Such feminists are usually opposed to the "equity" feminists who see
feminism's main task as the elimination of privileges based on (alleged) gender
differences. The so-called "difference' feminists stress the ways in which
women are different from men, and include such figures as Mary Daly, Carol
Gilligan, and Luce Irigaray. These two divisions represent the basic and constant
dichotomy in feminist theory, as mentioned previously in the discussion of the
tripartite classification schemes; the third category typically being reserved for
the less understood "catch-all" category of postmodernist feminism.
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values, and methods of theory-construction embody a masculinist
perspective. In this respect, she is both a deeply radical feminist and an
anti-modernist or post-modernist thinker. In addition, her "essentialism"
must be understood to operate at the "meta" or theoretical level. In
critiquing male-centered theory about women, Irigaray is attempting, for
strategic purposes, to re-define women for and within the traditional
theory. Her elucidation of woman's essence begins immanently within
the traditional theory which already essentializes women, and critiques
that essence by revealing the ways in which it contradicts what is said
about it. For Irigaray, the notion of an "essence"' or "concept" of woman
is itself intrinsic to the male representational order, and, as such, is not in
any absolute or objective way valid. 157 I believe that Irigaray knows quite
well that in the concrete (or "ontic," to borrow a term from Heidegger)
way, it is women who exist; not essences. But to do battle at the
theoretical level, essence may well prove to be an "essential" tool.
As we shall see more clearly below, Irigaray's understanding of the
patriarchal situation in which women find themselves poses the critical
157 Irigaray makes this point clear in the following passage from an interview:
"Can anyone, can I, elaborate another, a different, concept of femininity?
There is no question of another concept of femininity.
To claim that the feminine can be expressed in the form of a concept is
to allow oneself to be caught up again in a system of "masculine"
representations, in which women are trapped in a system of meaning which
serves the auto-affection of the (masculine) subject. If it is really a matter of
calling "femininity into question, there is still not need to elaborate another
"concept"— unless a woman is renouncing her sex and wants to speak like me"
This Sex Which Is Not One (p.122-123).
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dilemma for her in a profoundly challenging way. For Irigaray, following
Lacan, language, the entire representational-symbolic order, is itself male-
centered; thus any use of language by feminists would seem to be
always already co-opted. Given Irigaray's identification of the linguistic
order as phallocentric, how does she avoid the critic's dilemma with
respect to the totality of language? Since, according to the precepts of
this order, as Irigaray uncovers them, women's speech is necessarily
either imitative or "hysterical," how can she herself assume the subject
position as the author of critique which expresses the truth about
women? As Dianne Chisholm puts it,
. . . why does she mime so perfectly those projects, projections,
productions, contraphobias of phallogocentric discourse, why
does she mirror so readily the 'woman' of philosophy and of
psychoanalysis, why does she lend her writing to the re-
production of theory in seeming complicity with masculine desire?
Is she suggestible? Hysterical? Does she herself not entertain a
vicious circle when as a woman she enters the circles of
philosophy and psychoanalysis where "woman" (if Irigaray is
correct) functions as a trope of female absence and negation to
constitute the figurative illusion of male presence and autonomy?
In entering these circles, does Irigaray not, like the
philosopher/analyst, take this "woman" too literally to be the
universal — symbolic, ontological, historical— (non)representative of
women, and, consequently, like the hysteric, resign herself to
being spoken for, to a mutism of miming an imposed femininity?
in other words, does irigaray not mime the philosopher/analyst as
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a woman who has been displaced by the discourse that she
speaks, forgetting that this "woman" is also a mime?158
In Speculum of the Other Woman
,
159
Irigaray offers us a reading of
the history of western theory (especially of the feminine) from an
alternative perspective— that which has been defined as object and
"other," rather than from the point of view of the traditional (male)
subject of representation. Thus Irigaray's central methodological
metaphor in this text is the image of the speculum, the curved mirror
which reflects but distorts, and which is necessary to the examination
(by male medical science) of the curved contours of women's genitalia.
This image of the speculum indicates Irigaray's understanding of the
importance of the perspective of the other for performing critique, thus
Irigaray subsumes Harding's point about the necessity of an appropriate
(feminist) perspective. But already in the image of the speculum Irigaray
encodes more than Harding theorized. For the speculum is not a flat
mirror capable of representing the same reality that the masculine order
theorized (only incompletely, according to Harding's theory). The reality
itself will be of another kind. Given this dependence on perspective, I
would like to interpret Irigaray's postmodernism as an elaboration of,
158 Dianne Chisholm, "Irigaray's Hysteria," in eds., Carolyn Burke, Naomi
Schor, Margaret Whitford, Engaging With Irigaray , (New York; Columbia
University Press 1994).
159 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman , translated by Gillian C. Gill
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
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rather than in opposition to, standpoint theory. For Irigaray, the feminine
perspective, if it can be developed (and this is a big "if," given her take
on the patriarchal nature of the symbolic), can provide an alternative to
the traditional order.
Irigaray's speculum turns the tables on the tradition, inserting into
the text of the western canon the instrument of reflection wielded by the
feminine, rather than the masculine, as subject. She thus simultaneously
reminds us that the traditional male story is also a representation or
reflection, and, as such, an interpretation rather than a direct perception
of reality. Furthermore, Irigaray shows us that the male-authored story is
not the only possible one. Speculum can thus be seen as an example of
what Seyla Benhabib calls "defetishizing critique ," 160 for the legitimacy of
the traditional story is cast in doubt by the demonstration of another
possible interpretation. This use of the metaphor of the mirror also
alludes to the style of Derridian deconstruction, as Irigaray, like Derrida,
attempts to read the "tain" or other side of the standard mirror of
representation . 161 Like Derrida, Irigaray will examine the standard
operations of reflection to find their necessary ground in that which they
160 See Chapter One for the characterization of this type of critique, which
merely lays out the possibility of an alternative, thus refuting the assumption of
necessary universality of the position being critiqued.
161 For a discussion of this image as it pertains to Derrida's method, see
Rudolf Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection^
(Cambridge: Flarvard University Press, 1986).
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deny, repress, and oppose. Thus the male culture's reading of female
sexuality will be exposed as necessarily dependant upon female desire
and functions. Irigaray thus begins Speculum with a reading of Freudian
theory, the most contemporary and accomplished of the theories of the
feminine that she critiques in the text, and ends Speculum with a reading
of Plato's parable of the cave, which she interprets as a story of the
original denial of the feminine on the part of reason. Irigaray's reversal of
the traditional chronological order, in "deconstructing" Freud first and
Plato last, can be seen as her attempt to "unravel" the metaphysical
theoretical tradition beginning with the already woven tapestry of the
present and pulling on a single thread until she comes to the original
"stitch" in the complex image of the Platonic cave.
The Platonic Womb of Theory
Irigaray reinterprets Plato's cave parable as a flight from the
maternal, thus demonstrating the radical reversal of meaning which can
be achieved via a switch of perspective. Furthermore, in taking on Plato,
Irigaray also critiques the entire philosophical tradition, for Platonic
philosophy is considered the beginning, the origin, the womb of
philosophy. And this point of origin for philosophical thinking, for
reason's evolutionary dialectic out of the darkness of illusion, can be
seen as encapsulated in Plato's parable of the cave. Thus Plato's cave
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parable functions for Irigaray in a manner similar to the Odysseus
narrative s function for Adorno and Horkheimer. The cave is the story of
the beginning of western reason. Irigaray thus reads Plato's cave as a
metaphor for the womb ("hystera"), but according to Irigaray, Plato
inverts this womb. The neck of the womb is at the back, the back wall is
in the front, and the opening out of the womb slopes upward. The
significance of this inversion is clear. The dependence on the maternal,
as the true origin of life (and of reason), is denied. Furthermore, the cave
is revealed by Plato to be a place of copies, representations, and
simulacra which, like a conjurer's trick, mirrors and mimics reality, but is
not itself the real. The concept of reversal is again at play, as it is
inherent in the operation of a mirror to reverse the image. Thus, Irigaray
critiques not just Platonic idealism, but also the operation of
representationalism upon which the traditional philosophical quest for
truth relies.
This entrance to the cave takes the form of a long passage,
corridor, neck, conduit, leading upward, toward the light or the
sight of day, and the whole of the cave is oriented in relation to
this opening. Upward— this notation indicates from the very start
that the Platonic cave functions as an attempt to give an
orientation to the reproduction and representation of something
that is always already there in the den. The orientation functions
by turning everything over, by reversing, and by pivoting around
axes of symmetry. From high to low, from low to high, from back
to front, from anterior to opposite, but in all cases from a point of
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view in front of or behind something in this cave, situated in the
back. Symmetry plays a decisive part here— as projection,
reflection, inversion, retroversion— and you will always already
have lost your bearings as soon as you set foot in the cave; it will
turn your head, set you walking on your hands, though Socrates
never breathes a word about the whole mystification, of course.
This theatrical trick is unavoidable if you are to enter into the
functioning of representation (Speculum
,
page 244 ).
Irigaray shows in this essay that the Platonic representational
economy is based on a mimetic doubling and a reversal of reality.
Furthermore, as Irigaray points out, the cave functions as a "theatrical
arena" for the action. Irigaray therefore reveals that the work of western
representationalism, far from being natural, has been "staged." In
addition, this staging involves the control of what the prisoners are able
to see and discuss. Thus, vision and speech are shown to be the primary
means of circumscribing the real in the economy of Platonic metaphysics.
But even here, Irigaray shows us that the repressed feminine asserts
itself, as she points out the necessity of a background of silence which
allows for the voices of the prisoners to echo. This background points
metaphorically to the necessity of the feminine principle which, insofar as
it is denied voice, serves as silent medium and setting for the male
symbolic economy. Irigaray's deconstructive technique here reveals what
is casually passed off as unimportant in Plato's account (i.e., the offhand
remark that some of the prisoners talk, while other remain silent) to be of
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utmost importance in the critical task of mining that which has been
buried beneath the surface of representation.
Thus Irigaray's deconstructive technique is simultaneously a
psychoanalysis of the metaphysical tradition. Like psychoanalysis, this
critical method cannot be understood solely as a theoretical intervention,
but is also essentially a therapeutic practice. Irigaray conducts therapy on
the tradition, and like any good therapist, one of her basic techniques is
to listen to the symptoms described by her patient. These
symptoms— the contradictions, gaps, and desperate attempts to cover
over that which has been repressed— thus will themselves supply the
new standards, values and concepts which can then be used to structure
the new economy toward which Irigaray is working. These values will
therefore include a return to the concrete, the dark and the earth, to find
what has been buried there, and to listen to the significance of silence.
Freud's Libidinal Economy
Irigaray's development of the female (feminist) perspective
elaborates a characterization of women as a by-product of her reading of
the male tradition's theory of women. The "essence" which Irigaray
attributes to women is one which already belongs to women according to
the masculinist tradition. Thus her "strategic essentialism" functions as
immanent critique, for it works from within the already existing theory.
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Irigaray uncovers and remarks upon the places in the traditional theory of
women where women, even as defined by that theory, don't fit. Irigaray
thus reads the gaps and contradictions as symptoms of the repression,
and allows these places to become opportunities for understanding a
different economy of desire— of motivation, experience and pleasure. But
it is important to note that the possibility and structuring concepts of this
alternative economy are already presupposed in the tradition's
unconscious. Thus, where the traditional Freudian theory explicitly
categorizes in terms of unity and duality, woman must be denied and
repressed, for she is neither one nor two. Her sexuality is always in
contact with itself, for her genitals comprise two lips which touch each
other.
. . . woman's autoeroticism is very different from man's. In order
to touch himself, man needs an instrument: his hand, a woman's
body, language. . . . And this self-caressing requires at least a
minimum of activity. As for woman, she touches herself in and of
herself without any need for mediation, and before there is any
way to distinguish activity from passivity. Woman "touches
herself" all the time, and moreover no one can forbid her to do so,
for her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact.
Thus, within herself, she is already two— but not divisible into
one(s)— that caress each other. 162
162 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, translated by Catherine Porter
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), page 24.
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To the male, her genitals yield the horror of a "nothing to be
seen, yet this horror attests to the existence of an act of repression, for
if the feminine genitals were indeed simply nothing, there would be no
horror. Thus, Irigaray reads "the blind spot" of Freud's theory, which is
his understanding of the nature of the feminine. For Freud (and the entire
psychoanalytic tradition which he founded), women can only be
understood on the male model. This misunderstanding leads Freudian
theory into various contradictions and gaps, which Irigaray identifies.
These "gaps" include the following. 163 Because the male libidinal
economy is the only one recognized by Freud, feminine anatomy can be
seen only as "lack" or deficiency; feminine desire can only be envy for
the "superior" male organ; feminine sexual function can only be maternal.
True feminine desire and pleasure cannot be recognized or understood on
this model, for they differ radically from the male "norm" which supplies
the categories, values and structuring concepts for the understanding of
sexuality in general.
Another basic contradiction in Freudian theory that Irigaray
identifies centers on the thesis of penis envy. Most obviously, and as
many feminist theorists have pointed out, it seems absurd and unfounded
to assume that the little girl will consider her genitals "inferior," rather
163See Irigaray, Speculum . "The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry,
pages 1 1 -1 33.
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than merely different. After all, they give her great pleasure and should
therefore be a valued part of her body. It is only according to an already
presupposed valorization of both the penis and the specular 164 that
feminine genitals could be considered less valuable than the male's.
Freud, in fact, betrays this presupposition and desire by attributing the
little girl's alleged penis envy to the phallic phase of sexual development.
But in this phase, according to Freud's theory, "the little girl is a little
boy," that is to say that the girl's libidinal development is at this point
exactly the same as the boy's, centered on the clitoris, which for Freud is
simply the penis substitute. Why then should the girl envy what she
believes she already has? Irigaray sees the answer to this question to lie,
not in the girl's desire, but in Freud's.
Is the primitive, or most primitive, character of "penis-envy" not
an essential factor in establishing the primacy of the male organ?
In making the phallus necessarily the archetype for sex? The
primal sex? And making the penis the best representational
equivalent of the Idea of sex? There can only be one desire: the
desire to ensure domination by greed, by appetite for
appropriation. If anything were to contradict this desire— the little
girl's pleasures, for example — the whole economy of sexual
affects, and affectations, would have to be reinterpreted. And it
is difficult to predict where a shift in the attribution of sexual
powers might lead. But the misprisions needed to maintain the
164 That the visible is over-valued in the masculine representational system is
a basic theme of Irigaray's, which is lent support by the etymological
connection between "theory" from the Greek, ' theoria'
,
and "vision .
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established order lead one to suspect that such an operation
might take us far (Speculum
,
p. 58).
There are a number of additional contradictions that Irigaray
identifies in Freud s theory. For one thing, traditional Freudian theory can
understand the activity of breast feeding only by assimilating it to the
category of production. Quite obviously, this assimilation in no way
captures a woman's experience, which, according to Irigaray, involves a
great deal of pleasure. Once again, women's pleasure is not recognized.
This lack of recognition of female pleasure/experience is again reflected
in Freud's notion of "passive aims." Although Freud claims to reject the
stereotypical active/passive distinction for sexual difference, he
reintroduces it with his notion of passive aims. Since feminine sexuality
cannot fit the male model, it is seen as orientating itself toward passive
sexual goals, rather than as challenging the active/passive dichotomy.
Furthermore, the teleological nature of male sexuality is assumed to apply
to female sexuality as well. Freud never considers the possibility that the
very notion of aims or goals may neither structure nor adequately capture
the feminine sexual experience in the way it does the masculine. Another
theoretical glitch in the Freudian story comes with his claim that the
evolution to femininity is a "struggle," but at the same time, Freud holds
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that the female constitution, if followed naturally, leads to femininity.
Why then the inevitable struggle? 165
All of the above contradictions can be seen as presupposing the
masculine need for "sameness" and the inability to recognize difference.
Irigaray makes excellent critical use of this presupposition to identify a
characteristic of the male order that can only be received by that tradition
with horror. The masculine desire for sameness indicates a presupposed
homosexuality.
Thus Freud discovers — in a sort of blind reversal of
repressions— certain variously disguised cards that are kept
preserved or stored away and that lie beneath the hierarchy of
values of the game, of all the games: the desire for the same, for
the self-identical, the self (as) same, and again of the similar, the
alter ego and, to put it in a nutshell, the desire for the auto. . . the
homo. . . the male, dominates the representational economy.
"Sexual difference" is a derivation of the problematics of
sameness, it is, now and forever, determined within the project,
the projection, the sphere of representation, of the same
(Speculum , pp. 26-27).
Irigaray's Strategy of Mimesis
Thus Irigaray's critical strategy involves the traditional critical style
that we have already seen in previous critical theorists (most explicitly, in
Adorno and Horkheimer) of letting the contradictions speak for
1 65 lrigaray
,
Speculum . "The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry,"
pages 11-1 33.
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themselves. But there is also another way in which Irigaray's critical
strategy operates. Irigaray mimes her object. She imitates and reproduces
at a higher theoretical level the very contradictions that she finds. For
example, Irigaray's critique of Freud can be seen as a mimetic repetition
of one aspect of the psychoanalytic theory that she critiques. According
to the "castration complex" the little boy is overcome with feelings of
fear once he catches sight of the "nothing to be seen" of the female
genitals. The boy experiences this visual revelation as a threat to the
cathexis he has attached to his own genitals. This feeling of threat
experienced at the recognition of an alternative possibility for what had
previously been thought to be the universal condition can be seen as
similar to the condition evoked by what I have been, following Seyla
Benhabib, calling "defetishizing critique." In analyzing this aspect of
traditional Freudian theory, Irigaray simultaneously points out the deep-
rooted reasons for resistance on the part of the male-centered symbolic
order. She repeats at the theoretical level an unveiling of an alternative
libidinal economy. Just as the boy's glimpse of the female genitals was
traumatic for him, as it indicated the possibility of castration, so the
glimpse of another possible libidinal economy, provided by Irigaray,
threatens the male-centered representational economy in its self-conceit
as universal truth. This miming is a form of immanent critique, for
Irigaray takes so seriously Freud's theoretical story that she raises its
184
truth to the level of its effect on her very capacity to speak, shaping
what she is able to say. The only way she can speak her feminine alterity
within the existing theoretical traditions, and according to the very theory
of that tradition, is to mime Freud. The psychoanalytic tradition has set
the terms for the discussion of female sexuality. But since psychoanalytic
theory is self-contradictory, for it simultaneously depends upon and
denies the feminine, to mime that theory is already to critique it.
Irigaray is forced to use a mimetic critical strategy due to the
hegemony that masculine theory has in the realm of legitimate
discourses. The language which could adequately express feminine
sexuality does not yet exist. Thus, the only alternative to speaking
female sexuality within the terms laid down by male psychoanalytic law
is hysteria . 166 Irigaray therefore "mimes" the theory in the exaggerated
manner of the hysteric in order to make her point that the theory is
limited. Hysteria operates by miming discourse. Its gestures, silences,
paralyses, and nonsensical utterances, imitate meaningful speech.
166As Irigaray puts it: "Why make the little girl, the woman, fear, envy, hope,
hate, reject, etc. in more or less the same terms as the little boy, the man? And
why does she comply so readily? Because she is suggestible? Hysterical? But
now we begin to be aware of the vicious circle. How could she be otherwise,
even in those perversities which she stoops to in order to "please" and to live
up to the "femininity" expected of her? How could she be anything but
suggestible and hysterical when her sexual instincts have been castrated, her
sexual feelings, representatives, and representations forbidden? When the father
forces her to accept that, while he alone can satisfy her and give her access to
pleasure, he prefers the added sexual enjoyment to be derived from laying down
the law, and therefore penalizes her for her (or his own?) "seduction
fantasies"?" (Speculum, pages 59-60).
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Furthermore, hysterical miming, according to the authoritative terms of
the psychoanalytic discourse, conveys an "excess" which, although not
explicitly expressed, constitutes a latent potential meaning. According to
Irigaray,
. .
.
[the "neurotic pathology" of hysteria] is ambiguous, because
it signifies at the same time that something else is being held
back, kept in reserve. In other words, there is always, in hysteria,
both a reserve power and a paralyzed power. A power that is
always already repressed, by virtue of the subordination of
feminine desire to phallocratism; a power constrained to silence
and mimicry, owing to the submission of the "perceptible," of
"matter," to the intelligible and its discourse. Which occasions
"pathological" effects. And in hysteria there is at the same time
the possibility of another mode of "production," notably gestural
and lingual; but this is maintained in latency. Perhaps as a cultural
reserve yet to come . . . ? ( This Sex, page 138).
Thus Dianne Chisholm reads Irigaray's miming of Freudian theory
as a strategy of "mimetic hysteria" which is intended ultimately to lead
to the possibility of resistance . 167 She backs up this reading by appealing
to two different forms of mimesis which she sees as operative in
Irigaray, and which Irigaray borrows from Plato. There is both a
reproductive and a productive type of mimesis described in Plato.
According to Chisholm, Irigaray can be seen to be using the first sort of
mimesis, in its exaggerated repetition of traditional theory, in order to
167Dianne Chisholm, "Irigaray's Hysteria."
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pave the way for the second kind of mimesis. Thus, according to
Chisholm, we can read Speculum as an instance of reproductive mimesis;
while This Sex
,
with its lyrical poetic expressions of feminine desire, can
be seen as an instance of the second type. The former type of
(reproductive) mimesis leads to a possible resistance which is then
expressed in the latter ("utopian" according to Chisholm) type. Thus to
repeat Freud's words about feminine sexuality emphatically and
exaggeratedly, to adopt them as true of oneself, and to take them
seriously is already subversive, for it presupposes that excess of meaning
which makes possible the attitude of ironic and strategic acceptance of
the discourse being mimed. Irigaray's strategy of mimesis simultaneously
expresses and creates space for the feminine subject position that the
psychoanalytic discourse, at the level of meaningful theoretical content,
denies. Feminine hysterical mimesis offers a sort of pragmatic refutation
of the masculine theory which denies to women the subject position.
Miming Metaphor for Metonymy
The above described mimetic feature of Irigaray's critical method
touches upon several interrelated themes: the relationship of the sexed
body to language; metonymy and metaphor (displacement and
condensation, or contiguity and similarity); and parler femme or speaking
as a woman. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Irigaray s critical
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strategy, it is necessary to understand the traditional theory's explanation
of the relation between the sexed subject and language. Why is it,
according to traditional psychoanalytic theory, that women's relationship
to language is different from men's? According to Freudian theory, it is
the resolution of the Oedipus complex that allows for the development of
the superego, and hence the entry of the human subject into the world of
symbolic order and language. Since the Oedipus complex is resolved
differently for boys and girls, the boy, in renouncing the mother as the
original object of desire, sublimates this desire by using language and
creating culture and its products. The girl, however, never completely
resolves the complex, and never completely renounces the mother, for
she realizes that the mother is, like her, castrated. Furthermore, the girl
has no incentive to give up her original preoedipal desire, for she can
never hope to obtain the desired object (the phallus) by ultimately
possessing a woman of her own in the way in which the father
possesses the mother. Thus, the girl's superego is not as strong as the
boy's, nor is her ability to sublimate as great . 168 In Lacan's
168 According to Freud, ". . . the Oedipus complex escapes the fate which it
meets with in boys: it may be slowly abandoned or dealt with by repression, or
its effects may persist far into women's normal mental life. I cannot evade the
notion (though I hesitate to give it expression that for women the level of what
is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their superego is never so
inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require
it to be in men. Character traits which critics of every epoch have brought up
against women— that they show less sense of justice than men, that they are
less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often
influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection or hostility— all these
188
reinterpretation of Freud, according to his linguistic understanding of the
unconscious, it is the symbolic "name of the father" (rather than the
concrete individual father) that enters into the boy s preoedipal imaginary
relationship with the mother, and impels the development of the
superego injunction against incest. But for both Freud and Lacan, the boy
has the greater ability to use language, for the representational order
arises out of his renunciation of the mother . 169
Irigaray, as immanent critic, begins from the psychoanalytic story
of women's relation to language or the symbolic economy. However,
within that story, Irigaray finds and expands a space for the
representation of a feminine economy. Irigaray both identifies the
possibility of feminine speech within the theory, and elaborates that
speech from a position outside the male order. She works from both the
positions of immanence and transcendence. We can see an example of
the way in which she accomplishes this in her figure of the "two lips"
which constitute the female genitalia. According to Diana Fuss , 170 this
often-used figure of Irigaray's is a basic reason for the charge of
would be amply accounted for by the modification in the formation of their
superego which we have inferred above" Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality,"
The Pelican Freud Library, Vol.7, On Sexuality (Penguin, 1977), page 342.
169 For a clear and concise elaboration of this aspect of psychoanalytic
theory in both Freud and Lacan, see Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist
Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1990), chapter 3.
170 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism. Nature & Difference (New
York: Routledge, 1989), Chapter 4.
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essentialism so frequently levelled against her. Irigaray cites the two lips
as a basis for the alternative feminine economy; for the unity-in-duality of
woman's anatomy and pleasure challenges the male assumption of unity
over plurality, activity over passivity, similarity over contiguity, and
metaphor over metonymy
.
171 Most readers of Irigaray see her as
challenging the male system by attempting to valorize the neglected
poles of the above dichotomies. However, I would argue, following and
expanding on Fuss, that Irigaray deconstructs the dichotomies
themselves, showing the ways in which the male-valued poles
presuppose and carry with them their complements in the feminine. Thus
according to Fuss, the figure of the two lips functions as a "metaphor for
metonymy."
One wonders to what extent it is truly possible to think of the
"two lips" as something other than a metaphor. I would argue
that, despite Irigaray's protestations to the contrary, the figure of
the "two lips" never stops functioning metaphorically. Her
insistence that the two lips escape metaphoricity provides us with
a particularly clear example of what Paul de Man identifies as the
inevitability of "reentering a system of tropes at the very moment
we claim to escape from it" . . .. But, what is important about
Irigaray's conception of this particular figure is that the "two lips"
operate as a metaphor for metonymy; through this collapse of
boundaries, Irigaray gestures toward the deconstruction of the
171 The prioritization of metaphor over metonymy is so uncontroversial that a
standard reference text, The Oxford Companion to the English Language,
defines 'metonymy' as a species of metaphor. See The Oxford Companion ,
edited by Tom McArthur (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), page 653.
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classic metaphor/metonymy binarism. In fact, her work
persistently attempts to effect a historical displacement of
metaphor's dominance over metonymy; she "impugns the
privilege granted to metaphor ( a quasi solid) over metonymy
(which is much more closely allied to fluids)" ( This Sex, 1 10). 172
Furthermore, this use of metaphor to open space for metonymy supports
my contention that Irigaray's essentialism is strategic rather than
ontological or biological, for her project to construct a feminine speech is
based not on a literal reading of women's anatomy, but on a figurative
(although not entirely symbolic, for it is metonymical as well as
metaphorical) relation of the body to language.
Irigaray thus makes use of metaphor in order to make clear within
and to the male representational economy the alternative possibility of a
female economy based on contiguity and fluidity, and figured in the trope
of metonymy rather than metaphor. That this alternative economy indeed
exists is shown (metaphorically) by Irigaray in the central section of
Speculum. In the essay "Any Theory of the "Subject" Has Always Been
Appropriated by the "Masculine"," Irigaray makes use of metaphorical
imagery in order to describe the relationship of the feminine essence to
the male economy. The title makes clear that Irigaray is dealing with
theory as the object of her critique, rather than a reality about women in
themselves. Traditional male theory sees women as lacking self-
172 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking , page 66.
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consciousness; as "inert" matter which serves as the support for the
male subject. This subject, in order to achieve and preserve dominance,
continually distances itself from the material substratum. In a classic
metaphor that Irigaray here echoes, men are the sun and women are the
earth. But the earth, according to Irigaray, and unsuspected by the male
solar subject, is not inert, but also self-relates.
As things go now, man moves away in order to preserve his stake
in the value of his representation, while woman counterbalances
with the permanence of a (self)recollection which is unaware of
itself as such. And which, in the recurrence of this re-turn upon
the self — and its special economy will need to be located — can
continue to support the illusion that the object is inert. "Matter"
upon which he will ever and again return to plant his foot in order
to spring farther, leap higher, although he is dealing here with a
nature that is already self-referential. Already fissured and open.
And which, in her circumvolutions upon herself, will also carry off
the things confided to her for re-presentation. Whence, no doubt,
the fact that she is said to be restless and unstable. In fact it is
quite rigorously true that she is never exactly the same. Always
whirling closer or farther from the sun whose rays she captures
and sends curving to and fro in turn with her cycles. 173
The fact that Irigaray is infiltrating the male economy from within
is indicated in this essay. For here she describes the lengths to which the
male economy will go to insure itself against contamination by the
encroaching feminine. As Irigaray points out, with the advent of
173 Irigaray, Speculum , page 234.
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psychoanalytic theory, woman has been discovered to lie in men's
unconscious. But of course this discovery will be denied, repressed and
fought against. Irigaray's task is to block this repression and to bring to
consciousness that which the male economy wishes to remain repressed.
She continues to do so through her readings of various philosophical
positions in the middle section of Speculum.
For instance, her essay on Kant continues this attempt
.
174 She
reads Kant as conducting a very sophisticated salvaging of the male
subject's primacy and sovereignty over a nature which has begun to
assert its independence in the realm of theory. As Kant elevates
understanding over sensibility, according to Irigaray, the relation to the
mother is sacrificed. However, this relation continues to assert itself in
the mind's desire for such ideals as the sublime and the moral law. These
aspects of nature indicate male reason's recognition of that which it
lacks, and its attempt to come to grips with, to deny and to control this
lack, by positing limiting concepts (such as a te/os in nature and morals)
that function to bring the unfathomable under the control of reason. Still,
the repressed other cannot be completely tamed, and continues to make
its appearance at various places within the theoretical tradition.
Furthermore, there is one area of the traditional theoretical story that
completely gives up the attempt to swallow up and hide the feminine.
174Luce Irigaray, "Paradox A Priori," in Speculum , pages 203-214.
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Thus mysticism exists within western metaphysics as the one movement
that belongs essentially to the feminine, as the one place where women
have had a voice.
This is the place where consciousness is no longer master, where,
to its extreme confusion, it sinks into a dark night that is also fire
and flames. This is the place where "she"-and in some cases he,
if he follows "her" lead — speaks about the dazzling glare which
comes from the source of light that has been logically repressed,
about "subject" and "Other" flowing out into an embrace of fire
that mingles one term into another, about contempt for form as
such, about mistrust for understanding as an obstacle along the
path of jouissance and mistrust for the dry desolation of reason.
Also about a "burning glass." This is the only place in the history
of the West in which woman speaks and acts so publicly
(Speculum, page191).
Irigaray thus sees mystical discourse as bearing witness to the alternative
nature of feminine desire. She finds in mysticism the feminine values of
fire, burning, jouissance, and ex-stacy (in the literal sense of being
outside oneself). This feminine realm of discourse demonstrates for
Irigaray the possibility of the feminine economy and ontology that she
seeks to develop. And although the mystical has always been the place
of unreason, for Irigaray, the challenge will be to find and develop its
own inner logic.
194
An Alternative Economy
As we have seen, Irigaray makes use of the standard technique of
critical philosophizing in both remaining within, or immanent to, the
theory which is the object of her critique, while at the same time
attempting to develop values, standards, and concepts that are not
acknowledged by the existing tradition. She works both from within and
from without. One aspect of Irigaray's critique which allows her
simultaneously to "mine" these buried or repressed feminine principles,
and to "mime" the male discourse about the feminine, is her use of
psychoanalysis. In her interpretation of women as the "unconscious"
blind spot of the western metaphysical tradition, Irigaray has found a
way to present that tradition with its "other," without denying her own
embeddedness within the tradition. Since that other is latent within the
tradition, it can supply standards and values which are both
simultaneously immanent within and transcendent to that tradition.
Moreover, Irigaray's application of the insights of psychoanalysis to the
feminist critical practice can be seen as making progress over Harding's
inability to get beyond a modern scientific notion of objectivity to which
she merely tacked on the requirement of value interestedness. For
Irigaray, the feminist subject is, like the subject of standpoint
epistemology, a split or bifurcated consciousness that sees both the
traditional representation of reality and a beyond that is denied a voice.
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But for Irigaray, the psychoanalytic approach locates this bifurcation not
only in the individual feminist subject's psyche, but in the symbolic
structure of language which determines the "objective" reality itself.
Thus, Irigaray is able to avoid the dualism we have identified in Harding.
Furthermore, Irigaray's psychoanalytic strategy grants her some means of
access to the repressed unconscious of this bi-leveled reality (e.g., such
"therapies" as mimetic repetition, hysteria, and reading the "symptoms "
and gaps), and therefore the possibility of developing this repressed
element into a new representational order. Irigaray's "strategic
essentialism, " in developing the subjective side of the knowledge
equation, simultaneously elaborates a reality which no longer accords to
the structuring concepts of traditional objectivity.
There is another way in which Irigaray's achievement can be seen
to be an advance over that of Harding. Since Irigaray's strategy of
psychoanalytic deconstruction enables her to uncover what is already
there, only hidden and buried, she has, to a certain extent, surmounted
the obstacle of the critic's dilemma, by avoiding each "horn." Her new
standards already exist within the tradition; yet they are beyond anything
that has been explicitly recognized and instantiated. However, Irigaray's
achievement is not complete, for she fails to provide a fully-developed,
rational, theoretical argument for the applicability of these repressed
feminine values to the metaphysical tradition. It is not yet clear that what
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has been repressed can ever be expressed in anything more than a lyrical,
poetic, figurative, nonrational sense. Furthermore, since psychoanalysis is
itself not only a theory, but, perhaps more importantly, a practice, we
cannot fully credit Irigaray with finding a theoretical solution to the
critical dilemma. Like the other theorists we have studied, Irigaray seems
to "do" critique, without being able fully to explain or to justify her own
activity. Thus the ground for the possibility of her critique remains
elusive, appealing instead to the possible results of her critical work in its
founding a specifically feminine discourse ("parler femme"). However,
since this feminine discourse will itself operate according to alternative
(feminine) standards and values, perhaps it is to these standards that we
should look to find the ground for Irigaray's critical activity. Thus, with
Irigaray, as with other immanent critics, we encounter a certain
circularity, for the standards by which her work can be judged and
justified will only come into being at the conclusion of the work. The
"proof' apparently can only be found in the "pudding."
What then has Irigaray accomplished by bringing to the fore that
which has been forgotten, silenced, and denied within the male
metaphysical economy of representation? What are these new (feminine)
standards which can serve to ground an alternative economy? We have
already seen that Irigaray uncovers hidden feminine principles underneath
the male metaphysical tradition. Furthermore, these principles, as earth
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and ground for the male representational order, have nurtured that order
as the object of its repressed desire and motivation, and as the origin
from which it flees. In uncovering these feminine standards, values, and
structuring concepts, Irigaray not only offers a challenge to the male
tradition, but also points the way to further development.
Irigaray's critique of representationalism focuses on the concepts
of identity and sameness as basic to the patriarchal symbolic order. This
economy has therefore been incapable of encoding the
feminine— allowing the feminine entry into the system only as an object
that conforms to its own principles. Since this order operates according
to laws of exchange (which provide the telos for the values of identity
and equivalence), women too are given value only insofar as they
function for the exchange relation. Thus, in the current symbolic system,
women serve primarily as commodities in a system of exchange between
men . 175 An alternative symbolic economy must therefore be structured by
principles other than identity and sameness. These will include the (more
feminine, according to Irigaray) concepts of difference and plurality;
fluidity (rather than solidity); contiguity; touch (rather than sight);
metonymy (rather than metaphor). Furthermore, as I have been arguing,
^ For a brilliant and lucid analysis of the exchange of women as
fundamental to the patriarchal order, see Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women:
Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex," in Alison M. Jaggar and Paula S.
Rothenberg, editors, Feminist Frameworks: Altern ative Theoretical Accounts of
the Relations Between Women and Men, second edition (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1984).
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these alternative values are grounded not essentially in feminine
anatomy, but in a critical and careful reading, a psychoanalytic
deconstruction, of the repressed presuppositions of the male symbolic
order. Irigaray's suggestions
— underdeveloped, though they may be— for
an alternative symbolic economy are derived from and grounded in the
already existing symbolic order in the sense that this order carries with it
an unconscious underside— the feminine— which contains the repressed
alternative.
Since, therefore, we must reject a simple essentialism of women's
bodies as grounding the activity of Irigarayan critique and the new
representational economy toward which it points, we need to ask what
we are left with? Can the negative— that which the tradition has denied
as nonbeing — serve as adequate ground of a new epistemological
economy, or are we left with the theoretical impasse that has haunted
our attempts thus far throughout the dissertation? The hints that Irigaray
has given us have been considerable, but still insufficiently developed.
But as we have seen, the mimetic strategy of immanent critique has once
again, in Irigaray, formed the basis of her method, as it has in several
other theorists we have previously examined. Perhaps it is time to look
more closely at the concept of mimesis which has shadowed the
metaphysical tradition as the constantly repressed complement, and dark
underside to the light of reason. Furthermore, as we have seen, the
199
activity and attitude of mimesis, as well as the political commitment to
extending power to the oppressed, has structured the performance of
critique in both its immanent and transcendent aspects, thus suggesting
that our search for a theoretical, rational ground for critique and the
radically critical knowledge provided by feminist theory, can no longer
ignore the necessary nonrational elements of political power and
mimesis. I therefore intend to explore these elements and their
applicability to the problem of grounding the critical perspective in the
last two chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CRITIC'S GROUND IN THE POLITICAL: FOUCAULT AND ARENDT
We have seen that the critical dilemma appears to elude a
completely theoretical solution in the theorists we have examined so far.
For this reason, many theorists in the post-modern movement have
begun to explore the possibility of alternatives to pure theory in attempts
at offering legitimation of their critical work. In this chapter, I will
examine two such theorists, who, although apparently and at first glance
appear to be worlds apart in their theoretical orientations, can be seen as
sharing an important methodological tactic and a common turn to the
practical/political realm of human existence as the ground of their
critiques. More specifically, both Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt
conduct critique by bringing to light the excluded possibilities of
interpretation which they find at the origin of their objects of study. Thus
Foucault offers an alternative understanding of the workings of political
power, while Arendt gives a theory of freedom which she claims
previously existed, but which has been abandoned and covered over.
Both theorists, therefore, practice a form of "defetishizing critique" which
delegitimates the status quo by showing its pretensions to universality
and necessity to be without ground. Furthermore, both Foucault and
Arendt manifest significant theoretical gaps in their accounts which are
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of great relevance for the question of grounding critique. These gaps, I
believe, represent place-holders for future theoretical work, and it will be
to an elaboration of the possible filling of these gaps that I intend to turn
in my final chapter.
The Ground of Critique in Political Power: Foucault
Michel Foucault's notoriously relativist (some would say "nihilist")
position has elicited attacks from many critics. His professedly "post-
modernist" stance has produced negative reactions ranging from
puzzlement to exasperation
.
176 Because post-modernism rejects humanist
values, it would appear that Foucault must abandon the quests for either
truth or freedom. Furthermore, Foucault refused to be characterized as a
structuralist, thus rejecting the theoretical alternative frequently
embraced by the intellectual French Left of the last several decades . 177
Foucault instead opts for a more humble theoretical stance then either
structuralism or a humanism grounded in absolute subjectivity. His
position claims to be localized and perspectival, without recourse to a
theory of historical totality or universal truth.
176See James Bernauer for several responses that find Foucault to be childish
and narcissistic. Bernauer, "Michael Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking," Philosophy
and Social Criticism, volume 12, Summer, 1987.
177See Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michael Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),
chapter 3.
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But the critical intent of Foucault's work seems to belie this denial
of access to trans-historical values. His painstaking "genealogical" and
"archeological" inquiries into the domains of human power, knowledge,
and subjectivity can succeed as critique only to the extent that they
uncover failings and injustices. But to identify injustice is to be
acquainted with justice; to criticize untruth is to value truth. Hence, the
unmasking of domination and deception, with which much of Foucault's
work is concerned, must see itself as contributing to a more truthful
understanding and a more realized freedom than exist currently. To
maintain, as Foucault does, that he is a "specific" rather than a "global"
or totalizing intellectual
,
178 whose work appeals to nothing absolute,
leads to the apparent paradox that one who denies the existence of truth
is offering it, and one who denies the reality of the individual is seeking
freedom.
When Foucault argues that knowledge, in its modern
manifestation, "follows the advance of power," or that the modern
subject is an effect of the strategies of "discipline" and bio-power ," 179 he
risks the charges of self-refutation and incoherence, for how are we to
178Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Paul Rabinow, The Foucault
Reader
.
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), page 73.
179Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison , translated
by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), and Michel Foucault, The
History of Sexuality , volume 1, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Random
House, 1 978).
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take his own theoretical pronouncements? If Foucault is correct, then his
own position is merely another effect or strategy of power. But if his
position is an unmasking of the hidden operations of power, and is for
that reason an instance of a truth not subject to the control of power's
schemes, it must be that his analysis of the power/knowledge relation is
mistaken. For according to Foucault:
. . . truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a
myth whose history and functions would repay further study,
truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted
solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced
only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces
regular effects of power. Each society has its own regime of
truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what
counts as true. 180
It appears that Foucault must either give up the relativist claim that
power sets up "regimes of truth," which then determine the field of
possible discourse, or he must settle for a theoretical position which
admits complicity with the power/knowledge system in which it
functions, thus compromising his critical position. Thus, the critical
180Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in The Foucault Reader, pages 72-
73.
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dilemma is applicable to Foucault's work in a clear and profound way.
The demand seems straightforward enough. Foucault must give us a
general theory of the operations of power/knowledge, and account for his
own ground as the subject of a truthful discourse or a revolutionary
practice. If he fails these tasks, his critical project is denied legitimacy.
Thus, according to Michael Walzer, "We are to withdraw our belief in,
say, the truth of penology and then support
. . . what? ... At this point,
it seems to me, Foucault's position is simply incoherent ." 181
Or, as Nancy Fraser asks:
Whence, then, does Foucault's work, his description of 'the
carceral society', for example, derive its critical force?
. . . Does
he presuppose some alternative metaphysic, say, one of bodies?
Or is his critique radically anti-foundationalist and if so, to what
sort of justification can it lay claim? 182
But perhaps Foucault has developed the possibility of an alternative form
of grounding his activity of critique which does not succumb to the
critical dilemma. Flow does Foucault believe himself to avoid the
extremes of either a nihilistic relativism or a foundationalist absolutism?
Foucault's understanding of the relationship between power and
knowledge can help us to achieve a deeper view of the way in which the
181 Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," in Foucault: A Critical
Reader, edited by David Hoy, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pages 353-
385.
182Nancy Fraser, "Foucault's Body-Language: A Post-Humanist Political
Rhetoric?" in Salmagundi. Fall 1985, volume 61, page 56.
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critical dilemma may be overcome. The essential point here is that
Foucault sees the ground and possibility of his own critique as arising
from the very object of that critique. In this respect, Foucault is an
immanent critic, whose "genealogical " strategy is to reveal the origins of
the object of his critique, without evaluating those origins in terms of any
absolute or transcendent criteria. Furthermore, what Foucault uncovers
by means of his genealogies is a fundamental operation of power, rather
than reason. It is then power, rather than reason, that grounds our
modern institutions and beliefs; and it is power, rather than reason, that
should be seen as grounding Foucault's critical capabilities. This reliance
on the nature of power, rather than of reason, for Foucault's critical
ground perhaps can give to his strategy of immanent critique an
alternative way of eluding the critical dilemma. As we shall see, power in
its modern form, for Foucault, cannot be analyzed on an either/or model
that would accord with the terms of the critical dilemma. Thus power, in
its implications with knowledge, also makes possible the resistance to
power— a resistance of which Foucault's critique makes use. In order to
make clear the rationale behind Foucault's attempt to elude the dilemma,
I will now turn to a discussion of his historical methodology. How is it
that genealogy can be used as a critical tactic that escapes the either/or
extremes of nihilistic relativism or a transcendent absolutism?
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Genealogy as Immanent Critique
Foucault's historical method is self- consciously modeled after that
used by Nietzsche-genealogy
.
183
Traditional historiography sees the
origin of an historical phenomenon as embodying a pure and pristine
essence which then unfolds in a continuous manner. This concept of
original unity and purity encodes the historian's belief in transcendental
essences behind historical development. Historical knowledge, in
uncovering these essences, makes clear the meaning of the present as
the inevitable result of the operations of necessary laws. The effect of
traditional historiography is, therefore, a comforting legitimation of the
present, for the present appears as the culmination of a development in
accordance with the dictates of a universal and trans-historical reason.
In contrast to the above "Platonic" view, genealogy sees in
historical development only "the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-
box of chance ." 184 Thus, genealogy, in refusing to accept metaphysics as
the truth of history, searches for the errors and accidents, the lowly
details and ironic reversals, the disparities and differences at the
beginnings of historical phenomena. According to Foucault, "What is
found at the historical beginning of things is not inviolable identity of
183Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Paul Rabinow, editor,
The Foucault Reader, pages 76-100.
184Nietzsche, Dawn , quoted by Foucault in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and
History," page 89.
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their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity ." 185 We can,
therefore, laugh at the origins of human values and practices, as we find
that truth is often born of error, that we owe the concept of freedom to
the ruling classes, and that humanity evolved from the ape . 186 The critical
function performed by this attitude of irreverence toward human history
is obvious. The accidental nature of the present, and its irrational and
contingent development out of absurd beginnings makes a mockery of
the self-congratulatory view which sees the present as the fulfillment of
past promises.
History is looked upon by the genealogist as the "body of a
development ." 187 The concepts "Entstehung" and "Herkunft" are
therefore more appropriate to genealogy than is "Ursprung," or "origin."
"Herkunft" means "stock," or "descent," and thus refers to the unique
and various factors and events out of which arise the "traits," or marks,
the bodily peculiarities of a phenomenon. Thus, for example, our curious
modern desire to probe into and to speak about our sexuality descends,
according to Foucault, from the Catholic confessional practices of
eliciting sexual secrets . 188 "Entstehung," which is also commonly
185 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," page 79.
186Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," page 79.
187Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," page 79.
188Foucault, History of Sexuality, volume 1
.
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translated as "origin," is better understood, according to Foucault, as
"emergence," the moment of "arising ." 189 Genealogy, in analyzing the
emergence, must avoid the pitfall of the metaphysical historical method
which sees the present as the te/os of the past. What emerges for the
traditional historian is a puposefulness seeking realization in its present
function. But the relationship between a historical development and the
need which it answers is not teleological. According to Foucault, this
relationship is rather the result of a "series of subjugations ." 190 Thus,
genealogy de-legitimates and de-necessitates the present. The revelation
of conflict and power at the origin of fundamental human practices and
beliefs cannot but help to make the status quo appear to be radically
unjustified by rational standards. Thus Foucault's critical strategy
functions as a mode of what we have been calling"defetishizing critique,
for it offers an alternative possibility to our current understanding,
thereby delegitimizing the belief that the current view is necessarily true.
The explanations offered by Foucault for the emergence of a
development which we regard as valuable and necessary (for example,
the prison system, or the worrisome nature of our sexual identities) in
terms of accidental factors and disparate aims poses a critical challenge
to our self understanding. Genealogy thus speaks with a critical voice
189Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, Flistory," page 83.
190Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Flistory," page 83.
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without appealing to trans-historical or absolute values. It is quite enough
that our current humanist conceptions of justice, human dignity, and
truth be confronted with their origins in absurdity and the violence of
warring powers.
Power as the Real Ground
The emphasis which genealogy places on conflict and power is
not, however, unproblematic. In fact, it raises anew the question of
Foucault's theoretical inconsistency. Foucault, in keeping with his denial
of access to trans-historical absolutes, professes to be a nominalist with
respect to power . 191 Also, as we have seen, genealogy refuses to accept
teleological explanations for the emergence of historical developments.
Flowever, Foucault appears to give a functionalist account of the rise of
disciplinary power to dominance at the end of the classical period . 192 This
account takes as basic certain historical needs, among them the need of
power to expand. Discipline appears to have won out over the old
economies of power because it offered the greatest opportunity for the
expanse of power. This was due to its infiltration of political and
economic institutions, its "embodiment" in the material historical
processes of the time. Thus power grew by answering to needs created
191 Foucault, Flistorv of Sexuality, volume 1, page 93.
192Fm ir.ault. Discipline and Punish
,
part two.
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by other historical developments: the increase in population, and the
growth in society's productive capabilities
.
193 This historical
conjuncture required a means to regulate the increasingly large and
mobile population to the change in the productive apparatus. These
needs were met by the newly emerging scientific "disciplines," which
Foucault, the genealogist, describes as the “physics or anatomy," or the
body of power . 194 Far from being a straightforward Marxist explanation
for the emergence of disciplinary power (that is, that discipline succeeded
to the extent that it was functional for the growth of the forces of
production), Foucault's functionalism attributes as much explanatory
weight to the needs of power as to those of the economy.
In fact, the two processes— the accumulation of men and the
accumulation of capital— cannot be separated; it would not have
been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men
without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both
sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that
made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the
accumulation of capital. . . Each makes the other possible and
necessary; each provides a model for the other. 195
Thus power is, according to Foucault, irreducible to either the scientific
disciplinary institutions, or the political/economic apparatuses within
193Foucault, Discipline and Punish, page 218.
194Foucault, Discipline and Punish , page 220.
195Foucault, Discipline and Punish , page 221.
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which it functions and through which it is exercised. Power is credited as
a force in its own right, able to make use of material history, and thus
attributed with a significant explanatory role in Foucault's work.
But is this an anthropomorphization of power? How are we to
understand power's apparent intentionally, its ability to enact schemes
and "strategies," without taking power as either a subject endowed with
agency, or as a transcendent absolute guiding history? This aspect of
Foucault's genealogy is particularly troubling to Charles Taylor, who sees
it as a point of incoherence . 196 According to Taylor, the notion of
strategies of power without a subjective intention is incoherent insofar as
no account is offered which relates this broad pattern of non-intentional
purposefulness to the wills and intentions of historical actors. Taylor
believes that some such account is necessary since it is historical actors
who appear to compose the drama of history. If it is to be proposed that
the conscious intentions of human beings do not, contrary to their
understandings, succeed in steering the course of historical development,
an explanation must be given for the way in which human intention and
action is subsumed or overridden by a greater force . 197 As Taylor argues:
196Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in David Couzens Hoy,
editor, Foucault: A Critical Reader . (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), page 83.
197Taylor gives examples of the type of account he is looking for: accounts
which hold that the motivations of some human behavior cannot be
acknowledged, or "invisible hand" accounts such as Marxism and those variants
which see unintended consequences as a result of collective action. See
Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," pages 86-87.
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purposefulness without purpose requires a certain kind of
explanation to be intelligible. The undesigned systematicity has to
be related to the purposeful action of agents in a way that we can
understand.
. . The reason for this requirement is that the text of
history, which we are trying to explain, is made up of purposeful
human action. Where there are patterns in this action which are
not on purpose, we have to explain why action done under one
description on purpose also bears this other, undesigned
description. We have to show how the two descriptions relate. A
strategic pattern cannot be just left hanging, unrelated to our
conscious ends and projects. 198
But Foucault appears not to accept this requirement, for, as Taylor points
out, Foucault not only fails to offer such an account, but he "doesn't
even feel the need to start looking ." 199 Furthermore, according to Taylor,
it seems as though it would be impossible for Foucault to give an
explanation in terms of current models, without giving up some
fundamental aspect of his theory . 200 An explanation is required according
to Taylor, but cannot be given without inconsistency on Foucault's part.
The Foucaultian Gap
What I would like to suggest is that, rather than entailing an
inconsistency in Foucault's genealogies of power, this unwillingness and
198Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," page 87.
1
"Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," page 88.
200Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," page 89.
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inability to offer the type of explanation which Taylor seeks stems from
the necessarily incomplete nature of Foucault's critical project. Foucault's
genealogy of power is a response to a deep inadequacy which Foucault
saw in contemporary critical theory. According to Foucault, an
implicational network binds together the workings of power, knowledge,
and human subjectivity at the deepest levels of human reality
.
201 One
manifestation of this implicational system can be seen in Foucault's
account of the relationship among disciplinary power, the "disciplines" of
the human sciences, and the type of subjectivity— the docile bodies and
normalized individuals— which this power/knowledge regime produces . 202
Another such embodiment is unearthed in the symbiotic connections
among the power techniques of the Catholic confessional, the disciplines
of medicine, psychology, and law, and the sexual identity of the modern
individual . 203 Indeed, much of Foucault's work is an analytic study of the
historical juncture at the end of the eighteenth century when changes
occurred in these three fundamental aspects— power, knowledge, and
subjectivity— of human reality. A major contribution of Foucault's
201 See Biddy Martin "Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault," in editors, Irene
Diamond and Lee Quinby, Feminism & Foucault: Reflections on Resistance ,
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988) for a discussion of the
imp i: cations of this network for feminism's exploration of the relations between
sexuality, subjectivity, and power.
202See Foucault, Discipline and Punish .
203See Foucault, The Flistorv of Sexuality volume 1 .
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genealogy of the modern age is its bringing to light the role played by
power in shaping human history. The self-understanding of modernism,
particularly as manifested in the human sciences, has systematically
failed to recognize the irreducible nature of power, according to Foucault.
Thus, modern political theory conceives of power in terms of either of
two models: Marxist theory, which reduces power to the economy (and
its various state and ideological apparatuses) or liberal political theory,
which reduces power to rights held by individual human subjects, who
exchange these rights within a legal/political system of their own
creation. We have, therefore, both an institutional and a Hobbesian
sovereign/rights model for understanding power. One reduces power to
the socio-economic structure, the other grounds power in human
subjectivity.
These options can be seen as (inversely) echoing the terms of the
critical dilemma. Power, as the object of critique is seen as either
transcendent to or immanent within the subject. But power is also, in a
sense, the subject of critique, (Foucault's critique of power thus echoes
the ambiguity of Kant's critique of reason) for Foucault as immanent
critic cannot and does not exempt himself from power's reaches. Thus
power, as subject or agent of critique, is also on these models either
immanent to the subject (as a possession or right), or existing outside or
transcendent to the critical subjectivity which it determines. But Foucault
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rejects both models, for neither can account for the possibilities
uncovered by genealogy that power is exercised rather than possessed or
exchanged, or that power is itself a relation of forces and not merely an
arm of the economic apparatus. 204 This rejection is a requirement of
Foucault's larger critical project to critique modernity from within. To
understand power either as structural-institutional or as a possession of,
or on the model of, human subjectivity is to participate in the theoretical
discourse which belongs to the modern regime of power/knowledge,
which is precisely the target of Foucault's critical activity. The modern
"regime" has excluded or ignored the possibility that power functions in a
non-subjective but "strategic" manner. Thus to see power along the lines
of a Nietzschean war or "agonistic" model, as Foucault does, is one way
to propose the possibility that the accepted models are inadequate to
theorize power.
Foucault's genealogy of power can therefore be seen as his
attempt to retrieve an exclusion that occurred at the origin of the modern
period. Genealogy, in tracing the power to punish to the beginning of its
modern form, finds there a dramatic reversal with respect to power's
visibility. Power previously was exercised in the social arena as a
"spectacle" of ritual torture. 205 But the exercise of the power to punish in
204Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Rabinow Reader, page 220.
205See Foucault, Discipline and Punish , part one.
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the modern period is obscured, as it takes place in prisons and under the
guise of the need to reform the criminal or to protect society. Power
hides itself, according to Foucault, for it "is tolerable only on condition
that it mask a substantial part of itself ." 206 But this description of power
should not be taken as a metaphysical absolute to which Foucault
illegitimately appeals. Rather, it is a description of the appearance of
socio-political reality to the modern perspective. From within the regime
structured by disciplinary power, we tend not to see it. Foucault's
genealogies therefore seek to open the closed regime of disciplinary
power/knowledge to a possible interpretation, a possible truth about the
working of power which had not yet been considered. In this way,
Foucault can be seen as engaged in the type of "defetishizing" critique
we have seen in previous theorists. But unlike the previous theorists we
have examined, Foucault is quite explicit about the truth status of his
critical descriptions. Fie is not claiming absolute truth or certainty, the
status of law or general principle, but merely offering an alternative
description.
T. Carlos Jacques offers a similar reading and justification of
Foucault's critical practice .
207 Jacques sees Foucault as working only
206Foucault, History of Sexuality, volume 1 , page 86.
207T. Carlos Jacques, "Whence Does the Critic Speak? A Study of Foucault's
Genealogy," Philosophy and Social Criticism, edited by David M. Rasmussen,
(Boston: Boston College, 1991), volume 17, number 4, pages 325-345.
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immanently within a particular historical situation, so that his genealogies
are localized rather than universal or absolute. And within the local
situation in which Foucault works, his critiques function to delegitimize
the smug belief in the universal validity of the received view by reference
to the equally plausible views that have been excluded.
This gives us a clearer idea of what the genealogist challenges,
and what he or she refers to, in doing so. Not only is the aim to
upset the self-certainty of contemporary practices, but more
specifically, the self-certainty of universalistic theory which
reflects the mechanisms of disciplinary power. And this is
accomplished in the name of, by appeal to, local subjugated
oppositional knowledges. 208
Jacques argues that the mistake of critics of Foucault (such as Taylor,
Fraser, Walzer, Habermas, and others) who charge him with self-
refutation is to believe falsely that critique requires theoretical ground in
order to be rational. But according to Jacques, this requirement is
"empirically false," for we frequently engage in critique on the basis of
the "differing practices existing within the domain of dominant
practices." 209 And this kind of practical critique in the name of that which
has been oppressed is sufficient and legitimate.
Thus to demand, as does Taylor, that Foucault give us a
theoretical account of the operations of power which would be
208Jacques, "Whence Does the Critic Speak?," page 336.
209Jacques, "Whence Does the Critic Speak?," page 338.
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consistent with the discourse that reduces power to the intentions of
individual subjects is to miss the point that Foucault's provocative thesis
about the strategic nature of power in the modern period is a self-
conscious rejection and critique of the entire sovereign/rights model.
Taylor's advocacy of the humanist values of truth and freedom, as
necessary presuppositions of Foucault's theses on power, does not
appreciate the extent to which the discourse of humanism is implicated
in the regime which Foucault wants to critique. Thus from Foucault's
perspective, a discursive practice basing itself on the rights and freedom
of the individual is not sufficient to challenge the operations of
disciplinary power . 210
Since Foucault is rejecting the philosophical presupposition that a
theoretical ground is necessary for legitimate critique, Jacques believes
that Foucault is not engaged in philosophical critique . 211 Foucault's
critique is localized genealogical history, so he does not confront his
philosophical critics on their terms, but avoids or dissolves the
requirement of transcendence by refusing to make universal and absolute
claims. But I believe that this interpretation misses the point that
Foucault's historically situated and localized genealogies do contribute to
a philosophical and theoretical position, namely the denial of the
210
ln fact, Discipline and Punish describes how the discourse of the humanist
reformers contributed to the emergence of disciplinary power. See part two.
211 Jacques, "Whence Does the Critic Speak?," page 337.
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universality of the particular theoretical models that they critique (e.g.,
that power is a possession either of the subject's sovereignty or of socio-
political institutions). Although Foucault makes no positive theoretical
pronouncements, nor does he claim universality or necessity for his
descriptions, the upshot of his work is to cast doubt on the established
philosophical wisdom. Furthermore, Foucault's refusal to make positive
theoretical pronouncements is itself philosophically strategic, for it
enables him to make use of theoretical tools that he does not, in any
ultimate or absolute sense, endorse. Thus, as a strategic practice,
Foucault can appeal to the modernist concept of human rights when it
suits his purpose in a specific case. For example, in an interview given
shortly before his death, Foucault invokes the notions of truth and rights
as a means of criticizing the polemicist. According to Foucault "... a
whole morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the search for the
truth and the relation to the other ." 212
It is therefore evident that Foucault is not a nihilist. But neither are
his appeals to humanist values invocations of trans-historical absolutes.
Foucault believes all currently held values to be contaminated with
power. This is why Foucault has attempted to adopt a more modest
stance than that of the "totalizing critic." Power is seen as strategic in
212 Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations," Rabinow
Reader, pages 381-390.
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order to do battle with it on new ground. However, at times we may
wish to use old weapons. Truth and freedom belong to this arsenal, but
their use poses the risk of co-optation. As I see it, Foucault's
genealogical/critical tactic is to create space within dominant discourse
for what he calls "subjected knowledges." But Foucault is not advocating
that the perspectives of the criminal or the insane become the
paradigmatic knowledges for a new regime. Rather his strategy attempts
to make a space, a difference, or "interstice," within the standard order
which will allow the entry and perhaps the infiltration of what has been
previously excluded. This manner of critique does not profess to know
all, or to know for sure, and therefore repudiates absolutes. But it
maintains a critical distance, a degree of transcendence, by appealing to
differences and exclusions, by opening "interstices" within which powers
may battle and domination may be exposed.
In this way Foucault's method of critique is similar to that which
we have seen in Irigaray, for both attempt to bring to the fore the
excluded other which exists underneath and within the current tradition.
In order to do so, Irigaray draws upon psychoanalytic and literary
methods, while the ground upon which Foucault draws lies in the
workings of power and the political exclusion of groups and knowledges.
Neither philosopher has supplied a rock- solid theoretical ground which
can exempt their positions from the contaminations, biases, and
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determinations that they critique. However, the critical efficacy of their
work does not seem to require this. Like Meno's paradox which poses
the dilemma that learning is impossible on either of two apparently
mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives (that we either know or
are completely ignorant), the critical dilemma is beginning to look more
and more to presuppose an impossible and unnecessary demand. Perhaps
the theoretical ground of critique can be found in the actual practice of
immanent critique the actuality of which should be sufficient to
establish its possibility. If this is so, perhaps the question to be asked is
not whether, but how critique is possible. For the beginnings of an
answer, we now turn to Hannah Arendt, who can be seen as making
more explicit one way of filling in the gap left open by previous theorists'
attempt to justify critique.
The Ground of Critique in Political Freedom: Arendt
Hannah Arendt proclaimed her thinking to be a "thinking without
bannisters," by which she marked her rejection of such foundations as
tradition, religion, or other authority. As such, she necessarily grappled
with the problem of justification. In the following I intend to explore
some of the ways in which Arendt’s thought, without the safety net of
foundationalist grounding, has come to terms with the problem of
theorizing the human situation, in its relevance for what I see to be the
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critic's problem of legitimation. Although Arendt does not philosophize
out of the intimately personal, she does begin her theorizing immanently
in the concrete. For her, the most urgent theoretical and practical-political
challenge of her time was to understand the possibility and mechanisms
of totalitarianism. All of Arendt’s work can be seen as a response to this
challenge and as such, shares many concerns with other theoretical and
political movements which seek an understanding of oppression and a
path to freedom. Arendt's thought focuses explicitly on the problem of
freedom, which she believes has been mistakenly placed by the
philosophical-political tradition in the metaphysical realm, when its actual
locus is in the political. Thus for Arendt, the true ground of human
freedom and, therefore, also of the possibility of critical transcendence,
lies in the political dimension of human existence. According to Arendt,
there is a fundamental political dimension of life, of which the modern
tradition of political philosophy has lost sight. Arendt's entire corpus is
motivated by a desire to retrieve this covered over sense and experience
of the political and to bring to light an interpretation of human freedom
which requires the political as the space for its development. What I will
try to show is that Arendt's conception of political freedom can be seen
as beginning to fill in the gap left by previous theorists, by beginning to
formulate an explanation and justification of the possibility of the critic's
freedom. Thus, the ground of the critic's necessary freedom will be
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located in the political, rather than the purely theoretical realm. Both
philosophical critique and political action are grounded in, presuppose,
and attempt to instantiate human freedom. Furthermore, an ontological
relation between theoretical critique and the practical-political can be
elaborated in terms of the paradoxical structure of human freedom as
Arendt theorizes it. I intend to show that her idiosyncratic and original
interpretation of freedom offers provocative possibilities for the
understanding of both theoretical and practical human reality, and, in
particular, for the critic's capacity to transcend the reality in which she is
embedded, in order to propose alternatives.
The Critic's Immanence in "The Human Condition"
Arendt begins The Human Condition 213 with a prologue stressing
the essential connectedness of humanity to the earth. This lesson, in
spite of its apparent obviousness, has been, for the most part, little
recognized in philosophical writing. Arendt's reminder alerts us to what
must be taken as a fundamental axiom of theory— that theory is a
product of earthly beings who are necessarily tied to nature and to each
other as a condition for survival and for meaningfulness. By "human
conditions," Arendt does not mean "human nature," the possibility of
213 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958).
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which she rejects, but rather necessities which are conditional upon our
earthly existence. Thus, Arendt's existential structures of human
existence are not transcendent absolutes or "essences." Rather, she
seeks, as did Kant, for the necessary pre-conditions for what she takes
as "given." However, her given is not the self as a disembodied knower
or thinker, but as a concretely situated, embodied being. Thus, her
human conditions are contingent upon her phenomenology of a concrete
life world. Arendt's The Human Condition is an existential analysis, in the
Heideggerian sense of fundamental ontology, of the concrete
presuppositions of human "being-there."
What Arendt finds by means of her existential analysis of the
human condition is that our fundamental connectedness with others
constitutes us as political beings, beings who interact in a context of
shared values and meaningful articulations of these values. Arendt's
conception of the political presupposes a relation to others in the
fundamental ontological condition of plurality. Furthermore, this
fundamental existential structure of relationship does not determine a
necessarily hostile or antagonistic master-slave model of human relation,
nor even one which begins from an isolated self which then reaches out
to communicate with others. For Arendt, relationship lies at the heart of
"the human condition." Selves are never atomized on Arendt's view, but
225
are fundamentally in relation
.
214
In contrast to the traditional tendency of
modern liberal political theory toward atomization, Arendt's political is
first and foremost a sphere of human relatedness. Furthermore, this
relatedness is consolidated and developed by means of what is for
Arendt a basic political phenomenon — speech. As Arendt puts it,
"Wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political
by definition, for speech is what makes man a political being ." 215 Thus
for Arendt, the critic's power of speech already places theoretical critique
in the political, and not merely epistemic, realm of life.
However, according to Arendt, we've lost sight of the political
realm in the modern age. The rise of society and the social human being
has overshadowed the political as the proper sphere for public
interaction. Arendt argues that this usurpation of the political by the
social is due to the ascendancy of instrumentality as the basic scheme of
our rational comportment with the world. This ascendancy, in turn, can
be traced to the historical appearance and the philosophical acceptance
of a deep distinction between the life of action, the vita activa, and the
life of thought, the vita contemp/ativa, and the corresponding
hierarchizing of contemplation over action by philosophical and religious
214
ln fact, for Arendt, one of the hallmarks of totalitarianism is that it
isolates humans and thereby cripples their capacity for political action and
distorts their fundamental need and right for connection. See The Origins of
Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1951; 2nd ed. 1958).
215Arendt, The Human Condition , page 3.
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thought. Arendt s argument is that, within the historical transformation
from action as important in Ancient Greece to contemplation as the most
highly valued mode of being, and even throughout the reversal of this
hierarchy accomplished by Hegel and Marx, the distinctions within the
realm of action were lost in the shuffle. This loss entailed a diminution in
the meaning of the concept of action, so that all action was, by the
modern period, seen as action in accordance with necessity. In short, the
concept and recognition of the possibility of free human action was
overshadowed, as instrumental rationality in the service of survival and
world-making was taken as the guiding intelligence by means of which
human action could be understood, interpreted, and evaluated. And with
this loss, the place for this possibility, the political realm, had become
lost too.
Thus, Arendt's critical method shares common characteristics with
many of the theorists we have already discussed, who attempt a retrieval
of that which has been forgotten, repressed, excluded, or covered-over
by the currently existing tradition. Like Adorno and Horkheimer, Arendt
returns to the Ancients for the original possibilities of the theory she
attempts to critique. Like Foucault, she appeals to excluded knowledge,
and like Irigaray, she attempts to reveal that which has been repressed
by the tradition. We can therefore place Arendt in the camp of the
"defetishizing critics," for her basic move is to provide an alternative and
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plausible interpretation for that which has been already accepted as
understood. Furthermore, as a defetishizing critic, it is not necessary to
claim for her alternative theorization the status of absolutely certain or
necessary truth. She only needs to offer an account which is reasonable
and provides an alternative. Thus, Arendt tells a story of the political as
possible in another way than the tradition currently admits, but that is
latently contained in the tradition as an alternative origin.
The Immanence and Transcendence of Political Freedom
What then is the political? According to Arendt, in the ancient
Greek pre-Socratic conception, the polis was set up as the space of
power, defined as the potential for humans to distinguish and reveal
themselves as who they uniquely were. The political, as Arendt puts it,
"corresponds to " 216 the human condition which Arendt labels plurality,
which is the irreducible fact that we are equal yet distinct, and that each
of us is capable of expressing our distinctness. Each of us is unique at
the same time that we share basic characteristics as members of a
species. The condition of plurality thus entails a twofold structure of the
political; it is the realm of both performative expression and of
216Arendt uses this phrase to signify the peculiar relationship between a
structure, condition, or principle and its manifestation or effect. I will further
discuss this relationship which I attempt to understand as a type of "mimetic
causality" in the following.
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collaborative solidarity
.
217 As expressive, the political actor appears in
public space and aims at the manifestation of arete or excellence. As
collaborative, the political actor must call upon others for assistance in
carrying through her deed, as well as in determining the meaning, and
judging the significance and degree of glory pertaining to the action. The
political is for Arendt the place or dimension of life where freedom can be
enacted. Thus the political cannot be fully understood in Arendt's sense
without an understanding of what she means by freedom. As she herself
has summarized the connection, "The raison d'etre of politics is freedom,
and its field of experience is action ." 218
The Defetishization of Freedom
The philosophical tradition, according to Arendt, has lost or
covered over the concept of our authentic experiences of freedom, which
were recognized by the ancients. The current understanding of freedom,
both philosophical and pre-theoretical is problematic and paradoxical.
Freedom appears to be both necessary and impossible. As agents, we
must assume freedom; yet upon reflection, our actions appear to be
217 Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves identifies this dual aspect of Arendt's
political and believes that previous commentators have failed adequately to
recognize either one or the other aspect, thus yielding a distorted view of
Arendt's political theory. See Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves, The Political
Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (New York: Routledge, 1994).
218Hannah Arendt, "What Is Freedom?," in Between Past and Future (New
York: Viking Press, 1954) page146.
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consequences of either internal motives or external circumstances.
Thought itself, in its theoretical as well as its pre-theoretical form,
makes freedom disappear.
. ..
1,219 For Arendt, freedom is primarily an
attribute of action rather than of thought. Freedom is only alive and real
in human affairs, in the political.
The field where freedom has always been known, not as a
problem, to be sure, but as a fact of everyday life, is the political
realm. And even today, whether we know it or not, the question
of politics and the fact that man is a being endowed with the gift
of action must always be present to our mind when we speak of
the problem of freedom; for action and politics, among all the
capabilities and potentialities of human life, are the only things of
which we could not even conceive without at least assuming that
freedom exists, and we can hardly touch a single political issue
without, implicitly or explicitly, touching upon an issue of man's
liberty. 220
In fact, the philosophical focus on freedom as a metaphysical topic
and problem came historically late. There is no such concern in ancient
philosophy until the time of Augustine and St. Paul. Arendt thus sees
inner freedom, the focus of the later metaphysical tradition, to be a
derived phenomenon, originally the result of alienation from the worldly
political realm where freedom may be experienced as a fact. Freedom of
the will, the kind recognized by philosophy, is therefore something like a
219Arendt, "What Is Freedom?," page 145.
220Arendt, "What Is Freedom?," page146.
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wish fulfillment, a fantasy compensation for those denied real
freedom
.
221 Furthermore, it is this identification of freedom with free will
on the part of the philosophical tradition that led to the further
identification of freedom with sovereignty, for the attainment of inner
freedom was seen to be the way to escape from the control and
influence of others to become self-sufficient, and to attain the ideal of
complete mastery. The identification of freedom with sovereignty,
according to Arendt entails a dilemma: either no one is free (for no one is
completely sovereign; our sovereignty is limited by plurality), or freedom
requires domination over others. The structure of this dilemma echoes
that of the philosophical critic— either we are completely determined or
we are capable of a transcendence of a kind that Arendt believes to be
mistaken and illegitimate. The problem, as Arendt sees it, is in the kind of
transcendence or freedom presupposed and desired by the tradition.
What Arendt offers is therefore an alternative interpretation of
transcendent freedom and an explanation of its possibility. The traditional
valorization of control, domination, mastery, sovereignty, self-sufficiency,
and separation are seen by Arendt to be especially pernicious, and to
prevent both the theoretical recognition and the political-practical
instantiation of the possibility of authentic human freedom. Arendt would
221 Arendt sees this type of freedom, theoretically developed by the Stoics,
to be analogous to the kind of happiness claimed by the Christian martyrs. For a
slave to claim "inner freedom" is like a Christian martyr to claim happiness while
being roasted alive in the Phaleric Bull. See The Human Condition page 235.
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like to bring into philosophical focus (and indeed into common public
practice) a kind of freedom which is neither domination over others, nor
over even the self by the sovereign will. According to Arendt,
Within the conceptual framework of traditional philosophy, it is
indeed very difficult to understand how freedom and non-
sovereignty can exist together or, to put it another way, how
freedom could have been given to men under the condition of
non-sovereignty. Actually it is as unrealistic to deny freedom
because of the fact of human non-sovereignty as it is dangerous
to believe that one can be free— as an individual or as a
group— only if he is sovereign. . . Under human conditions, which
are determined by the fact that not man but men live on the
earth, freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they
cannot even exist simultaneously. Where men wish to be
sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must
submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual will
with which I force myself, or the "general will" of an organized
group. If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they
must renounce. 222
The Dual Nature of Free Action
That Arendt's theory of freedom stresses its non-sovereign
character can perhaps be seen more clearly in her analysis of the dual
nature of free action. Again in correspondence with the twofold structure
of plurality which determines both human connectedness and distinction,
free action on Arendt's view encompasses two parts. In keeping with her
222Arendt, The Human Condition , page 164.
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methodological commitment to concrete everydayness and the actual
world of praxis, Arendt returns to ordinary linguistic usage in antiquity,
where she finds that both the Greeks and Romans had two different
words for action. In both ancient tongues, action is conceived in two
parts, the first of which is the introduction of something entirely new,
and the second of which is the carrying through, with the help of others,
of what had been begun. Free action is both spontaneous and
cooperative, for Arendt, both autonomous and relational. Thus an
elaboration of the fundamental human condition of plurality, through its
manifestation in the political, points to two other basic human conditions
which, for Arendt are equally as important as plurality, and these are
natality, the fact that we are born, and, what Sela Benhabib calls
narrativity, or the "web" of preexisting meaningful human relationships
into which we must act . 223
Natality, according to Arendt, encodes both the facts that we are
born into our historical situatedness as earthly and embodied beings, yet
we are capable of free action as well. This freedom, according to Arendt,
is expressed in the human capacity to begin something new. Arendt finds
this capacity to be essential to both the Greek and Roman political
experiences of freedom. Turning to Augustine, Arendt is able to find an
223Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York: Routledge, 1992) pages
90-95.
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account of this Roman concept of freedom as beginning. For Augustine,
freedom was not an attribute of will or the inner self, but was first and
foremost a fundamental capacity of human life. According to Arendt,
In the Cjty of God, Augustine, as is only natural, speaks more
from the background of specifically Roman experiences than in
any of his other writings, and freedom is conceived there not as
an inner human disposition but as a character of human existence
in the world. Man does not possess freedom so much as he, or
better his coming into the world, is equated with the appearance
of freedom in the universe; man is free because he is a beginning
and was so created after the universe had already come into
existence. ... In the birth of each man this initial beginning is
reaffirmed, because in each instance something new comes into
an already existing world which will continue to exist after each
individual's death. Because he is a beginning, man can begin; to
be human and to be free are one and the same. God created man
in order to introduce into the world the faculty of beginning:
freedom.
Freedom as Mimesis
What are we to make of this strange argument and Arendt's
reliance on it? "Because he is a beginning, man can begin. . ." The
assumption is that since we are ourselves an instance of free action (a
product of God's freedom according to Augustine), we ourselves have
the capacity to act freely, to initiate something new, and to instantiate
freedom. Augustine's use of this argument is perhaps not so strange,
since he is able to provide a causal link to connect our existence with our
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capacity for free action as one of our attributes. Since for Augustine we
are manifestations of God's freedom, made in His image, He gave us the
gift of freedom. But Arendt, as a secular political philosopher, is not
entitled to appeal to this kind of supernatural causality, nor does she ever
attempt to invoke it. Yet again, in The Human Condition, Arendt appeals
to an apparent, but unexplained causal connection.
The fact that man is capable of action means that the
unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform
what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only
because each man is unique, so that with each birth something
uniquely new comes into the world. 224
How does our being unique, something new, account for our
possession of the capacity for free action? What causal mechanism is at
work here? There seems to be a gap in this account
,
225 for it seems
perfectly reasonable to hold that, although each of us in unique, our life
scripts have been pre-written either by God or by the laws of natural
scientific causal determinism stemming for our original characteristics.
What causal "glue" could ground Arendt's contention that because each
of us is a beginning, we have the capacity to begin? What I would like to
suggest is that this gap represents theoretical space which is yet to be
224Arendt, The Human Condition , page 178.
225Two other commentators have made mention of the need for an
explanation here. See Gabriel Tlaba, Politics and Freedom: Human Will and
Action in the Thought of Hannah Arendt : and B. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the
Search for a New Political Philosophy . (London: Macmillan, 1981).
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adequately elaborated, but which Arendt’s work has begun to explore
and which offers a possible explanatory concept which, as an alternative
to traditional forms of explanation, may be of use to critics in our
attempts to legitimate our own critical voices with respect to the
tradition, as well as to uncover and nurture instances of free action
which have gone unrecognized by traditional theory.
Free action, according to Arendt, is action on "principle." It is not
reducible to its goal (although action may seek a goal); nor is it reducible
to its motive (although motives may be implicated in action). To act on
principle, then, is not to be determined or motivated, but to be "inspired
from without." And to act on inspiration is to bring into being that
principle which inspires you. Thus, according to Arendt, freedom comes
into being only with free action. It is neither an immanent possession of
the subject, nor a transcendent absolute that preexists the subject, but is
something that is created by our attempts to imitate the beginning that
we see ourselves to be. Thus freedom, like such other principles as love,
honor, glory, duty, comes into being only insofar as we attempt to act
according to our assumption of its principle. This principle does not have
an absolute existence, independent of our actions, nor is it completely
determined by or reducible to any of our particular acts. It is both
transcendently normative, as it inspires us to act in imitation of our
conception of it; and it is also subject for its existence to our concrete
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attempts to instantiate it. Freedom exists as what we could call an
intentional object, brought into being only as we actively presuppose it;
yet it exerts a causal-normative force over our ability to act. Yet this
causality is not reducible to a mechanistic, linear causality, and so it
eludes articulation in current theoretical terms. 226
Storytelling, Rather than Theory
This peculiar relationship of structural similarity between the
human actor's natality and the capacity for free action is again expressed
in Arendt's elaboration of the complementary existential structure of
narrativity, which, as we have seen, is the ontological condition for
action's necessary human interrelatedness. This human interrelatedness
becomes the stuff of stories for Arendt, and it is within stories that we
find expressed and preserved human freedom. Arendt's notion of the
relation between an actor and his/her life story revolves around her
concept of the "who" which is disclosed in action. According to Arendt,
when a person acts, inserts herself into the world by means of action
226Perhaps the only sustained theoretical attempt to analyze this typ of
causal connection can be found in structuralism, specifically Althusser's reading
of Marx's concept of "Darstellung," or structural causality. This concept refers
to the way in which a larger social structure (e.g., the relations of production)
that is brought into being by human activity has causal force over the
individuals whose actions created it. See Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar,
Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster, (New York: Pantheon, a
division of Random House, 1970). Also see Frederic Jameson, The Political
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act , (New York: Cornell
University Press), 1981, for a discussion of Althusser's analysis.
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and speech, what is disclosed exceeds any concrete qualities or
attributes. Action is the way in which every human attains an identity,
which is based on the uniqueness of each individual. When we want to
describe in speech who someone is, according to Arendt, we inevitably
recount a list of qualities which that individual may share with others.
The specificity of the individual eludes us, and yet it is this unique
specificity that guides our choice of words as that which we are
attempting to capture in our description.
The manifestation of who the speaker and doer unexchangeably
is, though it is plainly visible, retains a curious intangibility that
confounds all efforts toward unequivocal verbal expression. The
moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary
leads us astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a
description of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him;
we begin to describe a type or a "character" in the old meaning of
the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes
us.
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This who is irreducible to the what which we may describe, yet it is this
who which makes itself manifest in human action and speech. Because
this who eludes the type of description appropriate to natural and
inanimate things, the way in which it may be made present or brought to
life in the absence of the actor is through the telling of the actor's life
story. According to Arendt, we know who Socrates is better than we do
227Arendt, The Human Condition , page 181.
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Aristotle, in spite of the fact that we have Aristotle's writings expressing
his philosophical positions. This is because we have Socrates’ life story,
which reveals to us his unique person as manifest in the representation
of his actions and words.
The specific revelatory quality of action and speech, the
implicit manifestation of the agent and speaker, is so indissolubly
tied to the living flux of action and speaking that it can be
represented and "reified" only through a kind of repetition, the
imitation or mimesis, which according to Aristotle prevails in all
arts but is actually appropriate only to drama, whose very name
(from the Greek verb dran "to act") indicates that play-acting
actually is an imitation of acting. 228
Furthermore, this who someone is, as revealed in speech and
action, is not completely under the control of the subject of the action.
The actor reveals this who to others, and to herself, only by means of
the action. Yet the action's meaning, significance, and consequences are
never entirely predictable. Action inserts itself into a world of human
relations, and as such calls up other actions in response and is subject to
the meaning determinations of others. The actor is not the sole author of
his or her life story, in the same way in which a theorist believes she may
control her theoretical output.
The disclosure of the "who" through speech, and the setting of a
new beginning through action, always fall into an already existing
web where their immediate consequences can be felt. Together
228Arendt, The Human Condition p. 1 87.
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they start a new process which eventually emerges as the unique
life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all
those with whom he comes into contact. It is because of this
already existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable,
conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves
its purpose; but it is also because of this medium, in which action
alone is real, that it "produces" stories with or without intention
as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things.
. . . Nobody is
the author or producer of his own life story. 229
The relation between an actor and his or her life story is neither
totally one of authorship, nor one of passive experiencing. Rather, I am
the subject of my story in the twofold meaning of the term subject , both
its active source or cause and its passive sufferer. This twofold structure
mimics the structure of action as well, for human action cannot be
understood solely in terms of calculated, instrumental implementation of
a means toward an end or goal, nor as the necessary and inevitable
effect of some motivation, whether the motive force be unconscious and
instinctual or the direct result of conscious and deliberate thought or will.
This is not to say that there is no element of will, thought, aim, instinct,
or drive in action; only that action is not completely reducible to any of
these factors as sole determinations. Human action cannot be fully
understood in terms of instrumental-efficient causality. To so reduce the
significance of action is, for Arendt, to capture not action, but behavior,
229Arendt. The Human Condition , page 184.
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and with such a behavioral analysis, the possibility of a glimpse of human
freedom is lost. To reduce action to motive or goal is to lose the
uniqueness of the individual, the contextualized significance of the action
for others, and the principle which is created by and kept within
existence by the action which it inspires.
Motives and aims, no matter how pure or how grandiose, are
never unique; like psychological qualities, they are typical,
characteristic of different types of persons. 230
What is the connection between unique individuality and free
action? According to Arendt, freedom is not reducible to a possession or
attribute of the subject in the manner of the substance/accidents relation.
Any accident or property of an individual subject could just as well be a
property of another. The unique identity of an individual goes beyond the
sum of all her properties for Arendt. This includes the property of free
will. Theoretical attempts to ground freedom in the subject as a capacity
of subjectivity have usually located it in the will, but according to Arendt,
this attempt has faltered, since it is misguided. The problem with the
doctrine of free will is that once free will enters the empirical world and
is actualized, freedom is lost, for the action, according to Arendt, comes
under the sway of material causal determinants. And if we further
attempt to insist upon the reality of freedom, while simultaneously
accepting the causal determination of our empirical actions, freedom
230Arendt, The Human Condition , page 206.
241
becomes grounded in some kind of transcendental mystery of which we
must remain necessarily ignorant, as in Kant's theory of the noumenal
seif. According to this type of salvaging of freedom, since we can never
get "behind ourselves," so to speak, to know completely the wellsprings
of our actions, we must assume that we are free. This lack of knowledge
gives us the appearance of freedom as spontaneity. However, viewed in
this way, that is, knowing that we don't know, must entail a loss of
freedom, for freedom has traditionally been thought of as incompatible
with ignorance, and as involving control and mastery over the external
causes of our actions, in short, of autonomy. But the mastery of external
forces requires knowledge. The theory which equates freedom with
ignorance of the ultimate ground of our actions is therefore
unsatisfactory; for freedom strikes us as incompatible with ignorance.
If Arendt is correct, this irreducibility of the who revealed in action
eludes theoretical articulation, for it requires the assumption of human
freedom. The free human subject is, however, represented and
representable in the life story of an individual actor. 231 A story, unlike a
theoretical account, narrates the sequence of a life's events as they
231 Although I find the recent work by Bonnie Honig to be a move in the right
direction in its appropriation of Arendt for feminist theory, I disagree with her
view that for Arendt, there is no subject, self, or "doer behind the deed."
Arendt's subject is elastic, in flux and formation, and open to change and
definition through its actions, but this concept is, I believe, more in keeping with
existentialism's self-transcending subject than post-modernism's schizophrenic
non-subject. See Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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unfold and insert themselves into the larger text, the context, of other
lives. A narrative, unlike a determinist theoretical explanation, preserves
the moment of freedom in action, by resisting the reduction of this
freedom either to an inevitable determinant or function of the subject's
sovereign will or to the mere play of events on which the subject's action
has no effect. Since action is made manifest and its freedom preserved
only in a story, action must be recognized as essentially narrative. Action
is fundamentally symbolic, meaningful, textual, in a way which is
obscured by any rigid distinction between theory and practice.
We have seen that the relationship between an individual and
his/her life story is neither solely one of authorship, nor of passive
suffering, but is both active and passive subjectivity and subjection. A
narrative bears the same bipolar and ambiguous relationship to its hero as
does free action to the agent of action. For this reason, Arendt's
conception of freedom is not grounded in a traditional purely theoretical
manner. She never articulates a theory which justifies her contention that
we are capable of freedom but leaves open a gap in her theoretical
account. The burden of legitimation is thereby placed (in part) upon her
descriptive narrative of instances of freedom. 232 Freedom, on Arendt's
view can only be represented or imitated narratively. In fact, Arendt's
232See Arendt, Men in Dark Times . (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanoviceh,
1968), for examples of Arendt's narrative descriptions of the lives of free
actors.
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style and method have themselves been characterized as narrative.
According to Seyla Benhabib, with whom I wholeheartedly agree in this
respect, Arendt's historiography is an exercise in the political act of
"storytelling," rather than the "nostalgic history of decline" for which it is
frequently taken . 233 Thus Arendt depicts instances of freedom in the
stories she tells of ancient politics. Benhabib sees Arendt's work as "re-
membering," that is, a putting together the "members" of a whole, "a
rethinking which sets free the lost potentials of the past ." 234 Thus
Arendt's work functions as critique by demonstrating the possibility of an
alternative mode of both practical and theoretical political engagement.
Arendt's style of critique is one which thereby succeeds to a degree in
escaping the critic's problem of legitimation.
Forgiving and Promising as Aspects of Critique
The intertextuality of human action, like the unique distinctness of
the agent of action, and the newness, unexpectedness, and
unpredictability of the action's occurrence, constitute action's basic
human conditions on Arendt's view. Plurality, natality, and "narrativity"
are presupposed in every human action. These ontological preconditions
of action imply two other inherent characteristics of action:
233Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self , page 92.
234Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self , page 92.
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unpredictability and irreversibility. Action is unpredictable and
irreversible
— it is in fact for Arendt "miraculous," in the precise sense
which she gives to this word, as interrupting automatic processes
.
235
Action breaks into causal deterministic chain of events, and begins new
processes. Because these new processes are subject to causal laws, their
continuing movement of implication and effect cannot be recalled.
Because these new processes insert themselves into a human network,
where action on the part of others is called up in response, they are
unpredictable. Unpredictability and irreversibility constitute the major
risks of action.
Action is risky as everyone knows, but this risk, both for the agent
of action, and for its recipients, is somewhat mitigated by two human
capacities which Arendt analyzes as components of the political life:
forgiveness and promising. Forgiveness stops the automatic chain
created by an action and inserts itself into actuality in order to create a
new beginning. It frees the actor from the consequences of her action, as
well as the forgiver from the automatic behavior of simple reaction.
Forgiveness is itself an action, according to Arendt, and is grounded in
the human condition of natality . 236 Promising is another political capacity
which serves to avert the risk which free action poses. Promising
235Arendt, "What Is Freedom?," page 169.
236Arendt, The Fluman Condition , page 237.
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attempts to stabilize the uncertain and uncontrollable consequences set
off by action. It also helps to tame the "unreliability" of human beings
"who never can guarantee today who they will be tomorrow ." 237
Promising and forgiving are aspects of the miracle of human freedom,
and, as such, are political acts according to Arendt.
If we see these two features of political action as applicable to our
understanding of the practice of critique, the critic's dilemma loses some
of its sting. Thus, the critic's practice embraces the risks inherent in free
action by engaging in an activity which she knows may be without
theoretical justification. As such, the critique's transcendent moment is
likely to be missed by its recipients, who may attempt to deny its
legitimacy, either by interpreting the critique as nothing new or by
characterizing it as an unrealistic and utopian pipe dream. Thus the two
horns of the critical dilemma constitute a risk that the critic must take.
But to charge the critic with either horn is to fail to allow for the
possibility that critique is free political action of the sort that Arendt
describes. If we accept the possibility of Arendt's type of freedom,
perhaps we can both forgive the critic her immanence and seek the
transcendent promise implied by the critique. Furthermore, the critic
herself must make use of forgiveness and promising in her relation to the
object of critique. The critic's immanent embeddedness in that which she
237Arendt, The Human Condition , page 244.
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critiques requires of her an attitude of forgiveness, if she is to allow
herself, as she must, to use some of the very terms, values, and
standards which she critiques. But the critic is also implicitly promising
the possibility of something better. As we have already seen in Chapter
One, every critique includes a utopian moment, such that the
understanding of a problem, untruth, or injustice is already a positive act
and a promise for the future.
Arendt's vision of political freedom is one which can help us to
understand and allow for the possibility of the immanent critic's
transcendence. This type of freedom allows the embodied, historically
situated, causally determined human actor to begin something radically
new and to bring into existence the principle of freedom. This freedom, if
Arendt is correct, cannot be grounded theoretically, for it necessarily
eludes the reductionist terms of theory. But to accept this type of
freedom as a political principle of action allows for the mimetic calling up
of its being, as we engage in action and tell stories about it. As we have
seen in the theorists we have previously discussed, the critical force of
their work is apparent insofar as it renders the status quo questionable.
But these same critics seem to falter when the question of theoretical
justification is raised. Perhaps it is time to give up the quest for
theoretical certainty and to recognize, as does Arendt, that the human
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actor is capable of freedoms that the purely theoretical mind cannot
adequately grasp or account for. Furthermore, the concept of mimetic
causality, which links the actor to her freedom of action, can be seen to
offer a possibility of expanding the notion of rational ground beyond the
too narrow confines of the purely theoretical. I intend to conclude the
dissertation with a summary of this possibility.
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CHAPTER 6
PRAXIS, MIMESIS, TRANSCENDENCE
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the activity of
critique eludes a theoretical grounding or justification. In cases where the
object of critique is a totality of which the critique is itself a part, the
necessary transcendence cannot be accounted for. The various critics I
have examined oscillate between the two terms of the critical dilemma.
Adorno and Horkheimer, for example, cannot adequately envision an
alternative type of rationality to the instrumental one they find in force at
the origins of Western thought (as exemplified in their analysis of
Odysseus). Instead they point out the dialectical intermixture of reason
and myth that governs Western thinking. Their hope for a reconciliation
between estranged nature and instrumental reason relies on a faith in the
dialectic. This faith cannot be theoretically justified, since theory cannot,
on their account, transcend its immanence in this dialectical relation that
necessarily contains both the barbaric and the rational elements.
Kant similarly, in focusing on the subjective-critical perspective as
the author of the critical capacity, cannot theoretically justify the
transcendence required to engage in a critique of reason. Kant, like
Adorno and Horkheimer, sees reason as bifurcated — comprising both a
transcendent and immanent pole. For Adorno and Horkheimer, reason is
both mythical and instrumental; for Kant, it contains both the
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transcendental-critical perspective, and that of the empirical
consciousness. Kant s strategy is to adopt, in turn, each of these
perspectives and to attempt to use them to legitimate each other. I have
argued that this attempt fails. For the transcendence required to establish
the legitimacy of the empirical perspective cannot be upheld within the
restrictions that structure the empirical perspective's capacity for
knowledge; nor can the restrictions placed upon the empirical perspective
(which Kant argues are responsible for the legitimacy of the empirical
perspective's epistemic capacity) be maintained from within the
transcendental perspective. If transcendence is possible, the empirical
perspective becomes illegitimate when taken as the sole perspective
capable of achieving knowledge. If the empirical perspective is indeed the
only appropriate epistemic perspective, the transcendence required is
itself illegitimate. Kant's strategy oscillates between the two
perspectives, both of which are necessary, but neither of which can be
maintained. A concrete example of this oscillation is Kant's attempt at
refuting the charge of subjective idealism; he "dodged" the issue by
taking the charge of idealism to apply only to the empirical perspective.
Hegel, too, places the possibility of the transcendence required for
critique in the structure of cognitive consciousness. His attempt at
conducting a critique of the stages of knowledge that fall short of his
goal of the Absolute proceeds by following out the self-development of
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each of these forms. However this procedure cannot constitute a
theoretical justification of the ability of consciousness to achieve total or
absolute knowledge without already presupposing an acquaintance with
the Absolute as implicitly existing in each stage of consciousness.
Hegel's critique is circular and relies for its success on a faith in the
ability of the dialectic to self-overcome until it has reached absolute
truth. Furthermore, this attainment cannot be evaluated or justified until
the end of the dialectical journey has been reached. If we do not accept
Hegel's contention that spirit is currently in its final stage, we have no
access to the transcendent point of view required to evaluate his
achievement.
For Harding and the standpoint epistemologists, the transcendence
out of the patriarchal order which constitutes the object of their critique
is grounded in the dual consciousness of the feminist subject. The
standpoint epistemologists offer a theory that casts this consciousness
as bifurcated and capable of developing norms, standards, and values not
already operative in the male-centered tradition. However, the theoretical
basis for this bifurcated consciousness is not sufficient to justify the
claim that the feminist standpoint is superior to the traditional standpoint.
Thus Harding's arguments are structured in a circular manner; she
presupposes the superiority she is trying to establish. This presupposition
of superiority stems from her political-ethical commitment to the
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liberation of women as an oppressed class. Theoretically, the
epistemology she develops succumbs to the critical dilemma. Her belief
in the superiority of the feminist standpoint is based on an unfounded
exemption of the feminist bias from the critical considerations which
render a masculinist bias inferior, and her strengthened concept of
objectivity is merely the traditional concept with the feminist bias tacked
on. "Strong objectivity" is not sufficient to the task of grounding a
feminist (as opposed to any other) standpoint— her presuppositions
regarding the proper subject of knowledge can only support a
perspectivist relativism, not the superiority of the feminist point of view.
I argued in Chapter 4 that Irigaray's "post-modern" feminism
represents an advance over the standpoint theorists in that she offers the
beginnings of a theoretical explanation for the possibility of
transcendence arising out of the immanence of the male-centered
tradition. Irigaray's psychoanalytic deconstruction of the tradition's
theory of the feminine points out the way in which the tradition harbors
as its latent other the repressed feminine principle. Furthermore,
Irigaray's use of a psychoanalytic method of reading the "symptoms" of
the tradition's repression of the feminine— the gaps and contradictions in
the traditional theory— gives her a technique whereby she gains access to
the latent and unconscious feminine principles and values. Thus Irigaray,
like the previously discussed theorists, makes use of both a transcendent
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and an immanent point of view. She mimics the feminine as it is
currently understood — via her use of "reproductive mimesis" and its
"hysterical" expression in an exaggeration of essential feminine
difference; and she productively attempts to develop the alternative
feminine principles which she has uncovered in the tradition's
unconscious. Irigaray thus represents a more positive, constructive form
of the activity of critique than the theorists I previously discussed.
However, this positive aspect of her work is still insufficiently
theoretically developed, and, as with the feminist standpoint theorists,
the feminine values she upholds cannot be established to be superior or
more true to reality— only to complement those already espoused by the
tradition. Irigaray therein also relies on a political commitment to
feminism for the legitimacy and force of her critique.
Political commitment is more explicit in the work of Foucault,
whose critical goal is professedly the creation of room in traditional
discourse for the positions of the oppressed, excluded, and marginalized.
Foucault's genealogical strategy functions in a manner similar to
Irigaray's use of psychoanalysis; it uncovers the excluded principles and
values which are immanent to, but covered over by the tradition of
political philosophy. The effect of Foucault's critical enterprise is to
delegitimize the tradition's pretensions to universality and necessity by
presenting, in the manner of a "defetishizing critic," a plausible
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alternative. Since Foucault denies any status of absolute truth for his
critical elaborations, he is able, in part, to elude the demands of the
critical dilemma for a point of view which is epistemically superior to the
object of his critique. Nonetheless, the theoretical requirement for a
justification of the implicit hope that the tradition will acknowledge the
legitimacy of the viewpoints of the oppressed and excluded-as well as
Foucault's radically alternative theory of power— remains in force.
Without this theoretical justification, there is no reason for preferring
Foucault's alternative over the tradition which it is meant to displace
from its position of hegemony. Thus Foucault engages in critical practice,
but is unable theoretically to justify this practice without an appeal to his
political commitment.
Arendt explicitly proclaims the political dimension of human life to
be the ground and source of human freedom. For Arendt, the immanence
of the critic and human actor in the concrete life world of human
relations and historical situatedness is not an obstacle to be overcome if
freedom is to be possible. It is the very precondition of free action. The
transcendent freedom required by the critic requires an acceptance of our
earthly being according to the principles of natality, plurality, and
narrativity. Arendtian theory points to the possibility of elaborating a
theory of human freedom which can account for the critic's immanent
transcendence. Thus, I have analyzed Arendt as beginning to offer an
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account of the type of situated or immanent freedom necessary to the
activity of critique. Although this account remains underdeveloped in
Arendt, her positive contribution was to identify the place where such an
account may come into being in the gap between natality and free
action. Since this gap exists, Arendt's view of freedom must also be
found to be theoretically without ground, and to point to the necessity of
a political commitment to the possibility of freedom. It therefore remains
to further theoretical work more completely to elaborate this freedom.
Freedom must always be seen to be an attribute of the political and
practical, rather than the purely epistemic, dimension of life. Thus a
rational grounding of critique, in Arendtian terms, must broaden the
concept of reason to include the political.
As I framed the problem in Chapter One, the dilemma of critique
can be seen as an instance of the larger crisis of reason. Reason has lost
its foundation and autonomy, since it has increasingly been shown to be
historically situated, implicated in, and determined by the nonrational.
Thus rational critique appears itself always to be nonrationally motivated
and determined. Paradoxically, the very ability of critique to see this
nonrational determination presupposes its own transcendence out of the
factors which determine it. Critique appears to the purely theoretical
mind to be impossible; yet this impossibility is obviously achievable.
255
The solution is to give up an attempt at purely theoretical
justification in the already existing terms of the philosophical tradition
and to recognize the possibility of transcendence as immanent to our
embeddedness in the human situation. The theorists I have examined in
the dissertation have all understood their inability to escape completely
the confines of the tradition they were critiquing; yet at the same time
they were able to engage in critique by self-consciously remaining
immanent. Although we have seen these attempts falter on the question
of theoretical ground, we cannot deny that these critics practically
attained a critical force, rendering the objects of their critiques less firmly
established than before the critiques were conducted. All the critics we
have discussed — whether their targets were purely epistemological,
ideological, or political — engaged in a form of "defetishizing critique," in
which the self-certainty of the status quo was shaken by their work.
Since this practical actuality of critique is sufficient to establish its
possibility, the theoretical problem becomes how to account for it.
I have begun to answer this question by drawing out of some of
the theorists I have discussed the potential and promise of new concepts
which could be further elaborated in order to provide a rational ground for
critical transcendence. Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer point to and
suggest the possibility of an enlargement of the concept of reason to
include what the tradition deems to be its opposite-myth and mimesis.
This enlarged reason will constitute a reconciliation with nature— its
256
estranged other— in such a way that such traditional attributes of
instrumental reason as domination and oppression will be eliminated.
Although this vision is never fully or theoretically developed in Adorno or
Horkheimer, it is there as a potentiality, and as such, it should be seen as
calling for development.
Kant's promise of the possibility of critical transcendence leaves
the theoretical, epistemological realm altogether, and places this
possibility in the transcendental preconditions of knowledge and in the
necessary positing of the existence of a noumenal agent. Kant's critical
philosophy as a whole (comprising the three "critiques") locates the
freedom crucial to the noumenal agent in the ethical, rather than the
epistemological realm. But the autonomy of the three spheres Kant
proposes (the epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic) cannot be
maintained, for the epistemological must make use of the capacity for
freedom which it alone cannot ground. Practical reason therefore, for
Kant, is "higher" than theoretical reason, and so the epistemological
critique of pure reason must be seen to be an ethical and practical, as
much as a theoretical, activity. To this extent Kant's critical philosophy
supports my contention that critique itself necessarily has a practical
component. The challenge is to articulate this necessary connection
between the practical and theoretical aspects of reason, and to determine
why Kant thought it necessary to keep them separate.
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Similarly, feminist theory engages in the positive, constructive task
of elaborating the norms, values, methods, and principles which offer
new ways of theorizing the alternative reality that will ultimately justify
the feminist critical vision. Harding, for example, points to the need to
develop a new epistemology sufficient to the task of normatively
determining the political biases that lead to increased knowledge
.
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Objectivity itself, however, will need to be recast more radically than
Harding has done; the subject/object dualism she presupposes will need
to be abandoned in order to account for the way in which the object of
knowledge is constructed in accord with political biases. Irigaray is more
productive than Harding. Irigaray's alternative feminine economy bases
itself on values that the patriarchal theoretical tradition has neglected.
These values— fluidity, contiguity, touch, metonymy— may serve to
structure a new metaphysics brought into being on the basis of feminine
experience. The theoretical task to develop more fully this alternative
metaphysics remains for future work.
It is the concept of mimesis, as I have uncovered it in Adorno and
Horkheimer, Irigaray, and Arendt, that I find to be the most promising of
the new conceptual directions that we may take in theorizing a
238Richard Rorty believes that epistemology must be abandoned altogether,
since it is inherently foundationalist in a no longer supportable way. He sees the
new philosophical paradigm which will replace epistemology to be hermeneutics
and to be concerned primarily with edification rather than contributing to
knowledge. See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1079).
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transcendent freedom accessible to immanently situated rational beings.
Mimesis functions, in Irigaray, as a critical strategy for expressing the
failure of patriarchal theory to capture the feminine principle it pretends
to know. Mimesis serves as refutation in Irigaray. Her mimicking of
patriarchal discourse about the feminine functions to refute the position
of that discourse on the subjectivity of women. According to the male
dominated tradition of both metaphysics and psychoanalytic theory,
women are insufficiently ethically developed to speak meaningfully or to
author the products of culture. Furthermore, according to these
traditional theories, women's experiences can never be other than the
way they are described by male-authored norms. Irigaray's mimesis
repeats the male tradition's pronouncements on women, and thereby
demonstrates their absurdity and bias; the act of exaggerated repetition
performatively reveals the author of such repetition to be a subject with
her own point of view. Mimesis and hysteria convey an "excess" of
meaning beyond what the words signify; this excess points to a trapped
subjectivity whose hysteria conveys her entrapment in a discourse which
is revealed as insufficient to express her full meaning.
Arendt's use of mimesis is, of course, quite different from
Irigaray's. Arendt advocates the use of mimesis as a methodological
strategy capable of capturing the freedom of the political actor in a way
which is impossible for political and philosophical (metaphysical) theory.
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Storytelling is endorsed and used by Arendt as a replacement for
traditional theoretical explanation. But I argued that the possibility of a
new kind of theoretical explanation is present in Arendt's work. Arendt
appeals to mimesis as an explanatory concept crucial to her theoretical
position on the nature of freedom. Thus, I have analyzed Arendt as
outlining a theory of "mimetic causality" that can account for the
relations among the existential structure of natality, the principle of
freedom, and the actions of the human agent. This mimetic causality will
explain the way in which freedom comes into being as a reflection of the
uniqueness of each individual. Freedom is what I have called an
"intentional object," for it exists only insofar as it is presupposed and
enacted . 239 Political freedom, according to Arendt, comes into being only
with the actions of human agents. It is not a faculty of the will or a
possession of the subject. Rather it is an expression of the subject's
natality— the fact that each of us is born into the world as a new
beginning. Thus our ability to begin anew is a mimetic repetition of the
beginning we each represent. When we engage in action, we express this
239This type of existence may capture what Foucault means by power being
subject to its expression. Power is not an object possessed by individuals or
institutions, for Foucault. Rather it can only be expressed, in which case it
becomes a force in its own right. Thus power has eluded adequate theoretical
analysis, according to Foucault. This type of existence may also be applicable to
the problem in the Platonic theory of the Forms. According to Plato, the
particulars imitate the Forms (which is why they are ontologically inferior);
however the mode of this imitation has remained problematic and controversial
in Plato scholarship.
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aspect of ourselves in such a way as to escape the confines of
mechanistic determinism. Action for Arendt is "miraculous," and, as
such, cannot be predicted, controlled, or fully expressed in the terms of
current political theory. This type of causality suggested by Arendt
remains to be developed, but to see it as a form of mimetic repetition is a
start.
My contribution in this dissertation has been primarily negative and
critical, rather than constructive. I have analyzed ways in which the
theorists studied have failed to provide a purely theoretical grounding for
their critical philosophies. As such, this dissertation has itself been an
exercise in critique, which has pointed out the contradictions and failures
evident in these critical theories' attempts to establish their own
legitimacy. But I have also attempted to offer some preliminary directions
toward a positive elaboration that will fill in the space opened by what I
see to be the crisis of critique. I believe wholeheartedly in the possibility
of doing critical philosophy beyond the dilemma of legitimation. The
activity of critique is never entirely theoretical, but always also a political
enterprise. Pure theory, as it stands, can no longer play a foundational
role. Our activities— even our activities as thinkers and knowers— are
inextricably implicated in our political biases. The political aspect of
critique, and indeed of all knowledge production, must be kept
continually in view; our attempts to understand our cognitive activities
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must draw upon our political selves for the development of the new
concepts and standards adequate to this challenge. Contemporary
philosophy, if it is to outflank the dilemma of critique and of reason, is in
need of new modes of justification and normativity. But this is as it
should be. As Jean-Francois Lyotard reminds us, ". .
.
philosophical
discourse obeys a fundamental rule, namely that it must be in search of
its rule. Or, if you prefer: its rule is that what is at stake is its rule." 240 It
is precisely this difficult task of the construction of new standards which
lies before us now.
240Jean Francois Lyotard, "The Sign in History," in Post-Structuralism and
the Question of History , page 163.
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